乐鱼 体育

BY MYKHAILO MINAKOV

In 2021, European nations find themselves in a new geopolitical situation. The vision of One Europe, which stood behind EU integration in the west and center of the continent and the inspired post-Soviet transition in the east, seems to have lost its influence on political and economic processes within and among the nations of the continent.

The political map of Europe is defined by several fragmentation and integration processes unfolding across the continent: growing cleavages within the EU, Russia鈥檚 open rivalry with the EU, Brexit, Turkey鈥檚 return to Europe. In this analysis, I set aside the U.S. and Chinese factors to clearly see the structure of the continental divisions on its own.

EU leaders and peoples have recently been so immersed in their own business that they missed the moment when the meaning of 鈥淓uropeanization鈥� changed. Emerging from competition and cooperation among Brussels, national governments, subnational elites, trade unions, the corporate sector, civic movements, and neighboring rival states and distant partners, the realpolitik of the EU has very little connection today with the EU鈥檚 values, including the universal norms of justice and human rights, democracy, and peaceful coexistence.

An of today鈥檚 use of the term 鈥淓uropeanization鈥� shows that this idealistic residuum of values-based policies is subject to EU interests related to geopolitical power, economic gain, and the biological survival of its diverse populations. Conversely, some types of democratization processes on the continent have moved forward with anti-EU slogans or without regarding the Union as relevant partner. The pan-continental uniting force of the EU is in decline (or at least it is stuck in a ), but the Union is also undermined by strong , , and movements from within. Efforts to counter disintegratory processes within and to return to supporting liberal values in the EU鈥檚 neighborhood are critically important for the EU to remain the gravitational center for the continental integration processes.

I was surprised to see my European colleagues鈥� consternation over the Lavrov鈥揃orrell nondiplomatic, intentionally scandalous in Moscow last February. Official Moscow鈥檚 hostility toward the EU has been openly growing since 2013, the year when the EU signed Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova, and 2014, when Crimea was annexed and the Donbas war began.

Today, post-Crimean Russian elites are organized around sovereigntism, an ideology that affirms the supremacy of 鈥渢he people鈥� (the imagined majority of the population coming together around history, ethnic traditions, and traditional religions) and is hostile toward individual human rights and the cosmopolitan norms of justice and ecological balance. From a sovereigntist perspective, transnational networks and organizations promoting these latter norms and values globally or regionally, including the EU and the Council of Europe, are more than rivals: they are hostile entities that, with the help of local human rights activists, civic organizations, and minorities (鈥溾�� or 鈥渢raitors,鈥� in sovereigntist language), are bent on undermining the sovereignty of the 鈥淩ussian people鈥� (or 鈥�,鈥� in the ideology鈥檚 language).

One of the key ideologemes of contemporary Putinism is Russia鈥檚 mission to be the alternative Europe. This ideological posit has recently been tested on a Russian audience with the publication of Konstantin Bogomolov鈥檚 manifesto 鈥溾�� a week after the Lavrov鈥揃orrell incident. The major idea of this manifesto is that Russia, a nation hitherto 鈥渁lways oriented鈥� toward western Europe as an example of moral and civilizational excellence, is now at a loss since this 鈥淓urope of excellence鈥� no longer exists. Liberalism, individualism, globalism, ecologism, Brussel鈥檚 bureaucracy, and other ills have destroyed the traditional lifeworld of Europe. Now it is Russia鈥檚 turn to help the sovereign European peoples survive the crises in the West and return to their traditional lifeways.

The same sovereigntist ideology can be found in Russia鈥檚 constitutional amendments that were passed last year. These amendments have turned Russia into a conservative state based on the transcendental forces and tradition. Thus, foreign policy, ideological manifestos, and state-building are guided by conservative sovereigntism aimed at isolating Russia from the West and at undermining the EU鈥檚 normative influence and the spirit of European solidarity.

Brexit has added immensely to the complexity of European political divisions. Brexit hit the nerve center of Europeanization. For almost thirty years, integration of the continental democracies was at the core of the One Europe project. The UK鈥檚 exit from the Union not only inspired Euroskeptics, it launched a new trend in continental political processes. A European democratic nation does not necessarily have to be part of the EU; further, it may feel limited in the EU.

So, the ideological tensions on the continent are not limited to those of Brussels versus Moscow. Now London enters the mix with its own European policy as another alternative to the EU鈥檚 agenda. It is one more 鈥溾��: the UK鈥檚 foreign policy may not necessarily be against the EU, but the UK will focus on its own national interests and will build new alliances in Europe. There are already signs of such alliances with countries in the Balkans and South Caucasus, and with Turkey.

Turkey is another important player in Europe with its own alternative to integratory processes. Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an鈥檚 antagonism toward the EU and several European governments of recent years may now come to an end. The year 2021 started with Erdo臒an鈥檚 call to return to with the EU. This offer comes from a much stronger authoritarian continental player than in 2017鈥�19, when bilateral EU-Turkey relations reached a nadir. Today Turkey has a very strong military and economic in the MENA region and the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey鈥檚 support was for Azerbaijan鈥檚 victory in the war for Karabakh. Turkey has been increasing its presence鈥攅conomic, military, and political鈥攊n , , and . Even though Ankara is geographically located in Asia, it is evolving into another center of influence on European continent.

Nowadays European politics means much more than EU political processes. The continent is more and more divided into 鈥渁xes鈥� and 鈥渮ones of exclusive interests.鈥� This political multitude demands new kinds of institutions to prevent conflicts and meld the emerging geopolitical cacophony into a new 鈥渃oncert of nations.鈥�

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.