乐鱼 体育

Russia鈥檚 most recent invasion of Ukraine is fast approaching its two-year anniversary, with no end in sight. Russia continues to put on a brave face on this military and economic quagmire,[1] with Prime Minister Mishustin recently claiming that many countries still want to pursue business, trade, and investment in Russia.[2] 

Such bravado does not do justice to President Putin鈥檚 ambitious foreign policy. He is contemplating no less than a new global security architecture, downgrading the U.S. and Europe while pursuing what he obliquely terms the new 鈥渕ultipolar world.鈥� In the process, Putin has lost sight of Russia鈥檚 traditional allies and partnerships in the post-Soviet space, revealing major fault lines in current Russian foreign policy.

More BRICS

Mishustin鈥檚 sunny presentation of Russia鈥檚 international portfolio primarily relies upon Russia鈥檚 leading role in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Not only does BRICS represent a major share of the world鈥檚 economy and population, but Mishustin also emphasized the recent expansion of the BRICS (Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Argentina) as emblematic of Russia鈥檚 rising global stature. With the additional members, Russian diplomats claim that the world is a step closer to ending Western dominance of international trade rules and the U.S. dollar as the primary currency of exchange.

The BRICS started out as a singular BRIC in 2001, designed as a marketing ploy by a Goldman Sachs banker. It expanded to include South Africa and then morphed into a genuine organization, complete with yearly summits and its own infrastructure bank. Russia views the BRICS as a potential rival to the West and uniter of the global south. It even has proposed creating its own internet. [3] Such grand plans, however, require the resolution of several structural obstacles, including the question of what currency will unite the organization and how to create an internal payment system.[4]

What the new members bring to the table, aside from oil wealth from a few countries, is unclear. Iran was the most sanctioned country in the world until Russia surpassed it. Both countries unilaterally renounced the use of the dollar,[5] which Russia views as a weapon of the U.S. [6] The new president of Argentina, however, immediately deviated from the BRICS playbook by pledging to abandon the peso in favor of the dollar. 

Russia has bet its global reputation and economic future on the BRICS. It recently assumed the leadership of the organization, although the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a formal strategy will not be introduced until 2025.[7] Perhaps the most notable sign of potential weakness in Russia鈥檚 bet on BRICS concerns restrictions on Putin鈥檚 international travel. Putin was unable to attend the summit in South Africa because of an outstanding warrant from the International Criminal Court. President Lulu of Brazil issued a similar warning if Putin decided to travel to Brazil for the upcoming G20 meeting. [8]

Russia鈥檚 Cacophony of Partnerships

While the BRICS aspires to be a global player, most of Russia鈥檚 long-standing pacts and associations are more regional in focus. The oldest of these groups is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an improvised attempt to somehow keep the post-Soviet states aligned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not much has been heard from the CIS since the early days of its founding. Although its most recent gathering occurred on October 13, 2023, it seems that membership remains in a state of confusion, with three countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) disavowing membership.[9] Putin still has great hopes for the CIS. He wants the security services of each member state to act collectively to ensure the social stability and cultural values of the region.[10]

One of the most promising post-Soviet initiatives (on paper) was the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This coupling of former Soviet states began its existence as a customs union and emerged in 2014 as a coalition to encourage free trade among its members (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia). Yet the EEU has never lived up to expectations, and the most recent meeting in August 2023 showed an organization adrift.[11] The original incentive for joining the Union centered on providing its members with favorable access to the Russian market. But at this recent gathering, several members highlighted the need to become an economic bloc that deals with transfers of technology, pharmaceuticals, machine construction, and so forth. Other countries wanted to discuss the new economic reality of the region, most notably how the imposition of sanctions against Russia had affected the Union.[12] Finally, members called for new institutions to be built, like a single system of credit ratings and regional financial regulations. But no concrete reforms emerged from this meeting; instead, members agreed to kick the can down the road and create a new strategy to be implemented between 2030 and 2045.[13]

One other problem hangs over these regional affiliations. The lingua franca of the EEU and CIS has always been Russian, the language of the former imperial power. Mishustin wants this to continue to remain the case.[14] A new law in Kyrgyzstan, however, recognized two state languages: Russian and Kyrgyz, which Mishustin considered problematic for the region鈥檚 overall economic integration. Putin subsequently weighed in to reinforce the use of the Russian language in the post-Soviet space.[15]

The Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCA), a Eurasian security, economic, and defense organization, similarly has fallen short of expectations. Its membership includes Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, and the nations of Central Asia (excluding Turkmenistan). The cohesion of this organization, however, remains in doubt. India has long considered Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism, while there is a growing rift between China and India because of the latter鈥檚 increased ties with the U.S. The group has not weighed in on Russia鈥檚 continuing aggression in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia鈥檚 most recent contribution to the SCA was a visit by Russian procurator Igor Krasnov to organize increased cooperation between prosecutors in Russia, China, Iran, and Mongolia (a candidate member of the SCA), with a distinct whiff of revived Soviet legal practice.[16]

In many ways, Kazakhstan stands as the bellwether for all of Russia鈥檚 regional configurations. Over the long months of Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the weakest links in the Western sanctions regime, primarily through soaring parallel imports entering Russia via Kazakhstan.[17] values Kazakhstan as a firm ally and assisted its government during recent unrest.[18] But Kazakhstan has publicly agreed to observe Western sanctions.[19] Other Central Asian countries have promised to follow suit.[20] The most recent public meeting between Putin and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev did not end well. Putin flubbed Tokayev鈥檚 name four times, prompting the Kazakh president to finish his speech in Kazakh, a clear diplomatic slight against President Putin.[21]

Armenia Opts Out 

If the EEU and the SCA are struggling, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is on life support.[22] The CSTO鈥檚 members include Russia, Armenia, and several Central Asian states, and it serves as a counter to NATO, without the mutual Article 5-style security guarantees. 

The main internal dispute within the CSTO concerns Armenia in the aftermath of Azerbaijan鈥檚 assault on and capture of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia鈥檚 Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinian, accused Russian peacekeepers of not fulfilling their responsibility (in his eyes) to prevent Azeri aggression. Armenia鈥檚 reaction was swift and decisive. It has offered humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, skipped the November 23 meeting of the CSTO in Minsk, and boycotted a meeting of the CIS.[23] Even more egregiously, Armenia recently ratified the Rome statutes, thereby placing itself under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Thus, like Russia鈥檚 BRICS partners South Africa and Brazil, Armenia is required to detain Putin if he enters Armenian territory.[24] Russia鈥檚 Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that Armenia鈥檚 decision would have negative consequences for bilateral relations.[25]

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan did not end with the defeat of Nagorno Karabakh. The Azeris are demanding the return of several international border crossings to an Azeri enclave that Armenia is currently blocking. Azerbaijan declares that this obstruction is damaging prospects for peace.[26] So the possibility of Russia being further dragged into this dispute is real. And Pashinian has only increased his rhetoric against Russia, accusing Russian television of destabilizing his country.[27] Even positive developments, like Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu鈥檚 recent announcement that the joint CSTO air defense system has been all but completed, does not change the perception of an organization in free fall.[28]

With Friends Like This??? 

Russia鈥檚 most important diplomatic relationship remains its partnership with China. Plenty of ink has been spilled analyzing both the threats and potential consequences their relationship represents. Both Russia and China consistently and confidently proclaim that a future multipolar world awaits global governance.[29] They further have declared that there will be 鈥渘o limits鈥� to the Russia-China relationship, and Beijing has surreptitiously aided the Kremlin鈥檚 war effort.[30] 

Nevertheless, Putin鈥檚 recent trip to China to mark the 10-year anniversary of China鈥檚 Belt and Road initiative did not go well for the Russian president. He procured no new trade deals on energy or agriculture.[31] Oil and gas exports from Russia are up, although China is allegedly receiving these products at a sharp discount. Russia has grand designs for the relationship, including increasing trade in yuan while pursuing a global policy of de-dollarization.[32]

President Xi remained circumspect when talking about future bilateral relations with Russia. He mentioned that the two leaders have formed good relations and a personal friendship. But one Russian analyst admitted that China 鈥渁lways acts in its own interest,鈥�[33] confirmed by a recent meeting between the EU and China.[34]Putin鈥檚 trip to China also reinforced the impression of Russia鈥檚 junior partner status in this relationship, a fact brought home by the recent China-U.S. summit in San Francisco. Xi proclaimed that the world was big enough for two powers.[35] He made no mention of a third. 

