A blog of the Kennan Institute
In 2023, in addition to waging a brutal war against Ukraine, the Russian government continued to deploy so-called 鈥渢raditional values鈥 against the rights of women and LGBTQ+ citizens. Vladimir Putin also resumed his end-of-the-year press conference and the televised Direct Line call-in show, both of which he had skipped in 2022. With his orchestrated reelection looming in March, Putin held a four-hour marathon event combining the conference and the Direct Line on December 14.
Our recent research has of unpacking gender and LGBTQ+ issues in the Russian political context. Below, we analyze the Russian ideology of 鈥渢raditional values鈥 in the service of the war and look at what Putin said and did not say at the press conference/Direct Line to understand the implications of his statements on women鈥檚 rights and his silences on LGBTQ+ people鈥檚 rights in Russia.
Tool of Repression Turned into War Fuel
Since Vladimir Putin鈥檚 return to the presidency in 2012, the notion of 鈥渢raditional values鈥 has been featured front and center in the regime鈥檚 crackdown on the opposition and civil dissent.
In the years leading up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin鈥檚 rhetoric became increasingly homo-and transphobic, with repressive consequences. In 2021, Putin that teaching children about gender fluidity was akin to a crime against humanity, and in 2022, he the full-scale invasion as resistance to the West鈥檚 attempts to 鈥,鈥&苍产蝉辫; that Russians who cared about 鈥渟o-called gender freedoms鈥 and opposed the war were, in essence, traitors.
Shortly after the widely unpopular 鈥減artial鈥 military mobilization in the fall of 2022, Putin signed a that formalized the 鈥減rotection of traditional values鈥 as a state policy. Two weeks later, the Duma extended the 鈥済ay propaganda鈥 ban to the entire public sphere, outlawing all forms of positive LGBTQ+ representation in the media, film, literature, and art. Viacheslav Volodin, the Duma chairman, the extended law as a triumph of Russia鈥檚 traditional values and as a way to protect Russian children from 鈥渢he darkness spread by the United States and European countries.鈥
Not stopping at that, last summer the Duma passed a law banning gender transition and depriving all of legal recognition and vital health care.
Then in November, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, the Russian Supreme Court ruled something they called the 鈥渋nternational LGBT movement鈥 to be an extremist organization. With no clarity on what they meant鈥攖here is no singular or identifiable 鈥渋nternational LGBT movement鈥 in Russia or globally鈥攖he designation will likely make it possible to prosecute all forms of LGBTQ+ advocacy in Russia and further threatens individual queer people. Indeed, in the aftermath of the court鈥檚 decision there was of gay clubs across Russia, while several LGBTQ+ advocacy groups shut down their operations, leaving the remaining activists to deal with a from the LGBTQ+ community for help with emigration.
Surprisingly, Putin said nothing about this repression or LGBTQ+ issues at the 2023 press conference/Direct Line combo. His silence reflects the latest phase of Russian state-sponsored homo- and transphobia that builds on the long-standing of homosexual erasureand criminalization. Throughout most of Soviet history, the penal code outlawed sexual relations between men, while female homosexuality was condemned as a mental illness. The very notion of nonheterosexual desire was erased from the public sphere, condemning LGBTQ+ individuals to a life of silence and hiding.
Russia decriminalized same-sex relations after the Soviet collapse, but homophobia remained widespread, making any progress in LGBTQ+ advocacy and acceptance of queer lives slow. The Kremlin eventually capitalized on this lack of progress when it introduced 鈥済ay propaganda鈥 laws, which painted LGBTQ+ Russians as a threat to traditional values. The scapegoating effects of banning 鈥済ay propaganda鈥 increased violence and discrimination against LGBTQ+ people, pushing many back into the closet or out of the country. With the Supreme Court鈥檚 labeling of LGBTQ+ activism as extremist coming into effect on January 10, more and more queer and trans Russians will likely turn to these survival tactics.
