乐鱼 体育

BY MIKHAIL FISHMAN

On June 27, a Russian missile attack on a shopping center in Kremenchuk, Ukraine, left twenty-one civilians dead and many injured. First, Russia鈥檚 deputy ambassador to the UN, Dmitry Polyansky, suggested the attack was staged. The next day, Russia鈥檚 Defense Ministry  Russian forces had attacked a nearby arms and munitions depot and that the fire had spread to the shopping center, which, according to the MoD, was nonfunctioning at the time.

Russia鈥檚 foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, put out the same story鈥攖he shopping center was closed and empty鈥攄espite abundant evidence to the contrary: reporters on the ground interviewed visitors and employees who were inside the building at the time of the attack; survivors were taken to hospitals and shared their accounts; even the state tax service of Ukraine presented proof that the cash registers at the shopping center were operational that day and took in almost 3 million hryvnias. Finally, Vladimir Putin casually dismissed the suggestion that civilians might have died during the attack: 鈥淭he Russian army does not strike at civilian targets. There is no need.鈥�

This was a striking example, if just one out of infinitely many, of how the Kremlin counters an obvious truth when it does not serve its interests. It鈥檚 always the same. No matter what amount of evidence is presented and how meticulous the eventual court ruling is鈥攕uch as the district court in the Hague taking years to conclude the trial over the downing of Flight MH17 by a Russian BUK missile launched over Donbas in July 2014鈥攊t is dismissed by Moscow as insufficient. No matter how scrupulous and up to standard the analysis of Alexei Navalny鈥檚 blood samples by experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which left no doubt he was poisoned with a nerve agent in August 2020, this expertise is rejected as biased and politically motivated. No matter how thoroughly the crimes committed by Russia鈥檚 military in Ukrainian cities and towns, such as Bucha, Irpen, and Mariupol, are documented, the Kremlin has already cast the future trial as invalid. 鈥淲ho believes they can bring others to justice while being immune to any justice themselves?鈥� argued Dmitry Medvedev, while characterizing the United States as a global evil of Hitlerian caliber.

The response is always the same, and it is even couched in the exact same words, as if Putin鈥檚 reactions were generated by Kremlin-developed software. 鈥淲e know who was responsible, who prepared this provocation, using what means, and we know who the people involved were,鈥� Putin told UN Secretary-General Ant贸nio Guterres in regard to events in Bucha. 鈥淚 know everything, I have been briefed on who was bankrolling it, who was preparing it, everything鈥�: in 2005, these were the words with which Putin dismissed the allegations that Viktor Yanukovych鈥檚 presidential election victory in 2004 was rigged. In November 2004, widespread perception that the election had been rigged in favor of Yanukovych triggered the Orange Revolution, and Viktor Yushchenko鈥檚 campaign presented ample evidence of vote fraud.

In 2004, Putin believed the United States had 鈥渞obbed鈥� him of Ukraine. Since 2014, and even more vigorously after he started the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has accused the United States of orchestrating 鈥渁n unconstitutional armed coup鈥濃�攖hat is, political robbery 鈥攊n Kyiv in 2014, during the Revolution of Dignity.

This is not true. As long as the Ukrainians were protesting on the streets that dramatic winter, Western negotiators tried to cool their ardor, to no avail: what started on Kyiv鈥檚 Maidan square essentially as a student protest in late November 2013 transformed in less than three months into a full-scale civilian uprising. But in Putin鈥檚 mind, people do not have free will: they exist not to change the course of history but to be governed. Yet even when the Kremlin officials suggest they know what really happened, they are never specific, and often come up with different and contradictory answers. The story they tell is never entirely told. 

 

Almost religiously, the truth is declared unachievable and elusive: there is no argument or evidence that would work as rock-solid proof of anything, and there is no authority in this world powerful or legitimate enough to establish and validate any visible reality as authentic. This is a weapon of both defense and attack. Putin insists the goal of his 鈥渟pecial military operation has never changed,鈥� but which one is it among the dozen or so goals that Russian propaganda or even Putin personally have pointed to? Stopping NATO鈥檚 expansion to the east? Liberating the Donbas? Recovering Russian territory? The denazification of Ukraine?

 

Unclear military goals leave room for improvised expansion or retreat, but this is more than a wartime agenda. In the world of elusive and unverifiable truths and norms, the leadership is free of any obligations and need not follow any rules: laws, standards, and policies can be interpreted arbitrarily, according to current need. Historically, Putin has been an opportunist, someone who has always adapted concepts, views, and ideologies to his agenda. In fact, he is much more than that, having turned opportunism into state doctrine: total discretion is the only rule that Russia鈥檚 government applies to its actions. When the norm is elastic, those who have the power to interpret it hold absolute power. Putin鈥檚 adage, 鈥淓verything has to be in accordance with the law鈥濃�攕o notorious it has become a joke on Russian independent media鈥攎eans exactly the opposite. His power has no limits. 

 

Attempts to neglect rules and norms鈥攁nd the truth鈥攖race back to pre-Putin times in Russian politics. Putin鈥檚 predecessors in the Kremlin neither sought wars nor planned to transform Russia into an autocracy. Instead, they found themselves constantly fighting for survival as Russia鈥檚 political life turned into a life-or-death struggle. And as soon as they navigated the political world in an extremely hostile environment, their ability to expand their powers鈥攁nd to stretch the norms to fit their needs鈥攚as limited by ruthless political competition. But this started to change dramatically when Putin came to power and eventually took Russia鈥檚 undeveloped system of checks and balances under control. 

 

What is ruling? Even in a democracy, some part of governing is invisible to the general public. Every political institution has a back office: clerks filling out papers, aides providing counsel, agents handling negotiations. (Not to mention the special services, which are much less open to public control.) What is corruption? Where is the line between consulting and advising, between advising and unlawful intervention? What is abuse of power? Political competition鈥攁nd democratic tradition鈥攃onstantly push these issues into the public limelight.

Just as blurring the line between asking for a favor and coercion characterizes Mafia operations, in an unchecked autocracy the gray zone between law and lawlessness, between justice and arbitrariness, between truth and lies expands indefinitely. Rules erode. The autonomy of the justice system degrades into rule by telephone, freedom of the press turns into censorship, members of parliament become helpless executors of the government鈥檚 will, and the polity transforms into disenfranchised subjects of the crown. Over time, human rights, the rule of law, and democratic procedures, ideals still falsely adorning the fa莽ade of the Russian governmental edifice, are stripped from public life, superseded by violence and despotism. To this process there is no natural limit.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.