乐鱼 体育

With a high-intensity civil war looming, Myanmar鈥檚 future hangs in the balance. Whereas Myanmar鈥檚 military (the Tatmadaw) looked capable of crushing resistance in the first few days of the coup, their inability to tamp down on the protests and other signs of struggle, such as reports of heavy losses and some defections, render the prospects for the military鈥檚 consolidation of power much murkier. In May 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG)鈥攁 group of ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) politicians, activists, and representatives from several ethnic minority groups鈥攁nnounced the creation of a 鈥溾�� to oppose the military regime. The question now emerges: can the National Unity Government organize an effective fighting force and defeat the Tatmadaw on the battlefield? Several military challenges鈥攎ost importantly the lack of a unified pan-ethnic 鈥淔ederal Army鈥� and an inability to contest control of the air鈥攎ean that the NUG will find it difficult to achieve victory beyond the rugged terrain that dominates the country鈥檚 borderlands.

High-Intensity Civil War

Although the protests and Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) launched in response to the Tatmadaw鈥檚 February 1^st coup began as non-violent resistance, the military鈥檚 indiscriminate crackdown created the conditions for . As , Myanmar is not in an to , and the country has long suffered from various Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO)-led insurgencies in its outlying border states鈥攚ith some even dating back to independence. However, the coup by contrast sows the seeds for a higher-intensity reaching into the -impacted, Bamar-dominated central regions.

The anti-junta movement鈥檚 determination and the Tatmadaw鈥檚 unwillingness to restrain itself has now resulted in a that . The NUG with the Tatmadaw and . On the junta鈥檚 part, the of a provision for the release of detainees in 鈥攁s well as the junta鈥檚 apparent pressure鈥攊ndicate that the two sides鈥� demands are intractable enough for war to be likely. With in the ASEAN- and China-led negotiation process and in the case of surrender, the NUG has few alternatives to armed resistance.

The National Unity Government鈥檚 Military Challenges

The NUG has decided to engage in military struggle and . As a precursor to a promised 鈥淔ederal Army鈥� uniting the disparate EAOs under a single command, the NUG announced the development of a 鈥�.鈥� as to its organizational structure or design, this move constitutes the first steps in the NUG鈥檚 decision to engage in direct military conflict with the Tatmadaw. In recent months, operating under the banner of 鈥淧eople鈥檚 Defense Forces鈥� have indeed engaged the Tatmadaw and . Whether these groups are within a loose NUG-directed structure, or鈥攎ore likely鈥攍ocally organized units operating independently, remains to be seen.

Some hope remains for the NUG鈥檚 new army to organize itself. Two EAOs, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and about half of the combat brigades making up the Karen National Union (KNU), continue to launch attacks and against the Tatmadaw in support of the resistance, including the . Other local militia groups, such as the , are , while a spate of throughout against Tatmadaw targets are ongoing. Political assassinations of regime personnel also , a key element of insurgency and political warfare. Other reports indicate that are (although not yet at a scale likely to tip the tide). Meanwhile, numerous anti-junta demonstrators have reportedly fled to EAO-held areas to and . 

Unfortunately for the NUG, also . Historically, after the military鈥檚 crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising to continue the fight against the Tatmadaw but . Today, several obstacles stand in the NUG鈥檚 path. For one, urban guerilla warfare鈥攊ncreasingly the , as in 鈥攈as a poor record of success in history. Furthermore, civilians have reportedly made use of homemade weapons and bombs, but equipping a sizeable army seems unlikely. The EAOs may produce arms locally or acquire them from or , but procuring enough to field an army capable of taking territory in the country鈥檚 center . Despite being stretched thin, the Tatmadaw is still a well-equipped and large force commanding , , and a range of allied and Border Guard Forces. All of the anti-junta EAOs united would struggle to overcome such a force, as combined they number only . Finally, as demonstrated in the against the locally-organized , militia groups will find it hard to hold territory against the military in a pitched battle as deficits in heavy weaponry, artillery, and airpower inflict a heavy toll.

Of these challenges, two more stand out as the most detrimental to the anti-junta forces: a lack of EAO unity and no airpower. The other challenges may be severe and detrimental but arguably surmountable. However, without uniting most EAOs and countering Tatmadaw airpower, the NUG and its People鈥檚 Defense Force will find it very challenging to defeat the junta on the battlefield.

Military Challenge 1: EAO Reluctance

Lacking in military capability and with the existing 20-some EAOs already benefiting from decades of insurgency experience, established supply lines, base areas, and combat-capable units, the NUG quickly promised to appeal to Myanmar鈥檚 EAO insurgent groups and , most notably via its announcement of a planned Federal Army.

So far two major EAOs, the and a large portion of the , have entered into sustained, direct military conflict with the Tatmadaw, while some other groups also signaled their opposition to the junta. The Chin National Front, a much smaller group, , and the somewhat larger Karenni Army and its political wing, the Karenni National Progressive Party, on the side of the local civilian resistance in Kayah State. That said, the Karenni Army鈥檚 leadership remains careful to . Additionally, the 10 signatories of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement are to other EAOs to forge an anti-junta coalition. Finally, members of the Northern Alliance (which the KIA is a part of), issued statements and some components have even limited .