Finally, from Russia鈥檚 standpoint, the most stable international pact remains the Union State of Russia and Belarus. This pact dates back to the 1990s and was signed by Russia鈥檚 Boris Yeltsin and Belarus鈥檚 Alexander Lukashenko. The nature of this agreement (a commonwealth, confederation, a supranational state) has always been rather murky. After 24 years of existence, Prime Minister Mishustin just announced that a joint tax committee is almost in place.[36] Nevertheless, Belarus has been Russia鈥檚 staunchest supporter during the war in Ukraine, while Russia has long been Belarus鈥檚 main trade and energy partner. 

These longstanding ties, however, have not stopped Lukashenko from demanding compensation from Rosatom for the delay in the construction of a nuclear power plant, although the plant was only built thanks to a $10 billion loan from the Russian Federation.[37] Belarus also appears to be pursuing its own China policy, so even Russia鈥檚 most loyal partner seems willing to play international powers against Russia itself.[38] 

Conclusion

Russian foreign policy and its parade of confusing acronyms continues to churn. Moldova officially announced that it would no longer be a part of the CIS.[39] In a surprise move, Prime Minister Pashinian agreed to be head of the EEU, with the proviso that it remains a purely economic and not a political organization.[40]The UAE, the newly appointed member of BRICS that was theoretically to help lead the BRICS鈥� (and Russia鈥檚) overture to the global south, refused to open a bank account in the country for Rosneft to facilitate energy payments to India.[41] Finally, Argentina announced it would not in fact be joining the BRICS.[42]

Putin鈥檚 revolving door of coalition partners, however, cannot distract from his disastrous invasion of Ukraine. Putin finds itself in a war of attrition while trying to mobilize new troops just to keep this stalemate going. Putin may have scratched the imperial itch and annexed Ukrainian territory, but he must now defend a 600-mile front that is grinding down his military forces. His annexations in Ukraine have only added to Russia鈥檚 demographic crisis, since it has not added a younger population but merely a new crop of pensioners. In addition, his actions have alarmed his neighbors and, with Finland鈥檚 accession to NATO, more than doubled Russia鈥檚 border with the NATO alliance.

Putin still possesses substantial sources of revenue from gas and oil, but without the top prices that European customers previously paid. Instead, Russia has been forced to limit its exports of benzine and diesel, to stabilize the domestic market.[43] Even more disturbing, Russia has been forced to accept energy payments from India in rupees, a non-convertible currency that does not improve Russia鈥檚 balance sheet. 

Finally, the Russian economy has begun to feel the effect of global sanctions, with a host of problems (inflation, high interest rates, low investment, labor shortages, lack of access to Western technology and spare parts) that will eat at the Russian economy for years to come.[44] The impact of sanctions can also be swift and severe. On November 28, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the St. Petersburg stock exchange. The exchange immediately spiraled downwards and declared bankruptcy. .[45]Criminal indictments are most likely to follow.[46] International law may catch up to Putin as well, on such charges as war crimes and reparations.[47]

Russia still has resources to prop up its economy and keep the war effort going. How wisely Putin uses them remains an open question. Since the war (and before), Putin鈥檚 economic program can be summarized in the idea of 鈥渆conomic sovereignty.鈥�[48] Moreover, in terms of domestic spending, Putin appears to be focused on several grand projects and potential boondoggles, such a new railroad from Murmansk to the Amur district [49]and from Lugansk to Donetsk.[50] Putin professes the need to support small and medium-sized business, but only through a centralized national project.[51] Putin also likes to promote Russian technology, although the IT sector is facing a steep decline in wages[52] and significant brain drain.[53]

To counter these economic and geopolitical challenges, Russia must rely on a disparate group of partners cobbled together through past historical links, empty slogans, and long-standing resentments. Moreover, all of the problems confronting Russia鈥攅conomic, military, social鈥攁re linked and have the potential of cascading into each other during any crisis. 

