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NKIDP e-Dossier no. 10, "DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqu茅," is introduced by Jong-dae Shin and features 25 translated Romanian documents which chart North Korea's changing approach to inter-Korean relations and Korean reunification following the historic July 4, 1972, Joint Communiqu茅 between North Korea and South Korea.

To view the 25 translated Romanian documents on inter-Korean relations and North Korea's strategies toward Korea's reunification in the mid-1970s, please click here or see the link below.

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DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqu茅

by Jong-dae Shin

The July 4th, 1972, Joint Communiqu茅 , the first document to be agreed upon by both North Korea and South Korea following the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, was of particular historical significance. Notably, through the Joint Communiqu茅, the two Koreas reached an agreement on the three principles for reunification (independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity). The Communiqu茅 also pushed the North-South dialogue to a new level, as both sides agreed to cease slandering one another, to begin various forms of exchanges, to setup a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang, and to form a South-North Coordinating Committee charged with easing tensions, preventing armed clashes, and solving the issue of unification

As this collection of Romanian documents makes clear, however, soon after the announcement of the Joint Communiqu茅, there was an intense disagreement between North Korea and South Korea over the interpretation of the three principles for reunification. While the two sides sparred in the months following the release of the Joint Communiqu茅, it was the establishment of the dictatorial yushin system in South Korea in October 1972 which caused North Korea to significantly revise its strategy on how to best achieve the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Reporting from Pyongyang and elsewhere throughout the world, Romanian diplomats had a unique vantage point from which to report and speculate upon Kim Il Sung鈥檚 changing approach to inter-Korean relations. Based on Romania鈥檚 assessments, it appears that North Korea initially believed that the North-South dialogue was an effective mechanism to undermine the Park Chung Hee government and to help the democratic forces in South Korea seize power. Yushin, however, enabled the removal of the opposition in South Korea and allowed Park Chung Hee to completely monopolize the North-South dialogue, forcing the North Korean government to communicate solely with South Korean officials. This derailed North Korea鈥檚 plan to push for the participation of the opposition and other anti-Park government forces in the North-South dialogue and the creation of a 2:1 dialogue structure favorable to the North. As a result, North Korea could not easily develop its own vision to use the North-South dialogue as a platform to achieve Korean reunification .

While visiting Romania in March 1973, Korean Workers鈥� Party Secretary Kim Dong-gyu met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceau葯escu and elaborated on this strategy. Kim stated that the North Korean peace offensive initiated in 1971 had succeeded in a number of ways, arguing that the campaign had eliminated the unjustifiable and false charges that North Korea was a belligerent country and thus called into question any justification for the continued stationing of U.S. troops in the South. Furthermore, according to Kim, North Korea had pushed the South Korean government into a state of confusion and panic by isolating the regime both domestically and internationally (. See also ). Kim explained that North Korea sought to expand the dialogue through the South-North Coordinating Committee and meetings of the Red Cross representatives, believing that these channels would permit contact with South Korean laborers, farmers, students, intellectuals, and other democratic forces who were sympathetic to North Korea鈥檚 positions. The North-South dialogue could have thus become a tacit mechanism for encouraging a revolution in South Korea. Following such a revolution, the North Koreans anticipated that a democratic leader would guide South Korea towards peaceful unification with the North. In short, North Korea鈥檚 strategy was to 鈥渦se dialogue to isolate the Park government.鈥� Secretary Kim also emphasized that socialist countries should refrain from establishing relations with South Korea, arguing that pressure on South Korea from home and abroad would force Park to accept the North Korean unification plan for the establishment of a 鈥淔ederal Republic of Goryeo鈥� .

Recognizing that South Korea would probably not allow the opposition to become involved in the North-South dialogue, however, North Korea began to adopt several other tactics. At the second South-North Coordinating Committee meeting held in Pyongyang in March 1973, for example, North Korea attempted to drive the South into a corner by calling for the resolution of military issues above all else (). This was an attempt by North Korea to test how genuine South Korea was toward unification and to expose to an international audience the 鈥渄uality of a south Korea that says it desires dialogue on the one hand but is passive toward military issues on the other鈥� (). From then on, North Korea began an effort to isolate the South through an international propaganda offensive, hoping that such maneuvers would also undermine Park Chung Hee鈥檚 regime domestically (, and ).

