乐鱼 体育

BY OLENA LENNON

Since Russia鈥檚 launch of a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, it has been clear that Vladimir Putin鈥檚 鈥渟pecial operation鈥� did not go according to plan. Putin鈥檚 proclaimed goals of 鈥渄emilitarizing鈥� and 鈥渄enazifying鈥� the government of Ukraine鈥攃ombined with the Russian military posture and performance in the opening days of the invasion鈥攍ed many to conclude that Putin鈥檚 original war aims were nothing short of regime change in Kyiv.

However, faced with fierce Ukrainian defense and the West鈥檚 crippling economic sanctions, Putin appears to be recalculating his initial maximalist aims. Putin鈥檚 efforts to force Zelensky to concede on all demands鈥攍ay down arms, forswear membership in Western alliances, and recognize Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea and the independence of the "republics" in the Donbas鈥攚ould essentially amount to Ukraine鈥檚 surrender, and thus have proven futile.

Given the colossal failure of the Russian military to execute Putin鈥檚 political objectives, and faced with Ukraine鈥檚 resilience, supported by the West, Putin might be reducing his goals of 鈥渄emilitarizing鈥� Ukraine to destroying Ukraine鈥檚 economic, civilian, and defense infrastructure, sans political regime change鈥攁t least in the immediate future. Several signs of Putin's goal recalibration stand out.

First, after suffering tremendous equipment and human in the opening stages of the invasion, Russian forces are reportedly demoralized and exhausted, and face significant . Not only has Putin underestimated Ukraine's military鈥攚hich has been modernized, professionalized, and battle-hardened鈥攂ut he has overestimated the Russian military鈥檚 capability to achieve his maximalist aims.

Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, Russia's military was 鈥渘ot built for this war,鈥� and 鈥渋n terms of manpower, readiness, and logistics, it was not designed to sustain strategic ground offensives or hold large tracts of terrain, especially in a country the size of Ukraine.鈥� Nor were the Russians 鈥渞eady for unconventional warfare鈥� and urban fighting in Ukrainian cities, according to , a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

In light of the Russian military鈥檚 many deficiencies and poor performance, the Kremlin may be seeking not only an operational pause but also an abandonment of some of its maximalist aims, whose achievement would require a long-term commitment of forces Moscow cannot afford. 

Military losses have forced the Russians to change their tactics, most notably by making greater use of , but there may have been changes in Putin鈥檚 strategic calculus as well. As Russian ground troop advances have reportedly slowed, the strikes on critical infrastructure and military targets have intensified (the most recent strikes hit Yavoriv near the border with Poland and in Kyiv), as have indiscriminate .

These brutal, punitive strikes reflect the Kremlin鈥檚 frustration with the slow progress of the invasion and a desire to inflict more pain, force civilians to flee, and demoralize Ukraine鈥檚 political leadership. Attempts at holding some Ukrainian cities (such as Kherson and Melitopol) have already found the Russian military consumed and exhausted by urban fighting and civilian resistance, making the prospects of advancement grimmer by the day.

In light of these constraints, Putin鈥檚 miscalculated intent of 鈥渄emilitarizing鈥� Ukraine seems to be focused less on removing what he calls Ukraine鈥檚 鈥渘eo-Nazi鈥� government and more on destroying Ukraine鈥檚 military-industrial enterprises and critical infrastructure and hindering Ukraine鈥檚 ability to reconstruct, which assumes its survival as an independent state. 

Next, massive economic sanctions unleashed on Russia that were projected to cripple the Russian economy and military power in the are already . Meanwhile, the West鈥檚 to Ukraine have only increased in size and scope and will result in more losses for the Russian military. These losses, combined with economic pressures and rising domestic , may not only force Putin to the negotiating table with Zelensky (a move Putin has so far resisted) but threaten the very survival of the Putin regime.

Adding to Putin鈥檚 miscalculations is China鈥檚 unenthusiastic support of Russia. China remains a dark horse in this race. While China has not publicly condemned the Russian invasion, neither has it publicly supported it. Despite Putin鈥檚 and Xi Jinping鈥檚 friendly relationship and China鈥檚 opposition to Western sanctions, it is unclear whether China can fill the gaps in Russia鈥檚 economic and defense needs enough to sustain Russia鈥檚 war chest. Besides, China's desire to avoid economic consequences, including secondary sanctions, may to help Russia.

Under these conditions, Putin may soon be seeking sanctions relief, especially if his regime's survival is at stake. The establishment of humanitarian corridors enforced by ceasefires and an at least partial withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine will be seen as first steps in that direction. Based on Putin鈥檚 multiple miscalculations and the mounting pressure of military losses, economic sanctions, and domestic discontent, he is likely to seek an operational pause and explore opportunities for a negotiated settlement tied to sanctions relief.

The focus on as face-saving for either Putin or Zelensky might be misplaced. Putin will present any adjustments to his aims of Ukraine鈥檚 鈥渄emilitarization鈥� as original aims, allowing him to claim a victory. But even then, the viability of Putin鈥檚 regime might already be irrecoverable, regardless of the outcome of the war.

Zelensky, on the other hand, has already achieved many face-saving victories, not least in repelling Russian attacks, uniting Ukraine, and rallying the world in her support. Feedback loops between Zelensky, Ukraine鈥檚 armed forces, and civilians have reinforced Ukrainian statehood, patriotism, and resilience. However, it is incumbent upon Zelensky at this point to prevent further deaths and destruction and, as , a senior adviser to Zelensky, said, to 鈥渃ompartmentalize鈥� the sticking points related to Russia鈥檚 control of Crimea and some areas of the Donbas.

Whatever the terms of a future negotiated settlement and Ukraine鈥檚 鈥渄emilitarization,鈥� the West should continue its military and economic support of Ukraine. While negotiations are seen to buy time for Ukraine, and Russia may seem willing to scale down its ambitions, the fighting has been picking up, and waiting might create the dynamics and conditions for further miscalculations borne out of despair. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.