Alas, the West has no time to gloat, since the test of all these global alliances鈥攂oth in Russia and the U.S.鈥攍ies just around the corner. If the U.S Congress decides not renew aid for Ukraine in early 2024, it will invariably weaken the Euro-Atlantic alliance while giving Putin a golden opportunity to increase the pressure on Ukraine. Moreover, there will be no second chances if Ukraine becomes a casualty of Western division and Putin鈥檚 aggression. We may not be sleepwalking into a major crisis; the facts are there for anyone who wants to see them. But if we don鈥檛 want to find out what Putin鈥檚 vision of a multipolar world actually looks like, we must support Ukraine now. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

[1] "袙 袣褉械屑谢械 蟹邪褟胁懈谢懈 芯 谐芯褌芯胁薪芯褋褌懈 卸懈褌褜 锌芯写 褋邪薪泻褑懈褟屑懈 械褖械 写械褋褟褌褜 谢械褌" [In the Kremlin, readiness was declared to live under sanctions for another ten years], The Moscow Times, October 24, 2023, . 

[2] 袛屑懈褌褉懈泄 袚芯薪褔邪褉褍泻 [Dmitry Goncharuk], "袦懈褕褍褋褌懈薪: 袨褔械薪褜 屑薪芯谐懈械 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁邪 褏芯褌褟褌 褋 薪邪屑懈 胁械褋褌懈 写械谢邪, 褌芯褉谐芯胁邪褌褜, 懈薪胁械褋褌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 胁 袪芯褋褋懈褞" [Mishustin: Many countries want to do business, trade, invest in Russia], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 (rg.ru), October 19, 2023, . 

[3] The Moscow Times, Telegram post, November 10, 2023, . 

[4] 袗薪邪褋褌邪褋懈褟 楔胁械褑芯胁邪 [Anastasia Shvetsova], "Putin 锌褉芯写芯谢卸懈褌 褉邪斜芯褌褍 BRICS" [Putin will continue working with BRICS], 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti], August 24, 2023, .  

[5] Jai Hamid, 鈥淩ussia, Iran finally dump the US dollar for good鈥�, Cryptopolitan, December 27, 2023,  

[6] 袗谢械泻褋邪薪写褉 袥械薪懈薪 [Alexander Lenin] 鈥溞浶靶惭�芯胁: 小楔袗 懈褋锌芯谢褜蟹褍褞褌 写芯谢谢邪褉 胁 泻邪褔械褋褌胁械 芯褉褍卸懈褟鈥� [Lavrov: The US is using the dollar as a weapon], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 27, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/11/27/lavrov-ssha-ispolzuiut-dollar-v-kachestve-oruzhiia.html?ysclid=lqy89mzo5c127104876

[7] 袠胁邪薪 小褘褋芯械胁 [Ivan Sysoev] 鈥溞溞樞�: 袩邪褉褌薪械褉褘 锌芯 袘袪袠袣小 锌芯写写械褉卸邪谢懈 锌谢邪薪褘 锌褉械写褋械写邪褌械谢褜褋褌胁邪 袪肖 胁 芯褉谐邪薪懈蟹邪褑懈懈鈥� [MFA: BRICS partners supported the plans of the Russian Federation's chairmanship in the organization], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], December 3, 2023,  

[8] "袘褉邪蟹懈谢懈褟 芯褌泻邪蟹邪谢邪褋褜 谐邪褉邪薪褌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 袩褍褌懈薪褍, 褔褌芯 械谐芯 薪械 邪褉械褋褌褍褞褌 薪邪 褋邪屑屑懈褌械 G20" [Brazil Refused to Guarantee Putin That He Won't Be Arrested at G20 Summit], The Moscow Times, April 12, 2023, .  

[9] 袗泄褋械谢褜 袚械褉械泄褏邪薪芯胁邪 [Aysel Gereyhanova], "Putin 胁褘褋泻邪蟹邪谢褋褟 锌褉芯 袚褉褍蟹懈褞, 校泻褉邪懈薪褍 懈 袦芯谢写邪胁懈褞, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 褔懈褋谢褟褌褋褟 胁 小袧袚" [Putin Spoke About Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Which Are Part of the CIS], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], October 13, 2023, .

[10] The Moscow Times, Telegram post, November 8, 2023, . 

[11] Evgeny Troitskiy, "The Eurasian Economic Union: Five Great Expectations and Hard Times," The Russia File, Kennan Institute, January 14, 2020, /blog-post/eurasian-economic-union-five-great-expectations-and-hard-times. 

[12] David Pierson, Anatoly Kurmanaev, and Sameer Yasir, "Putin, Xi and Modi Meet at Shanghai Summit," The New York Times, July 4, 2023, . 

