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After North Vietnam鈥檚 army launched an offensive against South Vietnam in early March 1975, it was clear by early April that the Saigon government would not survive. 

Henry Kissinger, then serving concurrently as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, desperately sought the assistance of Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin. As he recorded in his book Ending the Vietnam War, Kissinger categorized US-Soviet negotiations on a variety of issues in April 1975 as 鈥渟talemated,鈥� but he believed that the Soviets 鈥渃ontinued to have a stake鈥� in maintaining cordial relations.[1] Consequently, Kissinger began to engage Dobrynin to gain his and the Soviets assistance in managing the American exit from Vietnam. Kissinger did not engage the North Vietnamese because he believed they would ignore his entreaty or use it against him in negotiations. 

Kissinger sought two specific things from Dobrynin. First, to arrange for the orderly evacuation of US nationals and Vietnamese who Kissinger knew were in jeopardy because they had worked with the United States. Second, and although not mentioned explicitly in his book, Kissinger was determined not to let the looming South Vietnamese defeat interfere with other important consultations between the two nuclear-armed superpowers.

The contents of Kissinger鈥檚 talks with Dobrynin were partially disclosed in Kissinger鈥檚 own book as well as through the Foreign Relations of the United States series. But there are still gaps in the documentary record 鈥� gaps which are now partially filled thanks to new set of translated Russian documents. Originally sourced from the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) in Moscow, these documents are now accessible in English translation on the 乐鱼 体育 Digital Archive

On , Dobrynin noted that Kissinger, in a 鈥渟omewhat philosophical and detached mood,鈥� told him that the 鈥淣orth Vietnamese have been quite lucky,鈥� that Congress had 鈥減assed a law prohibiting US military intervention in events in Indochina.鈥� Foreshadowing his postwar defense of the Nixon administration, Kissinger  mused that 鈥渋f it were not for Watergate and the subsequent sharp decline in government power and authority, North Vietnam would not have been able to disassociate itself as easily, given that their actions violate the existing agreement with the US.鈥�

As North Vietnamese forces encircled Saigon in preparation for an assault on the city, , Kissinger relayed a crucial message from President Gerald Ford to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The note was carefully attuned to massage Soviet sensibilities while ensnaring them in big-power global politics. Kissinger began by asserting that US-Soviet relations since May 1972 had been  based on 鈥渞estraint,鈥� but that the 鈥渟ituation in Vietnam has now reached a point where the United States and the Soviet Union must consider the long-term consequences of the international situation as a whole.鈥� Kissinger requested that Moscow exercise its relations with Hanoi to 鈥渇acilitate a temporary cessation of hostilities [to] create controlled conditions that would save lives and facilitate the safe evacuation of American citizens and South Vietnamese individuals for whom we have a direct and special responsibility.鈥�

Kissinger played on Brezhnev鈥檚 ego by noting that Ford was directly requesting the Soviet leader鈥檚 help to convince Hanoi to permit an orderly US evacuation. Moreover, Ford had not asked the Chinese for similar assistance since Beijing鈥檚 ability to 鈥渋mpact global events are vastly different and incomparable to those of the Soviet Union. The USSR and the USA stand as the key players determining the course of global events on a worldwide scale.鈥� 

To arm Brezhnev with a compelling message, Kissinger confirmed that the US would not provide additional weapons to Saigon and that it would not undertake any military action unless its evacuation procedures were fired upon. Kissinger also reported that the US agreed to restart negotiations with Hanoi to find a political solution to the war. However, Kissinger revealed that if Washington was unable to evacuate its citizens in a safe manner, the 鈥渆motional turmoil鈥� and damage to America鈥檚 鈥渘ational pride鈥� might force Ford into rash actions. 

Although Kissinger knew his message was a thinly disguised plea for Soviet help backed by an obvious military bluff, he nonetheless attempted to situate his request within the broader goals of the policy of d茅tente with the Soviet Union. D茅tente would be severely challenged, he claimed, if the evacuation was a disaster. Yet if it could be achieved seamlessly, this would demonstrate to those in the US opposed to improving relations that 鈥渘o major international issues can be resolved without the participation of the Soviet Union, let alone by bypassing it.鈥� 

Although Kissinger鈥檚 report to Dobrynin was a masterful attempt at state manipulation, Dobrynin鈥檚 cable to Moscow containing his analysis of Kissinger鈥檚 request has not yet been obtained or translated. That cable, if it becomes accessible, will hopefully provide his analysis and recommendations, which should prove highly insightful into what the Soviets discussed with Hanoi. The next day, Dobrynin informed Kissinger that the Soviets had passed Ford鈥檚 note to North Vietnam. 

While waiting for the Soviet response, US intelligence noted that the People鈥檚 Army was marshaling near Tan Son Nhut airport, the primary evacuation node for American citizens. , Kissinger appealed again to Dobrynin. He said that President Ford鈥檚 鈥減rimary concern is whether the reported troop concentration around the Saigon airport signals North Vietnamese intentions to capture it and potentially trap any Americans not yet evacuated from Saigon before Hanoi formally responds to Washington鈥檚 appeal conveyed through the good offices of the Soviet side.鈥� 

Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger鈥檚 deputy National Security Advisor, speaking with Dobrynin shortly afterwards, ominously repeated that currently there were no US Marines securing the airport, but they were being 鈥渁massed in numbers and positioned near the South Vietnamese coastline for potential deployment鈥� if anyone interfered with the evacuation process. 