However, , the EAOs remain wary of the NUG due to past difficulties with the NLD and their own interests. For example, the Arakan Army, despite opposing the coup and issuing supportive statements, seems intent on and apart from the NUG. Others, like the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) under China鈥檚 unofficial protection, maintain a careful neutrality.

For now, a Federal Army encompassing most of the EAOs beyond the KIA and KNU appears more a goal than reality. Even the KNU and KIA operate in geographically distant regions, with the KIA in Kachin State to the north and KNU along the border with Thailand in the southeast. To make matters more complicated, have made in recent weeks on , which indicates within the organization as some factions continue fighting while others hope to deescalate. Elsewhere, the Tatmadaw has been making overtures to peel off other large groups, such as the . The NUG itself seems to realize that pan-ethnic unity is doubtful at this time, as signaled NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung鈥檚 to a question on EAO participation.

Military Challenge 2: Tatmadaw Air Superiority

Secondly, will constitute perhaps the steepest obstacle. In retaliation for KIA and KNU offensives, the Tatmadaw utilizes its fleet of Russian-supplied helicopters and multi-role fighters to launch air strikes against and . Although the KIA and others have demonstrated the capability to 鈥攁nd some groups have access to the effective 鈥攃ountering the Tatmadaw鈥檚 air power will prove nigh impossible with the opposition鈥檚 arsenal. The regime鈥檚 , as well as the , remain out of reach, and the junta鈥檚 air superiority provides a huge military advantage. Additionally, the junta has been to monitor protests, and these CH-3A unmanned aerial vehicles are capable of carrying munitions.

The role of air power in warfare and its efficacy in counter-insurgency , but it will be difficult for the NUG to transform itself into a force capable of conventionally challenging the Tatmadaw sans its own air power or effective countermeasures. For an for 鈥渉earts and minds,鈥� the Tatmadaw can deploy its air power at will to defeat concentrated opposition forces. In Syria, Russian and regime air power devastated opposition forces, while NATO鈥檚 imposition of a no-fly zone and subsequent aerial campaign in Libya for Ghaddafi鈥檚 government. Although the Assad regime鈥檚 victory in Syria is not complete, the splintering of the opposition and Russian fires for pro-regime forces to retake lost territory and largely overcome the rebels. It is thus no coincidence that the NUG鈥檚 Foreign Minister .

Unfortunately for the NUG, there is little hope for outside military support. Despite of U.S. or UN with air power in Myanmar, the odds of American or UN-sponsored action are vanishingly small. Chinese and Russian vetoes on the UN Security Council stymie any firm action, and the U.S. lacks important national interests in Myanmar that would incentivize intervention. Perhaps more importantly, China would almost certainly react extremely negatively to U.S. military presence in its backyard at a time of worsening U.S.-China tensions. In a sign of its desperation, the NUG at the in the Rakhine to address the NLD鈥檚 poor record on the Rohingya crisis after criticism from , but widespread American sympathy will not lead to military action.  

China, Myanmar鈥檚 most influential neighbor, may and has met with the , but China prioritizes pragmatism in pursuing its national interests. China prefers a winner, and, if it were to intervene, siding with the NUG would be a poor bet. Beijing increasingly that the Tatmadaw will likely emerge victorious, and for its strategic initiatives by backing the junta. If it comes, Chinese military involvement would most likely aim to defend their strategic China-Myanmar Economic Corridor investments () on either the junta鈥檚 side or as a third-party peacekeeping force intended to secure its own holdings. The prospect of the People鈥檚 Liberation Army erecting a no-fly zone benefiting the NUG is infinitesimal.

Limited Prospects for NUG Military Victory

With its military challenges, an NUG victory by force of arms appears remote, and outside help for the opposition is a dim prospect. In all likelihood, the Tatmadaw quells the protests and public support to rule a diminished, isolated, and highly coercive central government under a . In the event of a longer-term junta victory, the surviving opposition would likely transform into yet another insurgency along Myanmar鈥檚 borderlands (), while the EAOs would likely continue to struggle for autonomy or accommodate themselves with the military depending on the group. Myanmar in this scenario would likely resemble a .

Certainly, other outcomes beyond a Tatmadaw 鈥渧ictory鈥� remain possible but unlikely given the NUG鈥檚 prevailing military challenges. The Tatmadaw with all its air power has not yet overcome the myriad EAOs operating along the hilly and heavily-forested border states, and the anti-junta opposition鈥檚 commitment is clear. A regime collapse triggered by sustained political and economic pressure by the protesters and CDM could still occur if the crisis drags out long enough, while a or ceasefire remains in the realm of possibility despite . However, the Tatmadaw looks to have the upper hand, and the prospects of opposition military victory against the Tatmadaw are slim under current circumstances.

Follow the Asia Program on Twitter or .

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 乐鱼 体育. Copyright 2020, Asia Program. All rights reserved.