乐鱼 体育

In the course of the Kremlin鈥檚 stalled war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin鈥檚 regime has undergone multiple crises. Against expectations, the president has emerged out of them almost unscathed. This is because his opponents at home and abroad are cautious. Through blackmail, he has led them to believe that he is a dangerous player who will stop at nothing to retain power. 

The first crisis was the failure of the February鈥揗arch 鈥渂litzkrieg鈥� and the transformation of the assault into a protracted war. Prior to February 24 the majority of Russia鈥檚 elites were not even aware of the impending invasion. Putin鈥檚 gross miscalculation, which resulted in heavy casualties, seemed destined to undermine the president鈥檚 position in the eyes of his entourage. It did not.

The second crisis was the initial wave of sanctions, which caused an economic shock鈥攁 powerful spike in inflation, the departure of Western brands, and the collapse of imports. This crisis imposed significant costs on the population. It was bound to raise questions about the war鈥檚 meaning and price. It did not.

The third crisis was the Ukrainian forces鈥� counteroffensive in August and September, which demonstrated that the Kremlin, during the six months of war, had failed to develop a competent military strategy, failed to bring order to troops and logistics, and failed to strengthen the army鈥檚 morale and discipline. It did not cause much stir domestically.

The Kremlin鈥檚 鈥減artial mobilization鈥� was the fourth crisis. Its very announcement, which Putin had tried to avoid for as long as possible, and its course, filled with chaos, lawlessness, and haphazard repression, were scandalous.

None of these crises, which exposed Putin鈥檚 strategic errors, resulted in regime destabilization. Both at the beginning of the war and after the announcement of mobilization, public opinion polls showed a shocked and confused populace. But after each crisis the Russian public quickly returned to its previous state of indifference to the dramatic events of the day.

Putin Gets Away with It, Again

The fact that the Kremlin has successfully overcome these four crises is evidence of the regime鈥檚 strength and its long-term stability. Russia鈥檚 citizens and the country鈥檚 elites alike have noticed the absence of resistance and the fact that Putin has, once again, gotten away with heinous actions. This has nudged Russians to choose a strategy of getting used to the circumstances, which they now view as insurmountable.

The very fact that Putin has not been punished by citizens or the political elites for his defeats and managerial lapses is not, in terms of theory, surprising. The literature shows that defeat in a war is usually critical for those authoritarian leaders whose positions are shaky in the first place. For example, that was true in the case of the Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri, who lost the Falklands War. If a dictator鈥檚 position is stable, even an extremely difficult conflict that does not achieve its goals or a lost war does not undermine his position. Saddam Hussein after the 1990鈥�1991 Gulf War can serve as an example.

However, the fact that Putin鈥檚 regime has successfully navigated four war-related crises does not mean those crises went unnoticed. The failures were impossible to miss. Back in March and early April, Russia鈥檚 average citizen was convinced that the war would not last and that Putin would be hosting a victory parade in Kyiv on May 9. This was the 鈥淧utin is always a winner鈥� mantra. That did not happen. Since then, the war has absorbed more and more resources, human and material, unnerving the Russian majority with its brutality and frightening the public with uncertainty. A quick and victorious end to the war is no longer touted.

Administrative fiascos in both military and civilian spheres were impossible to overlook. The reality of the 鈥減artial mobilization鈥� did not bear out Putin鈥檚 promise that only carefully selected people with military experience and of certain age would be drafted. Discussions of the chaos of mobilization, the state鈥檚 inability to house, organize, and equip the mobilized, and unfulfilled promises of compensation to the draftees and their families flooded Russia鈥檚 social media.

The sham referendums in the occupied territories and the hasty incorporation of these territories into Russia looked no less scandalous. Russians鈥� perceptions of this campaign and of the overall balance of current losses and gains are clearly visible in their answers to the question about the main memorable events of the month in the Levada Center鈥檚 polls. In September, 47 percent of those polled mentioned the partial mobilization as a 鈥渕emorable event,鈥� while only 9 percent remembered the referendums. In October, 36 percent of the respondents named the 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� as a memorable event, 27 percent mentioned the mobilization, 16 percent remembered the explosion on the Crimean bridge, and only 6 percent spoke of the incorporation of four new regions into Russia. In other words, the theatrics of 鈥渞eunification with ancestral Russian lands,鈥� which Putin flaunted to override the sight of Russian troops fleeing their positions, were ignored or pushed to the periphery of the public鈥檚 attention.

Russian Society鈥檚 Value-Free Pragmatism

Those who believe that the Russians are seized by imperialist zeal or share the television propagandists鈥� jingoism are wrong. When talking to pollsters, the Russians agree with the clich茅s of the official military narrative out of compliance with the rules imposed on them. In reality, the war is felt as an uncomfortable and unnerving burden, one that must be borne so as not to have to confront the system head on and not to lose some perceived guarantees of relative well-being. The Russian public鈥檚 relationship with the regime is built on pragmatics, not on values. This pragmatic cost-benefit analysis holds the key to understanding Putin鈥檚 relationship with his domestic audience.

There are two aspects to Putin鈥檚 image in Russia. He is seen as a successful strategist who knows how to achieve his goals and distribute the benefits to his loyalists. He is also known as a vindictive player, always ready to use violence against an opponent. Of these two aspects, the first one has been significantly devalued while the second one, a readiness to use violence and an obstinate refusal to recognize losses and costs, has been brought into sharp focus by the war.

Paradoxically, attitudes toward Putin on the domestic front and international political scene echo each other to a much greater extent than is commonly thought. Putin鈥檚 defeats and failures in this war are obvious to any objective observer. Western experts and politicians routinely speak of Putin鈥檚 lost war. At the same time, in their perception, he remains a dangerous player who is capable of further escalation and therefore should not be provoked.

Putin鈥檚 nuclear blackmail, which has had a significant effect on the Western coalition鈥檚 caution in expanding arms supplies to Ukraine, appeals not only to external but also to domestic audiences. Both abroad and at home, Putin is seen as a player who is capable of unacceptable escalation. Despite his losses, he is not seen as a loser because he has a reliable insurance policy against ultimate defeat, which he is ready to use in case of emergency.

To the population and the elites, Putin no longer looks like someone who can lead to victory or provide a strategic perspective, like someone to whom it is worth linking their future. At the same time, the imagined costs of rebellion look so high that the population and the elites take up adaptation strategies despite the long-term costs associated with them.

A staged video recently circulated in Russia shows a man, a fighter with the Wagner Group, a private mercenary outfit, who has allegedly been captured by the group after a desertion attempt and cruelly executed鈥攈is head smashed in with a sledgehammer鈥攆or 鈥渢reason鈥� without trial. In Russia, this is taken as Putin鈥檚 signaling. It is the domestic version of the nuclear blackmail Putin threatens  internationally, and works just as well. Both are signals of readiness for unlimited and appalling violence.

Both Western and domestic strategic visions seem to accept that a complete victory over Putin is unavailable at this stage. Both seem to be suing for compliance and acceptance. Putin鈥檚 military and economic failures should at some point spark an internal resistance to the regime. They should, but they do not.

Those same failures should lead to a more intensive supply of weapons to Ukraine. They should, but they do not. These two attitudes toward Putin鈥攄omestic and international鈥攔un in parallel, but they recognize each other鈥檚 presence, reflect each other, and, who knows, may even influence one another.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.