A blog of the Kennan Institute
BY LENNY LOPATTO
Ukraine has upended Putin鈥檚 otherwise successful strategy of gaining leverage over neighboring states by manufacturing then freezing separatist conflicts within their borders. Before the occupation of Crimea, a coordinated, multiplatform disinformation campaign flooded eastern Ukraine with reports of violence targeting Russian speakers. These fabricated reports obscured the real motivations behind Russia鈥檚 military occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea. In contrast, Russia鈥檚 recent attack on Ukraine has been met with clear-eyed condemnation from the international community, backed up by . Putin鈥檚 disinformation machine has failed to convince Ukrainians, global onlookers, and even his domestic audience that Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine is justified.
The 鈥淒e-Nazification鈥 Narrative
Putin squandered any remaining pretext of moral justification for Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine with his on February 24, declaring a 鈥渟pecial operation鈥 to 鈥渟trive for the demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine.鈥 Eight years after the initial occupation of Ukraine, Putin鈥檚 claim that the Russian military was entering Ukrainian territory 鈥渢o protect people who have been abused by the genocide of the Kyiv regime鈥 has failed to gain any purchase among Ukrainians or a global audience.
Accusing perceived enemies of Nazism or fascism is a typical Kremlin disinformation narrative. A recent signed by over 300 鈥渟cholars of genocide, the Holocaust, and World War II鈥 states that Russian propaganda regularly presents the elected leaders of Ukraine as Nazis and fascists. 鈥淭his rhetoric is factually wrong, morally repugnant, and deeply offensive to the memory of millions of victims of Nazism and those who courageously fought against it, including Russian and Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army.鈥
As is the case with conspiracy theories, this one has a kernel of truth: several Ukrainian nationalist figures committed and collaborated with Nazis during World War II. But Putin isn鈥檛 invading Ukraine to protect that country鈥檚 people from Stepan Bandera or Symon Petliura. As Harvard historian of Jewish and Eastern European History Josh Meyers noted on Twitter, what makes modern Ukraine so inspiring (and Putin鈥檚 lies so transparent) is that 鈥溾: The 鈥攁 far-right all-volunteer infantry military unit formed in May 2014 with about 900 current members鈥斺渋s real and awful. But it is one battalion. To the contrary, have found Ukraine one of the least antisemitic countries in Europe. The is a Jew. The former is a Jew.鈥
Former deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia wrote that when Putin announced a Russian military operation in Ukraine, 鈥渋t became obvious that the only clearly stated goal was to change the country鈥檚 political leadership.鈥 Instead of giving the Russian leader the moral high ground, invoking Nazis has invited comparisons between
From 2014 to 2022: What Changed?
Some differences between the world鈥檚 reaction to Russia鈥檚 military operations in Ukraine in 2014 versus 2022 include more proactive strategic communication practices from the West, an abundance of open-source intelligence, and Russian public opinion.
In contrast to the U.S. response to the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the White House has made a concerted effort to to the public about before they happened, in order to undermine the potency of 鈥渇alse flags鈥 that fabricate a pretext for invasion. By consistently 鈥溾 these plans, the Biden administration, in partnership with Western allies , has prevented Russia鈥檚 disinformation tactics from achieving their goal: to sow confusion surrounding Russia鈥檚 actions in Ukraine in order to prevent an effective, unified response. Subsequent from Ukraine鈥檚 separatist regions prove that these intelligence disclosures were warranted.
Second, a constant stream of on-the-ground information, including photos and video, is being uploaded to social media and instant messaging platforms. This has given the average internet user unprecedented access to raw footage of troop movement, equipment transport, and the damage caused by Russian bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This overwhelming amount of raw information also provides cover to propaganda and misreporting. Luckily, it is matched by a growing cohort of with the necessary skills to verify and analyze reports from the conflict zone.
Another difference between Russia鈥檚 occupation of Ukrainian territory in 2022 versus 2014 is the reception of Putin鈥檚 primary audience, Russians. When Putin declared Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, his popular approval rating , attributed to the 鈥淐rimea effect.鈥 According to Levada Center鈥檚 , there is no general consensus in Russia on whether the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People鈥檚 Republics should be independent, should be incorporated into Russia, or should remain Ukrainian. Putin instead gained public consensus for escalating tensions with Ukraine through exhaustion.
Not only has Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine failed to boost Putin鈥檚 popularity but there are early indicators that it has weakened his base of support. According to the from , more than 6,440 people were arrested in four days of antiwar protests across Russia. The billionaires Oleg Deripaska and Mikhail Fridman have both .
By occupying a peaceful neighbor, forcing the populations of its cities underground to escape bombardment, and allegedly committing war crimes, it鈥檚 clear even to Russians living in the that Putin presents an exponentially greater threat to Ukraine than Nazis, NATO, or whoever he may blame next.
Disinformation Is a Devil鈥檚 Bargain
Whether or not Putin genuinely believed that Ukrainians would greet Russian soldiers as liberators, it seems clear that he made a severe miscalculation when he gave the orders to invade Ukraine. The initial position of Russian forces seemed to indicate that Putin was planning a relatively short campaign to , one that would avoid protracted combat and result in a decisive Russian victory. This plan has fallen apart. Russia鈥檚 military is actively bombarding . The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is reporting more than , while Russia is reporting . Putin has because they are his remaining leverage to prevent the consequences of his unforced error from coming to fruition.
Since the 2014 occupation of Crimea, Western leaders and a concerned public have watched Putin use every tool available to bend reality to suit his ambitions. He eliminated anything鈥攊ncluding freedom of expression, political opposition, and an independent media鈥攖hat could have stood between him and such an egregious miscalculation. A feedback loop of his own creation cut Putin off from reality.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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Kennan Institute
The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region through research and exchange. Read more
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