The UK has provided assistance to Ukraine since 2014, with donations of many high-end weapons systems. This article examines how the UK鈥檚 crucial role as one of Kyiv鈥檚 foremost allies has provided the UK Government with the impetus to quickly rebuild relations with the EU in addition to supporting Ukraine鈥檚 advances on the front lines.
The need for post-Brexit leadership combined with its willingness to transfer increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to Ukraine reasserts the United Kingdom鈥檚 prominent role within European security. London鈥檚 desire to demonstrate its commitment to the rules-based order has allowed it to expand its aspirations for global leadership, having often been the first and fastest to provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) with donations from sleeping bags to cruise missiles. This approach, however, is not without risks. Should the US and major European allies not follow a similar tempo, the UK risks an overexertion of its stockpiles, thereby disrupting modernization plans and reducing combat readiness. Despite the risks, the UK鈥檚 crucial role as one of Kyiv鈥檚 foremost allies has provided the UK Government with the impetus to quickly rebuild relations with the EU in addition to supporting Ukraine鈥檚 advances on the front lines.
Since Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea in 2014, the UK has initiated two significant efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and training: Operations Orbital and Interflex. From its initiation in 2015 to suspension in February 2022, Operational Orbital over 22,000 AFU troops receive training by UK service personnel in Ukraine across several multi-domain joint training exercises. Critically, and unlike its successor, Orbital did not see the transfer of lethal aid, instead focusing on the AFU鈥檚 infantry and medic skill 鈥榗apacity鈥 to NATO standards. This would change in the weeks leading up to the 2022 invasion, with the provision of NLAW anti-tank systems proving integral to strengthening Ukraine鈥檚 anti-armor capabilities to the invasion.
The launch of Operation Interflex in June 2022 represented a dramatic expansion of aid and training, over $5 billion across 2022 and 2023 - far eclipsing the $250 million in bilateral aid provided between 2010 and 2021. Working in conjunction with 'international partner forces,鈥 including Australia and New Zealand, Interflex has over 17,000 recruits to complete a five-week training course run in the UK, amid a wider international effort which has already seen the of 67,000 troops in over 30 countries.
Running parallel to the expansion in training opportunities, the UK has also dramatically ramped up its provision of lethal aid. In doing so, London has led by example in providing the AFU with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, arguably providing the impetus for its allies to follow suit. For example, the mid-January that London would send Kyiv Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) saw Germany make a commitment in donating Leopard 2 tanks just 10 days later. Whilst it is impossible to say how much the UK鈥檚 move informed German Minister of Defence Pistorius鈥 to grant Leopard re-export licenses, London鈥檚 ability to act as a pace-setting unilateral donor has undoubtedly played a role.
The UK has also supported Kyiv extensively in boosting Ukrainian air power. In May it was also announced that the UK, alongside the Netherlands, agreed to an 鈥榠nternational coalition鈥 to procure and train Ukrainian pilots to use F-16 jets. This was the culmination of previous announcements by Downing Street that the UK would help the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) to enable greater interoperability with NATO. Since then, several other countries have the coalition, and鈥搘ith US 鈥揾ave solidified plans to transfer F-16s ready for use in 2024. While the Royal Air Force does not fly the F-16, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has previously advocated allied air forces with Eurofighter Typhoon to facilitate the transfer of Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-24 jets to the Ukrainian Air Force.
Despite the risks, the UK鈥檚 crucial role as one of Kyiv鈥檚 foremost allies has provided the UK Government with the impetus to quickly rebuild relations with the EU in addition to supporting Ukraine鈥檚 advances on the front lines.
This was again reflected by the watershed in mid-May that the UK Government would transfer Storm Shadow cruise missiles, with a maximum range of over 250 km, to the UAF. Far Ukraine鈥檚 previous precision fires range of 80 km, as provided by HIMARS-launched Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, Storm Shadow will have a decisive impact on Ukraine's ability to target Russian logistics well behind front lines. The UK鈥檚 move was soon followed by France donating several of its Shadow Storm missiles, named SCALP-EG, and Germany making a hitherto promise of Taurus missiles, which have an even greater maximum range of 500 km. The UK鈥檚 donation of Storm Shadow missiles also adds pressure on the U.S. to donate Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which have been by Kyiv repeatedly.
The UK鈥檚 strategy is not risk free however; the longer the war continues, a greater strain is placed on the UK鈥檚 already-taxed stockpiles, thereby impacting the MoD鈥檚 readiness for major combat operations. This also risks creating obstacles for the UK鈥檚 long term lethal aid provision. A key example of this is the aforementioned donation of the UK鈥檚 limited stockpiles of Challenger 2 tanks. The UK itself has only been able to send Challenger 2 MBTs to Ukraine, out of a total active stockpile of 鈥 available on a 30-day mobilization.
This aligns with 14 Leopard 2 MBTs from Germany, and a further 100 by NATO allies earlier in January. These limited numbers emphasize Ukraine鈥檚 urgent need for the 31 M1 Abrams tanks which are estimated to in September this year. Once established, a steady supply of allies鈥 MBTs will lessen the strain on the UK鈥檚 already stockpile and prevent disruption to the MoD鈥檚 Challenger 3 plans. This raises the fundamental point that bilateral lethal aid is inherently limited by both the stockpile and productive capacity of a donor state.
The UK Government is certainly aware of this, with plans to mitigate readiness shortfalls published in the (DCP 23). Highlighting the importance of sustainment through adequate stockpiles and munitions, the MoD pledged to invest just $3 billion over the next decade to address this problem. As prescribed in DCP 23, the MoD also argued that building a 鈥榬esilient UK Defence Industry鈥 will be key to restoring industrial output. Furthermore, considering readiness is a foremost , a mismatched tempo of donations between the UK and its allies further jeopardizes long term plans for the MoD. Conversely, lessened combat readiness brought on by capability shortfalls may deter large scale future donations, unless allies can make commensurate donations.
The Global Europe Program is focused on Europe鈥檚 capabilities, and how it engages on critical global issues. We investigate European approaches to critical global issues. We examine Europe鈥檚 relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Our initiatives include 鈥淯kraine in Europe鈥濃攁n examination of what it will take to make Ukraine鈥檚 European future a reality. But we also examine the role of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE, Europe鈥檚 energy security, transatlantic trade disputes, and challenges to democracy. The Global Europe Program鈥檚 staff, scholars-in-residence, and Global Fellows participate in seminars, policy study groups, and international conferences to provide analytical recommendations to policy makers and the media. Read more
