乐鱼 体育

In September 2024, then-President Andr茅s Manuel L贸pez Obrador pushed through a major constitutional reform deliberately intended to make Mexico鈥檚 judiciary more responsive to popular opinion and political influences. Specifically, the recent reform introduces the direct election of all Mexican justices, magistrates, and judges at the federal and state level, reduces the number of Supreme Court justices from 11 to 9, reduces justices鈥� tenure from 15 to 12 years, establishes a new Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, and creates an administrative agency to manage the judiciary's resources.  

The electoral selection of judges is planned to occur in two phases, with two waves of elections slated for June 2025 and June 2027. To ensure that judges are well qualified, candidates will first pass through a filtering process by which they apply for consideration prior to being placed on the ballot. The nomination process for the first 881 judicial positions currently up for grabs began on October 16, 2024 and concluded on February 12, 2025, with thousands of potential candidates vying for a slot on the June 2025 ballot to take office in September. Once in office, the reform鈥檚 newly created Judicial Discipline Tribunal (Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial) will have the power to supervise, review, and sanction their work and decisions, which to adhere to whatever political influences are dominant at the national level. 

L贸pez Obrador asserted that this bold experiment in popular selection of the judiciary at all levels鈥攕omething not found anywhere else in the world鈥攚ould help to "democratize" the Mexican judiciary by allowing citizens to have direct input in selecting the arbiters of justice. However, critics argue that this reform will seriously undermine the independence of the judiciary, encourage corruption, and erode checks and balances in Mexico鈥檚 seemingly resurgent single-party political system.  

The reforms were introduced in the final month of L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 lame duck presidency, just as his hand-picked successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, was about to take office. Sheinbaum had been elected as Mexico鈥檚 first female president in June 2024, with a MORENA party super-majority capable of making changes to the country鈥檚 107-year-old constitution. L贸pez Obrador was determined to push through this reform as one of the final acts of his six-year presidential term (2018-2024. It was a move that he hoped would clear the way for the Sheinbaum administration (2024-2030) to continue with his leftist policy agenda, which he believed had been hobbled by the country鈥檚 courts.  

While L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 party had an ample legislative majority during his term, Mexico鈥檚 Supreme Court had pushed back against his efforts to militarize public security, weaken the country鈥檚 , and strike down an energy sector law that favored the country鈥檚 public utility over private investors. Lower federal courts had also issued injunctions that delayed the construction of his pet project, a trans-peninsular train (the 鈥淭ren Maya鈥�) to the Yucat谩n. Indeed, in April 2022 the Supreme Court even blocked L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 first attempt to reform the judiciary, which included popular election of judges as part of a broader constitutional reform that became known 鈥淧lan A.鈥� Months later, the Supreme Court again ruled against L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 next attempt, or 鈥淧lan B,鈥� which included a series of legal reforms approved by his party鈥檚 congressional majority in December 2022.  

Many saw these rulings as illustration of how an independent judiciary can and should serve as , as intended by constitutional reforms empowering Mexico鈥檚 judiciary since the 1990s. However, L贸pez Obrador charged that Mexico鈥檚 courts were controlled by an elite minority bent on hindering his efforts to transform the country. After his previous efforts were thwarted, L贸pez Obrador seized the opportunity of his (or Sheinbaum鈥檚) newfound qualified majority to push through the 鈥淧lan C鈥� reforms passed in September 2024.¹ L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 effort to squeeze in major constitutional reforms into the final weeks of his term was an unusually audacious move for a lame duck president, and resulted in by judicial sector personnel.² Mexican civil society organizations also responded with alarm over the president鈥檚 over-reach and its possible implications for Mexican democracy. Even normally reserved U.S. and Canadian diplomats issued public criticisms of the reform, causing L贸pez Obrador to declare an with both countries due to their alleged interference in Mexican domestic affairs.  