[13] "袚谢邪胁褘 褋褌褉邪薪 袝袗协小 锌褉芯胁械谢懈 懈褌芯谐芯胁芯械 胁 褝褌芯屑 谐芯写褍 蟹邪褋械写邪薪懈械" [The heads of the EAEU countries held this year's final meeting], 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], December 25, 2023, . 

[14] "袣芯屑褍 鈥� 胁褌芯褉芯泄 褉芯写薪芯泄, 泻芯屑褍 鈥� 锌械褉胁褘泄 懈薪芯褋褌褉邪薪薪褘泄" [For Some, It鈥檚 the Second Nature, for Others, the First Foreign], 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], October 27, 2023, . 

[15] 袙谢邪写懈屑懈褉 袣褍蟹褜屑懈薪 [Vladimir Kuzmin], "袩褍褌懈薪 锌褉懈蟹胁邪谢 褋褌褉邪薪褘 小袧袚 褉械褕懈褌褜 锌褉邪泻褌懈褔械褋泻懈械 胁芯锌褉芯褋褘 褉邪斜芯褌褘 屑械卸写褍薪邪褉芯写薪芯泄 芯褉谐邪薪懈蟹邪褑懈懈 锌芯 褉褍褋褋泻芯屑褍 褟蟹褘泻褍" [Putin Called on CIS Countries to Resolve Practical Issues of the International Organization for the Russian Language], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], December 18, 2023, . 

[16] 袠胁邪薪 袝谐芯褉芯胁 [Ivan Yegorov], "袠谐芯褉褜 袣褉邪褋薪芯胁 锌褉芯胁械谢 锌械褉械谐芯胁芯褉褘 芯斜 褍泻褉械锌谢械薪懈懈 褋芯褌褉褍写薪懈褔械褋褌胁邪 褋 袣懈褌邪械屑, 袠褉邪薪芯屑 懈 袦芯薪谐芯谢懈械泄" [Igor Krasnov Held Talks on Strengthening Cooperation with China, Iran, and Mongolia], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 7, 2023, . 

[17] Rahimbek Abdrahmanov and Kamshat Zhumagulova, "How Kazakhstan Helps Russia Bypass Western Sanctions," The Diplomat, October 25, 2023, . 

[18] "袨褌薪芯褕械薪懈褟 袪芯褋褋懈懈 懈 袣邪蟹邪褏褋褌邪薪邪 锌褉芯胁械褉械薪褘 胁褉械屑械薪械屑 懈 褉邪蟹胁懈胁邪褞褌褋褟 锌芯 胁芯褋褏芯写褟褖械泄" [Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan Have Been Tested by Time and Are Developing on the Rise], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 8, 2023, .

[19] 孝芯泻邪械胁: 袣邪蟹邪褏褋褌邪薪 斜褍写械褌 褋谢械写芯胁邪褌褜 褋邪薪泻褑懈芯薪薪芯屑褍 褉械卸懈屑褍 胁 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 [Tokayev: Kazakhstan will follow the sanctions regime against Russia], September 28, 2023, . 

[20] "孝芯褉谐芯胁谢褟 械褋褌褜 褌芯褉谐芯胁谢褟: 胁 袣懈褉谐懈蟹褋褌邪薪械 蟹邪褟胁懈谢懈, 褔褌芯 袘懈褕泻械泻 褋芯斜谢褞写邪械褌 褋邪薪泻褑懈懈 锌褉芯褌懈胁 袪肖 锌芯 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯褋褌懈" [Trade is Trade: In Kyrgyzstan, They Stated That Bishkek Observes Sanctions Against Russia as Much as Possible], The Moscow Times, July 12, 2023, . 

[21] Nick Mordowanec, "Putin Struggling to Pronounce Ally鈥檚 Name Raises Eyebrows," Newsweek, November 9, 2023, .

[22] 鈥溞Ｑ囆把佈傂叫感盒� 屑懈薪懈褋褌械褉褋泻芯泄 胁褋褌褉械褔懈 泻芯薪褋褌邪褌懈褉芯胁邪谢懈 锌谢邪褔械胁薪芯械 褋芯褋褌芯褟薪懈械 袨袘小袝鈥� [Participants of the ministerial meeting noted the deplorable state of the OSCE], 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], December 1, 2023, . 

