乐鱼 体育

Introduction

In his February interview with Tucker Carlson, Vladimir Putin raised concerns about the existential threat scientific and technological advances in genetics pose to humanity. [1] He compared the scale and magnitude of these 21st century advances with nuclear weapons in the 20th century. Drawing on precedents from the nuclear age, Putin stressed the importance of international dialogue to regulate the risks of irresponsible genetic applications. This is not the first time the Kremlin has placed issues of health, biomedical science, and biotechnology within a broader array of security problems. Russia鈥檚 approach to health policy offers a window into its government's mindset and strategic planning and suggests a framework for how the West should engage, or not engage, with Russia on issues like health and science.

Consolidating Control over Health

The linkage between state security and public health emerged during Russia鈥檚 economic and political upheavals of the 1990s. Russia experienced an economic contraction worse than America鈥檚 Great Depression. Along with the lack of economic security and political stability came a host of negative impacts on public health and demographic trends, including shrinking birth rates, lower life expectancy, a surge in drug and alcohol abuse, the spread of HIV, and even suicide. New systems of post-communist public health and epidemiology were desperately needed.

By the late 1990s, Russia had started reimagining a domestic system of public health and epidemiological surveillance. In addition to elevated individual health risks, Russia found itself confronting dangerous disease outbreaks after the collapse of the USSR. These included outbreaks of measles and diphtheria in Moscow in 1993 and cholera in Dagestan in 1994. [2] Authorities saw an urgent need for a different approach to health security in a country that no longer had the centralized control of the Soviet system. The combination of post-Soviet reforms and economic decline robbed the health system of resources while introducing new models of healthcare delivery. The early results of that transition brought improved care for those able to afford it. Few could afford it, however. The new Russian government also sought a post-Cold War strategy that would incorporate health, biological, and chemical threats into national security policy. [3] The defense community saw increased risks for the nation in the wake of decisions to curtail biomedical research and cut spending at a time when potential adversaries abroad advanced their own scientific and technological capabilities, widening the technological gap and potentially compromising long-term security. 

For Russian policymakers, these challenges threatened catastrophe both in terms of demographics and national security. Their solution mirrored their economic reforms: strive to integrate into the existing world system and eventually gain international influence, but also strengthen state authority and rethink approaches to the national security at the same time. 

Turning from Public Health to Health Security

The idea of health emergencies and biological risks as a part of national security started to take shape even when Russia鈥檚 focus was on global integration. Russian defense and security communities had become convinced that Cold War nuclear deterrence did not completely address modern threats, which included epidemics and the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. [4] As Russia began to improve both its political stability and economic performance, the Kremlin facilitated a joint decree to advance the integration of Russian health and security policies. [5]

The decree directed the Ministries of health and defense to establish a new laboratory for especially dangerous and exotic infectious diseases. [6] The Ministry of Health provided health data on the morbidity and mortality of epidemic diseases to the Ministry of Defense as a matter of national security. This decree followed the first  Federal Program (a legal document of strategic importance) focused on defending the population, troops, and territory of the Russian Federation from different pathogens. [7] While the Federal Program initially emphasized the democratic nature of the new requirements, prioritizing interagency cooperation, the eventual effect of the decrees was to shift the nation鈥檚 approach to health care back to Soviet-era epidemiological surveillance attitudes and practices.[8] As during the tsarist and Soviet eras, the state was to take precedence over the individual.

The game-changing situation for the policy balance between security and health was the reform of the state management system. [9] Gennady Onishchenko, Russia鈥檚 first deputy minister of health during the late 1990s, in 2004 was appointed the head of a new agency: the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor). [10] He was granted extensive supervisory authority, along with direct ties to security agencies. In practical terms, the function of public health was now subordinated to security agencies, and priority was given to increasing the role of sanitary control and health surveillance while reducing the status of the Ministry of Health. [11] This reform was described in the press at the time as a 鈥渟pecial operation,鈥� a 鈥渂litz-reform,鈥� and a key step in the construction of President Putin鈥檚 vertical of power. [12]