Mixed Rhetoric on Abortion
In contrast, Putin made several comments on women鈥檚 rights in response to a question about his position on banning abortion. Putin鈥檚 answer was the very definition of mixed messaging. He that 鈥渨omen鈥檚 rights and freedoms must be observed.鈥 But he also mentioned the state鈥檚 interest in population growth and thus its preference that pregnant women 鈥渄ecide to keep their baby,鈥 proposing that a large part of the solution to increasing the number of births was to appeal to the Russian 鈥渢raditional value鈥 of having a large family. Finally, Putin spoke about the need to address practical matters that affect the birth rate, such as the level of support provided to families with children and the conditions of hospitals where women give birth.
Putin鈥檚 conflicting yet relatively measured language regarding abortion reflects another Soviet legacy. The Soviet model of women鈥檚 emancipation recognized women鈥檚 rights to education and paid work, while also ensuring abortion access. While was never explicitly feminist in its reasoning, abortion on demand was its cornerstone. Putin鈥檚 rhetorical dance between the polar opposites of women鈥檚 rights and traditional values also resembles the messiness of the Soviet approach to abortion, which, as Mie Nakachi , combined state pro-natalism with a recognition of women鈥檚 right to control their own fertility.
At the same time, have introduced bans on 鈥渆ncouraging鈥 women to have abortions and have on private health clinics to stop providing pregnancy termination services. In addition, in October, the Ministry of Health to tighten the distribution of mifepristone and misoprostol, medications used in terminating early pregnancies. Currently the Duma is considering a federal ban on abortions in private clinics, which around 20 percent of these procedures.
The Future of Women鈥檚 and LGBTQ+ Rights in Russia
For the better part of Putin鈥檚 decades in power, mass audience events like the end-of-the-year press conference or the Direct Line have served as in which the president both explains his regime to broad audiences and maintains the appearance of an ongoing 鈥渄ialogue鈥 between himself and ordinary Russians. Judging by Putin鈥檚 silences on LGBTQ+ issues and his statements regarding abortion, we suspect that the Kremlin will continue the wholesale erasure of queer citizens鈥 rights but may not be as straightforward regarding restrictions on women鈥檚 rights. But Russia鈥檚 LGBTQ+ and women citizens are resisting.
Pushing LGBTQ+ Russians out of the country may lead to further mobilization of Russian queer diasporas abroad, and to new forms of transnational political activism. Both processes have already been for at least a decade, since Russia first adopted homophobia as a state policy. At the same time, with international borders closing and growing economic instability at home, emigration would be difficult if not impossible for most LGBTQ+ Russians. One of the goals for the transnational and migrant activist community should be finding new, possibly covert ways to support those unable to leave.
On Russian women鈥檚 rights, one important space to watch is the mounting by women relatives of mobilized soldiers. In recent months, they have been rallying to bring their husbands and sons back from the front lines. So far, despite the harsh criticisms of the mobilization, the war, and of Putin himself voiced on these women鈥檚 social media, the authorities have been reluctant to attack them openly as they have done to other antiwar activists, such as 鈥攑erhaps precisely because as soldiers鈥 wives and mothers they remain legitimate in the eyes of society.
At the same time, with Putin increasingly siding with ultraconservatives since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and with Russia continuing to experience a population decrease as a result of the loss of human life in the war and emigration, it seems likely that the pressure on women to have more children, with or without further restrictions on their reproductive rights, will only get stronger.
Meanwhile, as 鈥渢raditional values鈥 are used in Russia to justify the ongoing brutalization of Ukraine, millions of Ukrainian women are being affected by Russia鈥檚 war, including those whose reproductive rights were eradicated by sexualized violence, trauma to their health, displacement to Poland, where abortion is illegal, and damage to Ukraine鈥檚 health care infrastructure. Putin鈥檚 praise during the December press conference/Direct Line of his cousin, Anna Tsivilyova, the head of the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, suggests that the regime鈥檚 militarized traditional values paradigm will continue, perhaps even of Putin鈥檚 presidential term.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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