[23] The Moscow Times, Telegram post September 6, 2023, .; "袩邪褕懈薪褟薪 薪械 斜褍写械褌 褍褔邪褋褌胁芯胁邪褌褜 胁 褋邪屑屑懈褌械 袨袛袣袘 胁 袦懈薪褋泻械" [Pashinyan Will Not Participate in the CSTO Summit in Minsk], The Moscow Times, November 14, 2023,  . , "袗褉屑械薪懈褟 卸写械褌 锌芯屑芯褖懈 褋 写邪谢褜褕械" [Armenia Awaits Assistance from Abroad], 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], September 7, 2023, . 

[24]  袦邪泻褋懈屑 笑褍谢邪薪芯胁 [Maxim Tsulanov], "袩邪褉谢邪屑械薪褌 袗褉屑械薪懈懈 褉邪褌懈褎懈褑懈褉芯胁邪谢 袪懈屑褋泻懈泄" [Armenian Parliament Ratifies the Rome Statute], 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti], October 3, 2023, . 

[25] 挟褉懈泄 袣芯谐邪谢芯胁 [Yuri Kogalov], "袦袠袛: 袪邪褌懈褎懈泻邪褑懈褟 袗褉屑械薪懈械泄 袪懈屑褋泻芯谐芯 褋褌邪褌褍褌邪 斜褍写械褌 懈屑械褌褜 薪械谐邪褌懈胁薪褘械 锌芯褋谢械写褋褌胁懈褟 写谢褟 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈泄" [MFA: Armenia's Ratification of the Rome Statute Will Have Negative Consequences for Relations], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], September 28, 2023, . 

[26] The Moscow Times, Telegram post November 9, 2023, . 

[27] "袩邪褕懈薪褟薪 芯斜胁懈薪懈谢 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯械 褌械谢械胁懈写械薪懈械 胁 锌芯锌褘褌泻械 写械褋褌邪斜懈谢懈蟹懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 袗褉屑械薪懈褞" [Pashinyan Accused Russian Television of Attempting to Destabilize Armenia], The Moscow Times, November 24, 2023, . 

[28] 袗薪邪褋褌邪褋懈褟 小械谢懈胁邪薪芯胁邪 [Anastasia Selivanova], "小械褉谐械泄 楔芯泄谐褍 褋芯芯斜褖懈谢 芯 褋芯蟹写邪薪懈懈 芯斜褗械写懈薪械薪薪芯泄 褋懈褋褌械屑褘 袩袙袨 褋褌褉邪薪-褔谢械薪芯胁 袨袛袣袘" [Sergei Shoigu Announced the Creation of a Unified Air Defense System for CSTO Member Countries], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 26, 2023, .

[29] 袗泄褋械谢褜 袚械褉械泄褏邪薪芯胁邪 [Aysel Gereyhanova], "袩褍褌懈薪: 袪芯褋褋懈褟 懈 袣懈褌邪泄 胁褘褋褌褍锌邪褞褌 褋 械写懈薪褘褏 锌芯蟹懈褑懈泄 褎芯褉屑懈褉芯胁邪薪懈褟 屑薪芯谐芯锌芯谢褟褉薪芯谐芯 屑懈褉邪" [Putin: Russia and China Advocate Unified Positions in Shaping a Multipolar World], 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], September 20, 2023, .   

[30] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Assessment of China鈥檚 Support to Russia in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Ukraine." House Intelligence Committee. July 2023. . 

[31] Pyotr Kozlov, "As Putin Leaves China Empty-Handed, Russian Propaganda Hails Triumph Over the West," The Moscow Times, October 19, 2023, .  

[32] Hugo von Essen, "Russia-China Economic Relations since the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine," Swedish Institute of International Affairs, July 5, 2023. .  

[33] 袝谢械薪邪 袦褍褏邪屑械褌褕懈薪邪 [Yelena Mukhametshina], 袙谢邪写懈屑懈褉 袣褍谢邪谐懈薪 [Vladimir Kulagin]. "袩褍褌懈薪 锌褉芯胁械谢 锌械褉械谐芯胁芯褉褘 褋 小懈 笑蟹懈薪褜锌懈薪芯屑" [Putin Held Talks with Xi Jinping]. 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti]. October 19, 2023. Accessed [Access Date], . 