Russia's turn towards the securitization of health flourished amid international challenges in the early Putin era. For instance, Washington鈥檚 refusal to sign protocols for enforcing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), combined with a series of anthrax letter attacks in the United States (both occurring in 2001), raised the level of concern and frustration over the issue in both countries. [13] Russia worked to showcase its health securitization efforts, and in the process bolster its global influence, by proposing to feature it on the G8 agenda in 2006. [14] Russia eagerly accepted US-led amendments to the International Health Regulations that helped later to integrate Rospotrebnadzor as the WHO national coordinator for communicable disease risks and outbreaks into global health system in 2007. [15] During the Dmitry Medvedev presidency, health was one of the 16 featured sub-groups in the U.S.鈥揜ussia Bilateral Presidential Commission. The work of this commission was suspended in the wake of Ukraine conflict in 2014. [16]

Reimagining the Case of the Sputnik V Vaccine 

The clearest demonstration of the Russian state鈥檚 use of public health policy prioritizing international influence and security came with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. By this time, relations between Russia and the West were growing worse, so COVID-19, instead of empowering mechanisms of cooperation, showcased Russia鈥檚 approach to competition between great powers during a global health crisis. [17]

As part of this competition, Russia raced to produce the world鈥檚 first vaccine. It succeeded, launching a COVID vaccine in August 2020. Authorities named the vaccine Sputnik V to evoke Soviet Russia鈥檚 technological victory in sending the first satellite into space. The messaging was clear: Russia was presenting itself as a scientifically and technologically advanced country, like its Soviet predecessor during the Cold War. The Sputnik V vaccine was used for international distribution as well as for domestic vaccination; Russian scientists would go on to produce two additional vaccines that were mainly for domestic vaccinations. Neither had a title so grandiose as Sputnik V. 

From the standpoint of established international rules, Russia failed to meet three important requirements with Sputnik V. First, it did not follow international ethical and legal protocols for the clinical trials. Second, the Kremlin ignored international vaccine approval procedures (Sputnik V still lacks WHO approval). Third, because of this lack of approval, Russia was barred from using global health distribution networks, including WHO鈥檚 COVAX system, for its vaccine delivery. In the view of Western experts, Russia鈥檚 vaccine development and deployment was largely a failure.

Yet Moscow鈥檚 priorities during this episode are better understood through traditional Russian approaches to military and political thinking. In the Kremlin鈥檚 view, Sputnik V diplomacy was smart and successful foreign policy campaign. [18] The Sputnik V enhanced Russia鈥檚 scientific reputation because it was first to be developed. Further, Russia鈥檚 international distribution of its vaccine stood in stark contrast with Western nations that prioritized their own domestic supply and vaccine patent profits. 

Even though Sputnik V is not as technologically advanced as the mRNA vaccines from Moderna and Pfizer, it was the only COVID-19 vaccine with its own multilingual website. The Kremlin used modern digital tools in a global marketing campaign for its national brand in health, emphasizing the moral factor in international affairs through its model of vaccine distribution. It was largely successful in creating a widely shared public perception throughout much of the Global South that its vaccine saved lives, saved lives first, and saved lives in contrast to Western vaccine nationalism. [19] The Kremlin鈥檚 Sputnik V campaign succeeded, at least for a time, in redefining Russia鈥檚 global image beyond that of a 鈥渞egional power.鈥� [20]

The Future of Russian Health Security 

The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020鈥�21 solidified Russia's treatment of public health as an issue of security in domestic and foreign policy, prompting shifts in industry, law, and institutions. The pandemic, considered virtually from the outset as a security issue, redirected resources from more mundane but pervasive domestic health issues like cardiovascular disease, drug-resistant tuberculosis, and other persistent risks that affect Russia's demographic trends. 

At first, Russia created, from scratch, a domestic network of pharmaceutical plants and supply chains using partnerships between pharmaceutical companies and regional governments to produce tests, vaccines, and COVID-19 medications. Then Russia passed a federal law in 2020 on biosecurity that articulated such concepts as "biological threat," "biological risk," and "biological security鈥� in its health policy. [21] The law defined the powers of state authorities and established a procedure for constant national monitoring of biological risks. 

That same year, Putin formed a new interagency commission of the Security Council on countering contemporary threats to biological security, tasked with overseeing national response to threats associated with the spread of infectious diseases and antimicrobial resistance. [22] This commission included key health policy agencies (the Ministry of Health, the Federal Medical and Biological Agency, Rospotrebnadzor) and law enforcement agencies. 