Dobrynin鈥檚 memcon does not reveal his evaluation of the veiled American threats, although Kissinger later wrote that he assumed that Dobrynin did not take the implicit warnings of April 19 and April 22 seriously. 

On April 24, Dobrynin telephoned Kissinger to provide Hanoi鈥檚 response. The record of this talk was previously published in the  series. Dobrynin confirmed that Hanoi had 鈥渘o intention鈥� to interfere with the US evacuation, that any political settlement would 鈥減roceed from the Paris agreement,鈥� and that North Vietnam did not 鈥渋ntend to damage the prestige of the United States.鈥� Dobrynin noted that Brezhnev implored Washington not to engage in any 鈥渁ction鈥� that might create a 鈥渘ew exacerbation of the situation,鈥� a reflection of the American warnings. In a , Kissinger remarked that he had spoken to Dobrynin a second time, and that Dobrynin had classified Hanoi鈥檚 response as a 鈥減ositive development.鈥� Dobrynin added that 鈥渨hat is not said in the note is sometimes better than if it was very explicit,鈥� which Kissinger thought was 鈥渧ery interesting.鈥�[2]

Believing that Hanoi had given a 鈥済reen light鈥� to allow the safe evacuation of Americans, and despite Dobrynin鈥檚 caution about not demanding details from Hanoi, Kissinger responded the next day with a series of questions in an attempt to gain 鈥渆very last possible extension鈥� to remove as many Vietnamese as possible before Hanoi attacked Saigon. He also assured Brezhnev that, as long as no one interfered with the evacuation, meaning attacking Tan Son Nhut, the US would not 鈥渆xacerbate the situation.鈥�[3] Over the next four days, US airplanes continued to ferry American and Vietnamese citizens from Tan Son Nhut, but when North Vietnamese artillery hit the airport on April 28, killed two US Marines guards and cratered the runway, an .

Kissinger again threatened a US military response if further Americans were killed, and he warned Dobrynin that Hanoi鈥檚 actions 鈥渃annot help but impact鈥� US-Soviet relations since Hanoi鈥檚 message had been transmitted through Moscow. Furthermore, Hanoi鈥檚 actions are a 鈥渄eliberate and calculated blow to the prestige of the administration and the President personally.鈥� Dobrynin claims he 鈥渃almly rebutted鈥� Kissinger. He stressed that the Soviets had acted in good faith, and it was the America鈥檚 fault for not speeding up the evacuation. He buttressed his argument by citing the 鈥渃riticism unfolding in the US Congress and the press regarding the delayed execution of the operation to evacuate Americans from Saigon.鈥�

Hanoi鈥檚 slim published record is vague about these diplomatic exchanges but confirms that they had agreed to Kissinger鈥檚 request of April 19 to allow the Americans to evacuate. However, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu鈥檚 sudden resignation on April 21, and the actions of his successor Tran Van Huong to contact the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), Hanoi鈥檚 front in South Vietnam, to discuss a ceasefire, raised North Vietnam鈥檚 suspicions. The Politburo believed that the Americans were using the evacuation as a ruse to install a neutral administration in Saigon and thus delay Hanoi鈥檚 attack on the city. Based on this assessment, on April 26, the PRG publicly called for 鈥渢he total elimination of the entire puppet governmental apparatus and the puppet military and security apparatus. 鈥� This in effect was an ultimatum demanding that the enemy surrender.鈥�[4] Thus, Hanoi launched its military attack to conquer Saigon on April 26 partially to defeat what it alleged was a US scheme, rather than Kissinger鈥檚 stated but apparently hidden intent to evacuate more South Vietnamese.

Given the shelling of Tan Son Nhut, Ford ordered the evacuation of all Americans. This was accomplished by the morning of April 30 as North Vietnamese tanks rolled into the city center. Although the translations of Dobrynin鈥檚 memoranda of conversation offer fascinating new insights into US-Soviet relations, unfortunately his cables to Moscow providing his analysis of American policy and intentions remain untapped. Hence, the diplomatic maneuvering between Washington, Moscow, and Hanoi to end the Vietnam War remains clouded. Hopefully, further archival revelations from Moscow will enlighten the record.

Connected Sources

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 108-114. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 129-135. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 137-138. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 142-144. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

[1] Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America鈥檚 Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 542.

[2] TELCON, Scowcroft and Kissinger, 5:45 p.m., April 24, 1975, .

[3] Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 546.

[4] Vu Duong Huan, 鈥淣go岷 giao trong t峄昻g ti岷縩 c么ng v脿 n峄昳 d芒y gi岷 ph贸ng hoan toan Mi峄乶 Nam m霉a Xu芒n 1975,鈥� (鈥淒iplomacy During the General Offensive and Uprisings that Totally Liberated Vietnam in the Spring of 1975鈥�), T岷 ch铆 Nghi锚n c峄﹗ Qu峄慶 t岷� (International Studies Journal), No. 2 (101) (June 2015): 60.