[34] "小懈 笑蟹懈薪褜锌懈薪 胁褋褌褉械褌懈谢褋褟 褋 褉褍泻芯胁芯写懈褌械谢褟屑懈 袝小" [Xi Jinping Met with EU Leaders]. 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta]. December 8, 2023., . 

[35] Aamer Madhani, Colleen Long, and Didi Tang, "Biden and Xi to Meet at APEC in San Francisco," The Washington Post, November 16, 2023, . 

[36] 袙谢邪写懈屑懈褉 袣褍蟹褜屑懈薪 [Vladimir Kuzmin]. "袦懈褕褍褋褌懈薪: 袩褉邪泻褌懈褔械褋泻懈 胁褋械 谐芯褌芯胁芯 泻 蟹邪锌褍褋泻褍 薪邪写薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯谐芯 薪邪谢芯谐芯胁芯谐芯 泻芯屑懈褌械褌邪 小芯褞蟹薪芯谐芯 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁邪" [Mishustin: Almost Everything Is Ready for Launch of Supranational Tax Committee of the Union State]. 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta]. November 29, 2023, . 

[37] 袠谢褜褟 袥邪泻褋褌褘谐邪谢 [Ilya Lakstygal], 袗谢械泻褋邪薪写褉 袙芯谢芯斜褍械胁 [Alexander Volobuev]. "袥褍泻邪褕械薪泻芯 锌芯褌褉械斜芯胁邪谢 褍 袪芯褋褋懈懈 泻芯屑锌械薪褋邪褑懈懈 蟹邪 蟹邪写械褉卸泻褍 褋 袗协小" [Lukashenko Demanded Compensation from Russia for Delay with the Nuclear Power Plant]. 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti]. November 1, 2023, . 

[38] 袗谢械泻褋械泄 袪褘斜懈薪 [Alexey Rybin]. "小懈 笑蟹懈薪褜锌懈薪 锌褉械写谢芯卸懈谢 袥褍泻邪褕械薪泻芯 褋屑械薪褟褌褜 褋懈褋褌械屑褍 谐谢芯斜邪谢褜薪芯谐芯 褍锌褉邪胁谢械薪懈褟" [Xi Jinping Proposed Lukashenko Change the Global Governance System]. 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta]. December 4, 2023, . 

[39] 鈥溞溞拘恍葱拘残� 芯斜褗褟胁懈谢邪 芯 锌谢邪薪邪褏 胁褘泄褌懈 懈蟹 小袧袚 泻 泻芯薪褑褍 2024 谐芯写邪鈥�  [Moldova announced plans to leave the CIS by the end of 2024 ]The Moscow Times, December 21, 2023, . 

[40] 鈥溞愌�屑械薪懈褟 谐芯褌芯胁懈褌褋褟 蟹邪泻谢褞褔懈褌褜 屑懈褉 褋 袗蟹械褉斜邪泄写卸邪薪芯屑 懈 胁芯蟹谐谢邪胁懈褌褜 袝袗协小鈥� [Armenia is preparing to make peace with Azerbaijan and lead the EAEU], 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], December 26, 2023, .

[41] Nidhi Verma, 鈥淧ayment woes delay supply of Russian Sokol oil to India -sources鈥�, Reuters, December 26, 2023, . 

[42] 鈥溞⌒溞�: 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌 袗褉谐械薪褌懈薪褘 袦懈谢械泄 芯褎懈褑懈邪谢褜薪芯 芯褌泻谢芯薪懈谢 锌褉懈谐谢邪褕械薪懈械 胁褋褌褍锌懈褌褜 胁 袘袪袠袣小鈥� 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], , December 26, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6440685?from=top_main_9

[43] 袛邪褉褜褟 小邪胁械薪泻芯胁邪 [Darya Savenkova]. "袨谐褉邪薪懈褔懈谢芯 褝泻褋锌芯褉褌 斜械薪蟹懈薪邪" [Restricted the Export of Gasoline]. 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti]. September 21, 2023, . 

[44] Anders Aslund, "Why the Russian Economy鈥檚 Luck Is Running Out," The Moscow Times, November 21, 2023, . 