Drawing lessons taken from COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy, Putin announced, in April 2021, a new surge of public health and biodefense reforms: 鈥淲e need to ensure Russia鈥檚 independence in the production of the full range of vaccines, substances for pharmaceuticals, including drugs against infections that are resistant to the current generation of antibiotics. We must have a powerful, reliable shield in the field of sanitary and biological security.鈥� [23] Thereafter, the government launched a new strategic initiative, 鈥淪anitary Shield,鈥� aimed at ensuring that the next epidemic would not require lockdown. [24]

Sanitary Shield is a federal informational system presenting a new level of centralization in public health based on two features managed by Rospotrebnadzor. The first part is a scientific infrastructure of 15 high-level protection laboratories and 241 checkpoints across Russian borders. The speedy processing of data collected at checkpoints will contribute to the aim of sequencing the genome of viruses within 24 hours. Test systems will be ready in four days and vaccines in four months. The second part is digital infrastructure鈥攖he database is called 鈥淧erimeter鈥濃�攂ased on AI solutions to analyze epidemiological situations and to impose better control over health data. 

The new Russian National Security Strategy (NSS), adopted in July 2021, consolidated all the provisions mentioned above. It substituted public health risks associated with noncommunicable diseases (cancer, cardiovascular issues, endocrine disorders, etc.) that were mentioned in the 2009 and 2015 NSS with concepts of "bioterrorism" and "dangerous infectious diseases." [25] The 2021 NSS emphasized the connection between health and security, echoing ideas Putin introduced in 2012 regarding the future of warfare and modernized weapons. These are based on 鈥渘ew physical principles" like geophysical, genetic, and psychophysiological that are 鈥渃omparable with nuclear weapons but more 鈥榓cceptable鈥� in political and military terms". [26] This is how the Russian authorities, not just President Putin, think about the interconnectedness of health and security in the 21st century.

The announcement of the 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� against Ukraine in February 2022 radically changed geopolitical dynamics around Russia and triggered a notable turn in its global strategy. The national pandemic preparedness plan evolved during the Ukraine conflict into a comprehensive global health and biosecurity strategy outlined in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept.[27] The Kremlin now sees future pandemic preparedness as part of a three-level global system for monitoring and responding to infectious threats: within the country, in Russia鈥檚 鈥渘ear abroad,鈥� and in areas far from Russian borders. This includes the creation of a central command unit and special forces. The Russian global pandemic center will coordinate biological laboratories in strategically important regions: Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America. The mobile biological laboratories are intended to serve as an epidemiological special force in countries where risks of epidemics are high. These special forces are referred to as spetsnaz, the same term the Russian military uses for its elite formations, which are comparable to Navy SEALS or Green Berets in the West.

In an era of heightened geopolitical uncertainty, Russia鈥檚 Rospotrebnadzor was granted almost unlimited domestic power during the pandemic. It is now also one of the key players in advancing Russian foreign policy. It is responsible for ensuring that Russians are safe from chemicals, biological agents, and radiation; technological and food independence; scientific support; and practical implementation of risk-based surveillance to preserve the health of the nation. Putin鈥檚 first 鈥渟pecial operation鈥� in public health, which dates from 2004, is now fully entwined with his 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� that has dominated Russian life for over two years.

Conclusion

The story of Putin鈥檚 first "special operation" offers valuable insights into Russian policy formation, how it evaluates policy success, and the potential risks and benefits of cooperation with Russia's current political system in areas like health and science. Both have long been integral to Russian statecraft, and they now serve as important tools for its global outreach. The focus, however, is security doubled after February 2022. Moscow views modern health as a cutting-edge asset intertwined with concerns about the dual use of genetics and AI. This perspective reflects Russia's historical emphasis on science and technology in shaping warfare and defense, rooted in Soviet-era doctrines. [28] Public health is essentially subordinated to Russian strategic military objectives. 

