乐鱼 体育

BY MYKHAILO MINAKOV

As a student of the post-Soviet human, I am amazed to see how often political processes in contemporary Ukraine resemble those of its Soviet past. One such resemblance I see is between Volodymyr Zelenskyy鈥檚 policies and Mikhail Gorbachev鈥檚 .

Here I use the word 鈥減erestroika鈥� (literally 鈥渞eshaping鈥� or 鈥渞ebuilding鈥�) as a term for a political action that offers an alternative to the usual choice of revolution or reform, between overthrowing everything and starting anew or molding what one has into a different shape. In this context, then, revolution denotes an event of radical innovation and a new beginning in politics (or some other sphere of human activity). Reform, by contrast, is a change within a given political regime aimed at making it more effective and viable. Perestroika is in between.

When Gorbachev started to change the Soviet Union thirty-five years ago, he had in mind , especially industrial, economic, and political. But he soon learned that the Soviet system could not be reformed and he needed perestroika, something more than reform. In essence, he tried to open up the political and socioeconomic sectors to innovation while keeping intact the ruling regime. Thus he enforced some controlled political , some media freedom, called , some limited and , and the 鈥�new thinking,鈥� or a new approach to foreign relations. However, these steps were na茂ve and contradictory. And these contradictions ultimately led the USSR to self-destruct.

Zelenskyy electorally won on all political fronts in 2019. The mere fact of his victory introduced a Khrushchev-style to Poroshenko-era ideocratic politics. Diversity of opinion has increased in the mass media, along with a more openly critical stance on the national government. Zelenskyy鈥檚 first cabinet, that put together by former prime minister Oleksiy Honcharuk, was an outsider to systemic corruption, and the business community seemed to be happy with it. Inter-church conflicts also appeared to quiet down. And a hopeful belief that young people without political, policy, or administrative experience could bring lasting change to the system has been driving Zelenskyy鈥檚 perestroika of 2019鈥揺arly 2020.

Beneath all this, however, the essence of Zelenskyy鈥檚 perestroika lies in the attempt to tease apart two parts of Ukraine鈥檚 political system, the democratic fa莽ade and the shadow oligarchic state.

In my book , I analyzed how post-Soviet political systems evolved into a specific chiasm of formal and informal power institutions. There I showed that the formal fa莽ade of Ukraine was constructed as a set of weak democratic institutions that were under the invisible鈥攜et undeniable鈥攃ontrol of informal institutions. The main informal institutions were organized as oligarchic clans. These clans constantly competed, both among themselves and with sporadically independent government agencies, for control over official structures. The official structures included parliamentary factions, judges in courts, senior officials in the cabinet, governors, mayors, and so forth. Thus, by the time Zelenskyy entered the picture, Ukraine was a pluralist polity in which democracy was mixed with .

The more I study it, the more I am convinced: the perestroika of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2019 was actually directed at separating the formal institutions from the impact of the informal underworld. Unlike his predecessor, Zelenskyy did not belong to a clan, his own or any other. With the presidential administration under former chief of staff Andriy Bohdan, he tried to create a balanced system of clans, all held at arm鈥檚 length, that would not be able to intervene in the actions of the formal institutions. The policy of 鈥渘ew faces鈥� was conceived to bring into parliament and the cabinet people with no connections to the clans. The new president-led, single-party majority in government would function as a formal organization ensuring that the president鈥檚 agenda was supported by the Rada. Inexperienced but honest ministers would guarantee the ministries worked for the public good. A prosecutor general whose thinking was aligned with the president鈥檚 and who respected the rule of law would direct new and old law enforcement agencies to achieve a more just society in Ukraine. All these desiderata were expected to become part of officially sanctioned constitutional amendments and laws (and often these amendments are not of a liberal democratic nature). In this way the government would actually start working according to formal rules and for the public good.

Unlike Gorbachev, Volodymyr Zelenskyy turned out to be a fast learner. Simple solutions proved not to work in the dire conditions of Ukraine鈥檚 reality. One cannot make peace just by ing. And one cannot rebuild the Ukrainian state just by ignoring the informal groups that vast portions of the nation鈥檚 economic wealth, still financially support many MPs, judges, and mayors, and the mass media.

The recent personnel changes in the offices of the , cabinet, and might actually reflect Zelenskyy鈥檚 learning from the experiences of 2019. Now the new head of the presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, will have to find a new way to cope with Ukraine鈥檚 crises by negotiating deals with big business. President Zelenskyy鈥檚 March 16 with Ukrainian tycoons was dedicated to exploring ways his government could cooperate with the private sector on the most pressing national challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic and . The new cabinet is in the hands of people who, like Prime Minister and Minister of Economy , are the 鈥渘ew faces 鈥� sought by Zelenskyy and have broad experience working for oligarchic corporations, Ukrainian public establishments, and Western companies. Simultaneously, Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova, approved on March 17 by the Rada and the first woman in the post, is expected to exercise a 鈥渟trong hand鈥� in keeping the oligarchs (both supportive of and rival to Zelenskyy) and other informal groups under strict control.

Many experts have already Zelenskyy鈥檚 overhaul of the administration: they lean toward viewing the change of cabinet and prosecutor general as a sign of the oligarchs regaining their usual role. I do not necessarily find the personnel changes to be a sign of the administration鈥檚 defeat by the oligarchs. From the perspective of the oligarchic clans, the new cabinet remains the president-controlled executive. However, the new cadres on the presidential staff, in the cabinet, and heading up the law enforcement agencies may reflect a change of tactics in dealing with big business on Zelenskyy鈥檚 part鈥攁nd he might be more open to striking compromises with them鈥攂ut with the prior aim of his perestroika firmly in place: to prevent the oligarchs from misusing public institutions. It remains for the future to reveal whether the concessions lead to a return of (oligarchic-controlled) business as usual or whether they contribute to advancing Zelenskyy鈥檚 brand of perestroika, but with new means and at a different pace. And lurking on the periphery is the biggest question of all: whether Zelenskyy鈥檚 perestroika might end in failure, just as Gorbachev鈥檚 did.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.