By summer 1973, only one year in the wake of the July 4th Joint Communiqu茅, the gap between the two Koreas had widened considerably. At this stage, North Korea also began to accuse South Korea of seeking to 鈥渆nshrine the division of Korea鈥� through the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations (). North Korea responded to the South Korean 鈥淛une 23 Statement鈥� with its own proposal, Kim Il Sung鈥檚 Five-Point Policy for National Reunification on June 25, 1973, which called for the creation of the 鈥淐onfederal Republic of Goryeo鈥� and for both Koreas to enter the United Nations 鈥渁s a sole state鈥� (). The cooling of North-South dialogue was as dramatic as its beginning.

Owing to the divergent approaches taken by the two Koreas toward reunification, on August 28, 1973, North Korea declared the nominal end of the North-South dialogue. Announced under the name of Kim Yeong-ju [Kim Yong Ju], who was then North Korea鈥檚 head for the South-North Coordinating Committee, the August 28 declaration stated specifically that the North could no longer continue negotiations with Lee Hu-rak [Yi Hu-rak]. Lee, the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and South Korea鈥檚 representative in the South-North Coordinating Committee, was accused by the North of having plotted both the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping and the 鈥渢wo-Korea鈥� plan presented in the South Korean 鈥淛une 23 Statement.鈥� Moreover, while recognizing the need for continuing dialogue between the two Koreas, Kim Yeong-ju called for the restart of talks by replacing Lee, repealing the 鈥淛une 23 Statement,鈥� and restructuring the South-North Coordinating Committee to include members of various political parties, civil groups, and community leaders ().

Recognizing that it could not achieve its own plan for reunification through negotiations with South Korea, North Korea moved toward a plan to conclude a peace treaty through direct negotiations with the U.S. (). Particularly during the period surrounding the termination of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) in November 1973, North Korea signaled its intention to resolve the issue and conclude a peace treaty, among other political and military issues on the Korean peninsula, through direct negotiations with the United States and not with South Korea. It was in this context that North Korea began to elevate the Northern Limit Line (NLL) into an area of dispute from late 1973 () in an attempt to create an atmosphere where issues involving peace on the Korean peninsula would have to be resolved through direct negotiations with the United States. Then in March 1974 North Korea replaced its past North-South Korean peace proposal with a proposal to conclude a peace treaty with the U.S. As North Korea attempted to establish direct contact with the U.S., the North-South dialogue stagnated as a result.

Of course, this North Korean strategy was also unsuccessful as the United States dared not respond positively to North Korea鈥檚 overtures in the mid-1970s. In May 1975, the North Korean ambassador to Moscow, Kwon Hee-gyong, thus stated that the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea and U.S. support to the Park Chung Hee government were barriers to the unification of the Korean peninsula and that North Korea was presently considering three routes鈥攑eaceful, military and revolutionary鈥攆or achieving Korean reunification ().

At the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly held in November 1975, two different resolutions proposed by the Western and Communist countries for the resolution of the 鈥淜orea question鈥� were passed simultaneously, which was nothing short of a bizarre turn of events. Perhaps unsurprisingly, North Korea was greatly encouraged that a resolution sympathetic to its own viewpoint had been passed in the U.N. for the first time in history. North Korea attempted to use this momentum to garner international support through the Non-Aligned Movement, the U.N. and other organizations for the termination of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, the widespread international uproar that occurred after the Panmunjeom [Panmunjom] axe-murder incident in August 1976 led to the end of the annual discussions of the 鈥淜orea question鈥� in the U.N. The Panmunjeom axe-murder incident severely damaged North Korea鈥檚 diplomatic offensive and marked the end of d茅tente on the Korean peninsula that had flowered in the early 1970s.

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Shin Jong-dae is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, Seoul, and a former Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow 乐鱼 体育. Professor Shin鈥檚 current research focuses on North Korea鈥檚 foreign relations and inter-Korean relations during the 1970s. His numerous publications include Principal Issues of South Korean Society and State Control (co-author) (Yonsei University, 2005) and Theory of Inter-Korean Relations (co-author) (Hanul, 2005), The Dynamics of Change in North Korea: An Institutionalist Perspective (co-author) (Kyungnam University Press, 2009), and U.S.-ROK Relations during the Park Jung Hee Administration (co-author) (Academy of Korean Studies, 2009).

The timely completion of this NKIDP e-Dossier was made possible via the work of Joanna Liu, Soomin Oh, Yuree Kim, and Ria Chae.

To download e-Dossier no. 10, "DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqu茅," and to view 34 newly translated Romanian documents about inter-Korean relations, please click here or see the link below.

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