Moscow鈥檚 security concerns are not wholly invented. The legacy and ongoing concern of bioweapons shapes international dialogue. Just as Moscow sees a biosecurity danger in the United States, the US biodefense posture still identifies Russia as a threat in Europe. [29]

Despite pandemic-related losses, the conflict in Ukraine (which prevents almost all cooperation with Western pharmaceutical companies), and difficulties in the practical implementation of its political decisions, Russian leaders have proved adept at leveraging crises into regime stability and personal advantage. Regardless of the pressing need to address gaps in international law stemming from technological advancements, climate change, and military conflicts, it is crucial for the international community to understand and acknowledge Russian ways of thinking about health and biosecurity. Conventional metrics of success or reliability do not apply to how Moscow exercises political leadership during wartime in nonmilitary areas. The Kremlin will seek to impose its own norms, standards, and values, with health and science diplomacy, among other measures, as a gateway to strategically vital regions. Understanding Russian priorities and principles will provide Western policymakers with an important framework for effective response.  

 [1] Tucker Carlson Network, 鈥淭he Vladimir Putin Interview,鈥� February 6, 2024, .

[2] 协锌懈写械屑懈褟 泻芯褉懈 胁 袦芯褋泻胁械. 袣芯屑屑械褉褋邪薪褌, 3 写械泻邪斜褉褟 1993, ; CDC (website), Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 鈥淒iphteria Outbreak鈥擱ussian Federation, 1990鈥�1993,鈥� November 5, 1993, ; and G. G. Onishchenko, Iu. M. Lomov, and E. A. Moskvitina, 鈥淜holera v Respublike Dagestan鈥� [Cholera in the Republic of Dagestan], Zh Mikrobiol Epidemiol Immunobiol, suppl 2 (March鈥揂pril 1995): 3鈥�8, .

[3] 袪芯褋褋懈褟 胁 锌芯懈褋泻邪褏 褋褌褉邪褌械谐懈懈 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 (锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈, 芯谐褉邪薪懈褔械薪懈褟 胁芯芯褉褍卸械薪懈泄 懈 屑懈褉芯褌胁芯褉褔械褋褌胁邪), 袦., 1996. 小. 111鈥�132.

[4] 袗褉斜邪褌芯胁 袗.袚., 袛胁芯褉泻懈薪 袙.袟., 袩懈泻邪械胁 袗.袗., 袨蟹薪芯斜懈褖械胁 小.袣. 小褌褉邪褌械谐懈褔械褋泻邪褟 褋褌邪斜懈谢褜薪芯褋褌褜 锌芯褋谢械 啸芯谢芯写薪芯泄 胁芯泄薪褘. 袦.: 袠袦协袦袨 袪袗袧, 2010. 小. 5鈥�7.

[5] 袨 褑械薪褌褉械 褋锌械褑懈邪谢褜薪芯泄 谢邪斜芯褉邪褌芯褉薪芯泄 写懈邪谐薪芯褋褌懈泻懈 懈 谢械褔械薪懈褟 芯褋芯斜芯 芯锌邪褋薪褘褏 懈 褝泻蟹芯褌懈褔械褋泻懈褏 蟹邪斜芯谢械胁邪薪懈泄. 袩褉懈泻邪蟹 袦懈薪懈褋褌械褉褋褌胁邪 芯斜芯褉芯薪褘 袪肖 芯褌 20.11.1999 鈩� 558, .

[6] Control over the implementation of this order was entrusted to chief of the general staff of the armed forces, the first deputy minister of defense, and the first deputy minister of health: Chief State Sanitary Doctor Anatoly Kvashnin and Gennady Onishchenko, respectively.

[7] 袩芯褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈械 袩褉邪胁懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁邪 袪肖 芯褌 2 懈褞谢褟 1999 谐., 鈩� 737.
"袨 肖械写械褉邪谢褜薪芯泄 褑械谢械胁芯泄 锌褉芯谐褉邪屑屑械 "小芯蟹写邪薪懈械 屑械褌芯写芯胁 懈 褋褉械写褋褌胁 蟹邪褖懈褌褘 薪邪褋械谢械薪懈褟 懈 褋褉械写褘 芯斜懈褌邪薪懈褟 芯褌 芯锌邪褋薪褘褏 懈 芯褋芯斜芯 芯锌邪褋薪褘褏 锌邪褌芯谐械薪芯胁 胁 褔褉械蟹胁褘褔邪泄薪褘褏 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褟褏 锌褉懈褉芯写薪芯谐芯 懈 褌械褏薪芯谐械薪薪芯谐芯 褏邪褉邪泻褌械褉邪 胁 1999鈥�2005 谐芯写邪褏," .

