Power in the Middle East shifted in 2025, with Sunni groups gaining influence while Shiite factions linked to Iran weakened. Political turmoil, economic struggles, and escalating conflicts鈥攅specially between Israel and Iran鈥攄eepened instability, hindering regional diplomacy, development, and prospects for long-term peace.
The Middle East and North Africa faced 鈥渁n unprecedented level of crises, with millions caught in the grip of relentless conflict, political turmoil, staggering refugee crises and a deepening economic downturn.鈥
The longstanding balance of power in the Middle East shifted in 2025. Long-dominant parties and militias have been marginalized. Alliances have evolved; so, too, has the political spectrum. Among parties and militias, Sunni groups and leaders have witnessed a resurgence. Shia factions, especially the 鈥淎xis of Resistance鈥 tied to Iran, have lost influence and momentum. Islamist parties made gains in Jordan (in elections) and Syria (through a military coup). Militant movements have also inspired a new underground generation of 鈥,鈥 according to the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.
Violence in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen has spawned greater instability鈥攄iverting governments from development and charting a sustainable future, according to the . Regionally, prospects for a sustainable peace deal between Israel and all 23-members of the Arab League diminished, at least short-term. Tensions among pivotal players, notably Israel and Iran, have deepened the potential for a wider war.
Amid political and military changes, several countries have faced debilitating economic challenges. Development鈥攁nd any sense of a viable or stable future鈥攕tagnated. The Middle East and North Africa faced 鈥渁n unprecedented level of crises, with millions caught in the grip of relentless conflict, political turmoil, staggering refugee crises and a deepening economic downturn,鈥 the World Food Program in November 2024.
Major political parties that had won elections over the previous decade have lost popular support or been sidelined. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party of President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an lost several local elections鈥攆or mayors and city councils鈥攖o the opposition Republican People鈥檚 Party in March 2024. 鈥淲e lost momentum throughout the country,鈥 Erdo臒an afterward. The vote was telling because the opposition won the largest number of votes nationally for the first time鈥攁nd less than a year after Erdo臒an鈥檚 victory in a presidential contest left the opposition scrambling politically. In March 2025, the Turkish government Imamoglu just two days before he was expected to be nominated to run against Erdogan. Imamoglu faced multiple charges ranging from corruption to alleged links to a terrorist group. The CHP called it 鈥渁 coup against our next president.鈥
In a major upset, Iranian hardline candidates lost the presidency to reformer Masoud Pezeshkian in June 2024 elections, amid signs of growing disillusionment with theocratic rule. An carried out by a government agency in 2023 showed that more than 90% of Iran鈥檚 90 million people were dissatisfied with the government. Some said the regime was 鈥渂eyond repair.鈥 The regime鈥檚 escalating domestic vulnerabilities grew as it 鈥渄oubled down on a risky regional and global strategy that has produced more economic hardship and isolation,鈥 the Middle East Institute in January 2025.
In Tunisia, the government of President Kais Saied escalated the crackdown on Ennahdha, with of the opposition party鈥檚 senior officials. In early 2025, Tunisia the sentence of Ennahdha leader Rachid Ghannouchi鈥攁 former member of parliament and Saied鈥檚 main political rival鈥攂y 22 years. 鈥淭unisian authorities intensified repression of political opposition and other critical voices by carrying out mass arrests, imprisoning journalists, and targeting civil society groups,鈥 Human Rights Watch in January 2025.
Other leaders in the region were ousted. In Syria, the Assad dynasty鈥攚hich had ruled for more than seven decades鈥攚as toppled in a lightning offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, took over the presidency in December 2024. HTS, a Sunni movement, quickly exerted its newfound control across the country. It sought vengeance against minority Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam, who formed the base of Assad鈥檚 Baath Party. The fall of Assad鈥檚 government 鈥渃reated a momentous opportunity for Syria to break with decades of repression and turn the page on human rights,鈥 Human Rights Watch in December 2024. Yet, Assad loyalists fought on in the northwest. They triggered clashes with HTS forces. In March 2025, hundreds were in what increasingly played into sectarian rivalries between Alawites in the old government and Sunnis in the new government.
