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Last month, in comments that did not get much notice in the United States but captured immediate attention throughout Asia, Kurt Campbell, President Biden鈥檚 Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the National Security Council, , 鈥淲e are not going to leave Australia alone on the field.鈥� This means that any improvement in U.S.-China relations will require China鈥檚 alleviating the economic and political pressure it has applied to Australia for the better part of the past year.

Campbell鈥檚 clear statement of U.S. support for its ally represents a significant and strategically important shift in the response to China鈥檚 efforts to divide and conquer. By conditioning the improvement of relations between the two superpowers on China鈥檚 treatment of not only the United States but its closest allies, America recognizes the need to against Chinese economic and political coercion.

Over the past year, Beijing has taken aim at an array of Australian goods and services. In May, soon after Australia called for an independent international investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic and began to strengthen its foreign investment controls, Beijing angrily imposed and then escalated trade sanctions. These included punitive measures to curtail imports of Australian barley, coal, cotton, timber, copper ore, meat, lobster, and wine. Since Australia sends nearly 40 percent of its exports to China, this series of actions was clearly meant to send the to Australia that its economy was at risk if it continued to take political actions displeasing to Beijing.

Sometimes the policies were explicit and targeted specific sectors; sometimes they were implicit and arrived with warnings that the 鈥淐hinese public is frustrated, dismayed and disappointed with what Australia is doing now.鈥�

The Chinese government also encouraged popular boycotts of certain Australian products, increased tariffs and import restrictions on Australian goods, filed nuisance complaints with multilateral organizations, heightened investigations of Australian imports, and carried out deliberate slowdowns affecting these imports in Chinese ports. Sometimes the policies were explicit and targeted specific sectors; sometimes they were implicit and arrived with that the 鈥淐hinese public is frustrated, dismayed and disappointed with what Australia is doing now.鈥�

While the methods vary, the use of trade as a tool of economic coercion and political intimidation is clear. The Chinese Communist Party uses the promise of access to the China market as both an incentive and a deterrent to other countries.Recent studies have documented the in both instances of Chinese coercive diplomacy and the in the range of taken against the United States and its allies. It is increasingly apparent that the Chinese government is using a deliberate set of policies to create a system in which Beijing鈥檚 preferences influence foreign and domestic policy decisions by other countries while shrinking their space for dissent

This is the context surrounding China鈥檚 campaign to punish Australia through economic coercion. Now, nearly a full year into the campaign, the . The initial results by no means show a clear win for Beijing. Though Australian exports to China dropped by nearly AU$20 billion (US$15.4 billion), much of those losses has been by diversification to new buyers in other countries. Admittedly, the effects have been felt unevenly. While Australian wine and beef exports to China have dropped precipitously and not yet found replacement buyers, most other commodities targeted by Beijing鈥攊ncluding coal, barley, copper, cotton, seafood, and timber鈥攈ave found buyers in alternative markets.

With Beijing continuing to look for new products and industries to target, it is premature to judge the overall effect on Australia鈥檚 economy or the long-term implications of China鈥檚 strategy. Still, the initial data suggest that China鈥檚 campaign of economic coercion has had only mixed results in its impact on Australian businesses. Indeed, it has forced many of them, under pressure, to adapt and diversify. That鈥檚 undoubtedly good news: It suggests that moves to diversify away from China can work, although certain sectors will find it easier than others to manage the shift. Also, businesses will now be far more likely to understand the China can inflict on other economies for non-commercial reasons and will include this contingency in their normal risk-management calculations.

China鈥檚 strong-arm tactics have caused a nosedive in the favorable perception of Beijing by the Australian public.

Furthermore, while the Australian government, as well as its business community and academic institutions, previously had a wide range of views on China and Australian policy toward it, the blatant recent economic coercion, and the exposure of Chinese influence and intimidation in Australia, have significantly shifted Australian public opinion: China鈥檚 strong-arm tactics have caused a nosedive in the favorable perception of Beijing by the Australian public. Unfavorable views of China have skyrocketed, and an overwhelming majority (94%) of those surveyed the government to reduce Australia鈥檚 economic dependence on China.

Allied governments can help educate the private sector in this regard and may be able to provide firms with incentives as they search for alternative markets. But as long as countries approach this challenge bilaterally, they are unlikely to make much headway. Beijing鈥檚 use of economic coercion toward nations, companies, and individuals around the world is unlikely to diminish, which will make it critical that governments work not just within their own countries to support efforts to diversify but also with one another to minimize the impact of Beijing鈥檚 tactics.

The Biden Administration鈥檚 initial moves on this front are encouraging as a sign of the beginnings of such an approach. It  should develop in partnership with its allies a joint statement of principles to guide their responses to economic coercion. Future success will depend on greater coordination among different countries鈥� economic policies, ranging from retaliatory sanctions to export controls. The likelihood of future success would also benefit from strengthening alternative supply chains, so as to build resilience in the event of both man-made and natural disruptions. Finally, the United States and its allies should consider establishing a public-private reserve fund to aid countries and entities targeted by Chinese economic coercion.

In the end, it will take a united front to defeat Beijing鈥檚 efforts to divide, conquer, and subdue.

This post on American Purpose, reprinted with permission.  All rights reserved.

is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a global fellow at the 乐鱼 体育. He was previously a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and served on the U.S. secretary of state鈥檚 Policy Planning Staff.

The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the 乐鱼 体育.