[8] The team consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, Russian Academy of Science, and the joint-stock company Biopreparat.

[9] 校泻邪蟹 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪肖 芯褌 9 屑邪褉褌邪 2004 谐. N 314 "袨 褋懈褋褌械屑械 懈 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉械 褎械写械褉邪谢褜薪褘褏 芯褉谐邪薪芯胁 懈褋锌芯谢薪懈褌械谢褜薪芯泄 胁谢邪褋褌懈," .

[10] Gennady Onishchenko occupied positions of chief sanitary physician (1996鈥�2013), assistant to the prime minister (2013鈥�2016), and deputy of the State Duma (2016鈥�2021). His career goes back to Soviet times, when he was deputy director of the Main Directorate of Quarantine Infections of the Ministry of Health of the USSR (1988鈥�1990).

[11] 袩芯褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈械 袩褉邪胁懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁邪 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈 芯褌 30 懈褞薪褟 2004 谐芯写邪 鈩� 322, .

[12] 袣芯屑屑械薪褌邪褉懈懈. 袨褌 褉械写邪泻褑懈懈: 袣褉械褋谢芯 胁褋械胁谢邪褋褌懈褟. 袙械写芯屑芯褋褌懈, 鈩� 86. 24 屑邪褟 2004.

[13] The Nuclear Threat Initiative,  ; Emma Dorey, 鈥淯S Rejects Stronger Bioweapons Treaty,鈥�&苍产蝉辫;Nature Biotechnology 19, no. 9 (2001): 793, ; and Anthrax in America: A Chronology and Analysis of the Fall 2001 Anthrax Attacks, National Defense University, November 1, 2002, https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/626576/anthrax-in-america-a-chronology-and-analysis-of-the-fall-2001-anthrax-attacks/.

[14] 袩褉械褋褋-泻芯薪褎械褉械薪褑懈褟 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪芯褋褋懈懈 袙.袙.袩褍褌懈薪邪 锌芯 懈褌芯谐邪屑 胁褋褌褉械褔懈 谐谢邪胁 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁 懈 锌褉邪胁懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁 芦袚褉褍锌锌褘 胁芯褋褜屑懈禄, 小邪薪泻褌-袩械褌械褉斜褍褉谐, 小褌褉械谢褜薪邪, 17 懈褞谢褟 2006 谐芯写邪, . 

[15] World Health Organization (website), International Health Regulations, ; and 袩芯褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈械 袩褉邪胁懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁邪 袪肖 芯褌 16 屑邪褟 2005 谐. N 303 "袨 褉邪蟹谐褉邪薪懈褔械薪懈懈 锌芯谢薪芯屑芯褔懈泄 褎械写械褉邪谢褜薪褘褏 芯褉谐邪薪芯胁 懈褋锌芯谢薪懈褌械谢褜薪芯泄 胁谢邪褋褌懈 胁 芯斜谢邪褋褌懈 芯斜械褋锌械褔械薪懈褟 斜懈芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻芯泄 懈 褏懈屑懈褔械褋泻芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈," ; 袩芯褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈械 袚谢邪胁薪芯谐芯 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁械薪薪芯谐芯 褋邪薪懈褌邪褉薪芯谐芯 胁褉邪褔邪 袪肖 芯褌 11 屑邪褟 2007 谐. N 27 "袨 褉械邪谢懈蟹邪褑懈懈 袦械卸写褍薪邪褉芯写薪褘褏 屑械写懈泻芯-褋邪薪懈褌邪褉薪褘褏 锌褉邪胁懈谢 (2005)," ); and 袩褉懈泻邪蟹 肖袦袘袗 袪芯褋褋懈懈 芯褌 15 屑邪褟 2008 谐芯写邪 N 166 鈥溞� 褉械邪谢懈蟹邪褑懈懈 ,鈥�&苍产蝉辫;.

[16] Gregory D. Koblenz, 鈥淔rom Biodefence to Biosecurity: The Obama Administration's Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,鈥� International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 131鈥�148, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22400153/.

[17] Nataliya Shok, 鈥淲hy Vaccine Diplomacy Succeeded in the Past and Fails Today,鈥� The Hill, May 16, 2022,

.