All the Shia groups survived politically but appeared unlikely to regroup, rearm, or win back control of territory militarily anytime soon.
Across the region, Sunnis gained more political prominence and leverage. Saudi Arabia gained greater influence in both regional and international affairs. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto head of state, hosted the first US-Russia talks on ending the war in Ukraine. He also offered to host new diplomacy between the United States and Iran on terms to ensure that Tehran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. 鈥淭o buttress his newfound authority, the crown prince oversaw the worst period for human rights in the country鈥檚 history, embarking on a vast and violent crackdown on civil society, dissidents abroad, religious conservatives, regime rivals, and prominent businessmen,鈥 Human Rights Watch in January 2025. The crown prince 鈥渘ow enjoys uncontested authority over the most vital political, security, and economic state organs.鈥
As Sunnis gained leverage, Shia militias鈥攊ncluding Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq鈥攕uffered unprecedented losses after repeated airstrikes by Israel and the United States. All the Shia groups survived politically but appeared unlikely to regroup, rearm, or win back control of territory militarily anytime soon.
鈥淒espite decades of investment and rhetorical commitment to the 鈥榓xis of resistance, Iran has begun to distance itself from its proxy groups,鈥 the Arab Gulf States Institute in January 2025. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that Tehran did not have nor need a proxy force to operate beyond its borders.
Ending regional conflicts grew more complicated, amid 鈥渁 wider trend of increasing violence in the Middle East.鈥
Ending regional conflicts grew more complicated, amid 鈥渁 wider trend of increasing violence in the Middle East,鈥 the World Bank warned in late 2024. 鈥淭here has been more than a twofold increase in conflict episodes and a sixfold increase in MENA鈥檚 share of global fatalities since the 1990s.鈥
Diplomacy to end the Gaza war, free Israeli hostages, and provide more humanitarian aid to Palestinians repeatedly stalled. The first of three phases, a US-backed deal faced setbacks as both Israel and Hamas accused the other of violations. In February 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel would 鈥渙pen the gates of hell鈥 if the Palestinian extremist movement did not return the remaining hostages.
Hostilities between Israel and Iran also intensified. Both countries threatened to destroy the other after months of direct attacks. In October 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that attacks by Tehran and its allies 鈥渨ill grow stronger and more painful against the worn and decaying body of the Zionist regime.鈥 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel had dealt a 鈥渕ighty blow鈥 to Iran鈥檚 鈥渢error axis,鈥 notably Hezbollah and Hamas. In collaboration with the United States, Israel 鈥渃an and will finish the job,鈥 he said.
Missile and drone attacks by Houthi rebels in Yemen disrupted international shipping in the strategic Red Sea. Traffic through the Suez Canal by 42% in 2024. Roughly a third of the world鈥檚 container ships had transited the Suez in 2021. A UN resolution in 2024 warned that the increasing costs to transport essential goods 鈥渨ill have a negative impact on the economic and humanitarian situation worldwide.鈥
Internal conflicts also divided the region. In Libya, the longstanding conflict between rival regimes鈥攐ver political power and oil revenues鈥攁ppeared even more entrenched. The divisions reflected disparate interests within the Arab world. The Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Debibeh ruled in western Tripoli; it has been backed by Turkey and Qatar as well as the UN. The Government of National Stability, led by General Khalifa Haftar, has ruled in eastern Benghazi; it has been backed by Egypt and the UAE.
鈥淭he dream of a civil, democratic and prosperous Libya remains unfulfilled 14 years after the revolution that led to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime,鈥 Rosemary DiCarlo, the head of UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, to the Security Council in February 2025. 鈥淭he country鈥檚 leaders and security actors are failing to put the national interest ahead of their competition for political and personal gain.鈥
The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the 乐鱼 体育.
乐鱼 体育鈥檚 Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Read more
