乐鱼 体育

As the receding ice conditions allow for (relatively) safer navigation along the Arctic鈥檚 waterways for longer periods of time and technological progression in the development of smart submarines continues unabatedly, seems to have begun to take hold in the region; a development that could turn the region鈥檚 maritime domain into a critical global data chokepoint. For its part, NATO, which is currently in the of fine-tuning its High North strategy, needs to recognise the importance of the region as an emerging global data nerve centre and devise a well-defined plan for the protection of these cables. Failure to do so would jeopardise the Alliance鈥檚 air, land and naval operations and/or presence in the region.

Arctic cables matter for a number of reasons. They are considerably than those that traverse through the established routes like the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca. Hence, they tend to substantially increase the speed of data transfer between Europe, Asia and North America. They are also to malfunctioning and/or interruption. Only a handful of states have the required capabilities for carrying out sabotage operations in the Arctic Ocean while the lower volume of vessel鈥� traffic as well as the Arctic鈥檚 own geological specificities reduce the likelihood of damage by either anchors or undersea earthquakes.

Thanks to their ability to accelerate intercontinental data transfers, moreover, operationalisation of these cables would directly industries such as telecommunication, space, and defence. In a sense, subsea cables are nothing short of strategic and intelligence assets that enable countries which control them, or through whose territories they pass, to intercept data, better defend and monitor the global cyberspace, and develop their space industries.

As data strategic parity with energy for economic growth and national security, similarly, sustained access to data will be a critical prerequisite for both the of cross border infrastructural networks and one鈥檚 ability to standardise the use of data and digital applications. This is best evident in the case of China鈥檚 Digital Silk Road initiative which has prompted Chinese companies to their investment in, and ownership of, cellular wireless infrastructures, submarine and terrestrial cables, and data centres within the broader BRI framework   

Given the above, it is a matter of prudent decision making for NATO to incorporate the protection of undersea cables into its future Arctic strategy. Put broadly, one can identify two categories of threats in relation to the subsea cables in the Arctic: states abilities to intercept data and/or damage the cables and the ownership structures of the current and future projects. NATO鈥檚 efforts at its political role could receive a much-needed boost if the Alliance positions itself to become the venue of choice for high level talks with regard to the latter. However, it is the former that ought to take the center stage in NATO鈥檚 deliberations not least because it better suits its of proactive defence against hybrid threats in the Euro-Atlantic zone.

According to a by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, adversaries such as Russia could be motivated to damage or hack undersea cables in order to gain access to trade and military secrets. This poses a threat on an operational level, especially in the initial phase of a conflict, and tactical level by bringing socio-economic life to a standstill. Adding credibility to such assertions is the fact that Moscow has been to tap undersea cables and in fact it is highly to have had a direct role in the recent outage of undersea cables between Svalbard and mainland Norway.

As such, NATO needs to adopt a proactive stance on ensuring the security of Arctic鈥檚 future and current cables not least because it is set to become the most dominant security actor in the region once Finland and Sweden membership processes are finalised. Equally important is the fact that there exists for the usage and repair of (damaged) undersea cables in times of conflict. To this end, NATO must increase its naval assets in the Arctic so it can surveil the region鈥檚 waterways better. This could be done as part of its current push for the of an Enhanced Forward Presence in Norway as well as its investment for the development and deployment of more high tech assets in its naval operations. More importantly, member states, especially the seven Arctic nations, must facilitate NATO鈥檚 participation in repairing the damaged cables by classifying such activities as matters of national security. Doing so has the added advantage of paving the way for the Alliance to contribute to the development of a legal framework for the governance of undersea cables.