Yet, there is no doubt that the reforms raise serious concerns about the way that judicial elections will impact the political landscape in Mexico. In addition to political parties, other interest groups (including business interests and organized crime groups) will be more likely to attempt to influence the judicial election process, the functioning of the judiciary, and the rule of law. The fact that these reforms were passed in 2024鈥攁n election year in which at least 60 politicians were assassinated while campaigning for public office鈥攁lso raised serious questions about how judges will fair, who will be financing their campaigns, and what will happen to those who truly seek to uphold the law.  

As a practical matter, the that are up for election will present some significant challenges. First, the vetting and nomination process introduced by the reform will create a new, purportedly non-partisan process for candidate selection, unlike anything that exists for Mexico鈥檚 executive and legislative branches. That is, unlike any other elections in Mexico, parties will not nominate candidates and judges cannot openly profess a partisan affiliation. Instead, potential judicial candidates will be evaluated by an Evaluation Committee comprising representatives from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. However, since each branch will have the option to nominate up to a certain number of candidates, this could result in dozens of candidates for each judicial position and will make it difficult for voters to make well informed choices. For example, there could be up to ten candidates for each of the nine positions on the Supreme Court (a total of 270), perhaps dozens vying for two vacant seats on the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal, and dozens more for the regional electoral tribunals. Half of all circuit level magistrate seats (464) and district judgeships (386) will be up for grabs: a total of 881 federal circuit and state judges to be selected. Since each position has 5-10 candidates, the total number of judges in any given year could very likely range around 6,000-7,000 would be-nominees (pre-candidates).  

In the absence of party labels or 鈥渃ues鈥� and in the face of such a large number of candidates, voters will have to carefully research candidates鈥� educational backgrounds, career histories, and public statements to determine who is fit to serve. More likely, though, many voters 鈥攁nd even member of the Evaluation Committee鈥攁re likely to make their decision based on very limited informational cues (like gender, name recognition, or physical appearance), or simply stay home from the polls. In this sense, L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 gran experiment with judicial democracy may lead to poorly-informed choices or simply greater abstentionism in judicial elections.  

A second immediate consequence of the reform is that it will almost certainly result in a great deal of disruption in the judiciary as new judges are introduced to the system during the coming two years. Indeed, the fact that many judges have either already resigned in frustration or are now frantically campaigning to retain their seats under great uncertainty means that there will be a large amount of turnover in the Mexican judiciary over the next two years. This could lead to some very unfortunate outcomes, including the possible disruption of thousands of ongoing criminal cases, since proceedings will need to be restarted if the presiding judge loses his or her election.   

As a related final practical consideration, Mexican think tank M茅xico Eval煤a recently underscored that the reform has imposed , which are currently scrambling to update their constitutions and operating procedures to put the reforms into effect.  

At a minimum, there will be an enormous need to help new Mexican judges鈥攊ncluding many with far too little experience鈥攖o develop their court administration and trial management skills. Until recently, the United States had been providing aid to professionalize Mexican judicial system, including much needed trial preparation and litigation skills in law schools and prosecutorial offices. However, the 2024 judicial reforms will no doubt create a new area of need: judicial trainings and exchanges to assist Mexico鈥檚 nationwide cohort of novice judges. Given the state of U.S. foreign assistance, it is unlikely that the kind of programs once sponsored by USAID and the U.S. State Department will be available to help support this kind of essential training.  

In brief, L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 2024 judicial reform marks a significant shift in Mexico鈥檚 judicial system, and will be part of his much-debated legacy as a transformational president. While the reform aims to make the judiciary more responsive to popular input, it may instead undermine judicial independence, impair the functioning of the courts, and erode the fragile foundations of Mexican democracy.  

Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that the reform's impact will be far-reaching, will introduce significant disruptions to the judicial system, and creates an enormous need to prepare the incoming cohort of newly elected judges for what lies ahead. The United States and the international community鈥攊ncluding organizations that have provided aid to professionalize Mexico's judicial system鈥攕hould pay close attention to these developments and consider how to assist Mexico in maintaining an independent and effective judiciary.