[45] 袧邪 小袩袘 袘懈褉卸械 锌芯褌芯褉谐芯胁邪谢懈 斜邪薪泻褉芯褌褋褌胁芯屑 [Bankruptcy was traded on the St. Petersburg Exchange]." 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant]. November 27, 2023, . 

[46] 笑袘 褋褉邪胁薪懈谢 褋 锌褉械褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈械屑 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褞 胁芯泻褉褍谐 谢芯卸薪芯谐芯 斜邪薪泻褉芯褌褋褌胁邪 芦小袩袘 斜懈褉卸懈禄 [The Central Bank compared the situation around the false bankruptcy of St. Petersburg Exchange to a crime] 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti]. November 28, 2023  

[47] "小褌褉邪薪褘 G7 写芯谐芯胁芯褉懈谢懈褋褜 薪械 胁芯蟹胁褉邪褖邪褌褜 袪芯褋褋懈懈 邪泻褌懈胁褘 斜械蟹 泻芯屑锌械薪褋邪褑懈泄 校泻褉邪懈薪械 [G7 Countries Agreed Not to Return Assets to Russia Without Compensation to Ukraine]." 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌褗 [Kommersant], November 8, 2023, . 

[48] 袚褉懈薪泻械胁懈褔, 袛屑懈褌褉懈泄 [Grinkevich, Dmitry], 袗薪褌芯薪 袣芯蟹谢芯胁 [Anton Kozlov], and 携褉芯褋谢邪胁邪 袣芯褋褌械薪泻芯 [Yaroslava Kostenko]. "袣邪泻 斜褍写械褌 褉邪斜芯褌邪褌褜 锌褉械写褋褌邪胁谢械薪薪邪褟 袩褍褌懈薪褘屑 薪芯胁邪褟 屑芯写械谢褜 褉邪蟹胁懈褌懈褟 袪芯褋褋懈懈 [How Putin's Newly Presented Model for Russia's Development Will Work]." 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti], June 19, 2023.  

[49] 袚械褉械泄褏邪薪芯胁邪, 袗泄褋械谢褜 [Aysel Gereyhanova]. "袩褍褌懈薪 写邪谢 褋褌邪褉褌 写胁懈卸械薪懈褞 薪邪 薪芯胁芯泄 卸写 谢懈薪懈懈 胁 袦褍褉屑邪薪褋泻芯泄 芯斜谢邪褋褌懈 懈 蟹邪锌褍褋褌懈谢 薪芯胁褘泄 褌芯薪薪械谢褜 胁 袗屑褍褉褋泻芯泄 芯斜谢邪褋褌懈 [Putin Launched Movement on a New Railway Line in Murmansk Region and Started a New Tunnel in Amur Region]." 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], December 15, 2023, . 

[50] 孝褍谢褍锌芯胁, 袙邪褋懈谢懈泄 [Vasily Tulupov]. "袩褍褌懈薪: 褋褌褉芯懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁芯 袙小袦 胁 袛芯薪械褑泻械 懈 袥褍谐邪薪褋泻械 [Putin: Construction of VSM in Donetsk and Luhansk]." 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈 [Vedomosti], December 15, 2023,  

[51] 袟邪屑邪褏懈薪邪, 孝邪褌褜褟薪邪 [Tatiana Zamakhina]. "袙 袪芯褋褋懈懈 锌芯写谐芯褌芯胁褟褌 薪芯胁褘泄 薪邪褑锌褉芯械泻褌 锌芯 褉邪蟹胁懈褌懈褞 屑邪谢芯谐芯 斜懈蟹薪械褋邪 [In Russia, a New National Project on Small Business Development Will Be Prepared]." 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟 谐邪蟹械褌邪 [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], October 23, 2023, . 

[52] "袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻懈械 袠孝-褋锌械褑懈邪谢懈褋褌褘 锌芯卸邪谢芯胁邪谢懈褋褜 薪邪 褋薪懈卸械薪懈械 蟹邪褉锌谢邪褌 懈 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘 褋 褍写邪谢褢薪泻芯泄 [Russian IT Specialists Complained About Decreased Salaries and Remote Work Issues]." The Moscow Times, December 14, 2023. . 

[53] Alexander Marrow, Polina Devitt 鈥淓xclusive: Fear of tech 'brain drain' prevents Russia from seizing Yandex for now, sources say鈥�, Reuters, August 10, 2023,