[18] Igor Ivanov, 鈥淐reating a Smart Foreign Policy,鈥� Moscow Times, December 21, 2011, . 

[19] , 鈥淰accine Nationalism Harms Everyone and Protects No One鈥�, Foreign Policy, February 2, 2021,

.

[20] Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, 鈥淥bama, in Dig at Putin, Calls Russia 'Regional Power,'鈥� Reuters, March 25, 2014,https://www.reuters.com/article/world/obama-in-dig-at-putin-calls-russia-regional-power-idUSBREA2O19J/.

[21] 肖械写械褉邪谢褜薪褘泄 蟹邪泻芯薪 芯褌 30 写械泻邪斜褉褟 2020 谐. 鈩� 492-肖袟 鈥溞� 斜懈芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 胁 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈,鈥�&苍产蝉辫;.

[22] 袩褍褌懈薪 薪邪蟹薪邪褔懈谢 袦械写胁械写械胁邪 谐谢邪胁芯泄 泻芯屑懈褋褋懈懈 锌芯 斜芯褉褜斜械 褋 薪芯胁褘屑懈 懈薪褎械泻褑懈褟屑懈, 12 芯泻褌褟斜褉褟 2020, ; and 校泻邪蟹 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈 芯褌 12 芯泻褌褟斜褉褟 2020 谐. N 620 (褉械写邪泻褑懈褟 芯褌 15.08.2022), .

[23] 袩芯褋谢邪薪懈械 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪肖 袙.袙. 袩褍褌懈薪邪 肖械写械褉邪谢褜薪芯屑褍 小芯斜褉邪薪懈褞 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈 芯褌 21 邪锌褉械谢褟 2021 谐芯写邪, .

[24] 袩芯褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈械 袩褉邪胁懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁邪 袪肖 芯褌 2 写械泻邪斜褉褟 2021 谐芯写邪 鈩�2178 芦袨斜 褍褌胁械褉卸写械薪懈懈 袩芯谢芯卸械薪懈褟 芯 褎械写械褉邪谢褜薪芯泄 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁械薪薪芯泄 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪芯泄 褋懈褋褌械屑械 褋胁械写械薪懈泄 褋邪薪懈褌邪褉薪芯-褝锌懈写械屑懈芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻芯谐芯 褏邪褉邪泻褌械褉邪, .

[25] 校泻邪蟹 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪肖 芯褌 02.07.2021 鈩� 400 "袨 小褌褉邪褌械谐懈懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈," http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_389271/; 校泻邪蟹 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪肖 芯褌 12.05.2009 N 537 (褉械写. 芯褌 01.07.2014) "袨 小褌褉邪褌械谐懈懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈 写芯 2020 谐芯写邪," ; and 校泻邪蟹 袩褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袪肖 芯褌 31.12.2015 N 683 "袨 小褌褉邪褌械谐懈懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 肖械写械褉邪褑懈懈," .

[26] R. Zilinskas, Mauger Ph. 2018. Biosecurity in Putin鈥檚 Russia. P.1-3; and 袙谢邪写懈屑懈褉 袩褍褌懈薪. 袘褘褌褜 褋懈谢褜薪褘屑懈: 谐邪褉邪薪褌懈懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯泄 斜械蟹芯锌邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 写谢褟 袪芯褋褋懈懈. 袪芯褋褋懈泄褋泻邪褟谐邪蟹械褌邪, 19 褎械胁褉邪谢褟, 2012, .

[27] Nataliya Shok, 鈥淩ussian Foreign Policy Concept and Global Health: The War as a Turning Point,鈥�&苍产蝉辫;Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2023): 252鈥�259, .

[28] See more in the Russian Military Encyclopedia, .

[29] 袦袨 袪肖: 胁 屑懈褉械 屑械薪褟械褌褋褟 屑薪械薪懈械 芯 斜懈芯锌褉芯谐褉邪屑屑邪褏 小楔袗 懈蟹-蟹邪 锌芯谢褍褔械薪薪褘褏 胁 褏芯写械 小袙袨 写邪薪薪褘褏, TACC, 15 褟薪胁邪褉褟, 2024,  ; and U.S. Department of Defense, National Biodefense Posture Review 2023, .