乐鱼 体育

Party- and state-level operatives in Eastern Europe struggled to comprehend the ouster of Cuban strongman Fulgencio Batista and the rise of Fidel Castro in 1958-1959 鈥� in part because they depended on information provided by Cuban communists, individuals unaffiliated with Castro鈥檚 revolutionary movement and who often shared contentious views of the Castro鈥檚 ideological and political underpinnings.

A new set of documents, released on the 乐鱼 体育 Digital Archive in conjunction with the publication of my book , illustrates the complex ideological, operational, and political environments of the early phase of the Cuban revolution. These documents also depict the Eastern European communists struggling to make sense of what was happening on an island far, far away from them.

Initially, the Soviet Union and its East European allies had a lukewarm attitude toward the Cuban events. They drew upon the assessments of the local Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, or PSP), which compared Castro鈥檚 anti-Batista campaign to an 鈥渁dventure.鈥� Indeed, some of Cuba鈥檚 most critical socialist observers deemed Castro鈥檚 first steps into repositioning the revolution to the left as representing an attempt to develop a utopian-romantic 鈥渋deal type of socialism,鈥� as  argued.[1]  

For his part, Fidel Castro offered varying explanations for the way his rebel forces turned to the left in the months after entering Havana. In April 1960, the Cuban leader elucidated the pragmatic aspect of the revolution鈥檚 gradual radicalization .[2] Later, during his visit to Eastern Europe in 1972, in June, the Cuban L铆der M谩ximo admitted that the revolution was not yet socialist when Batista was driven out of power.[3] Similarly, a week later, the Cuban leader shared with his Czechoslovak counterpart, Gust谩v Hus谩k, that the July 26 Movement (M-26-7) he led into Havana lacked a communist program.[4]

The Partido Socialista Popular, with its direct contacts with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the 鈥渇raternal鈥� East European Communist Parties, seized the task of wooing the Soviets and its allies. The exposing the government's 鈥渢error鈥� and the interference of 鈥淎merican imperialism鈥� in Cuba鈥檚 affairs. The CPSU鈥檚 Central Committee agreed to support the fight of the Cuban people in the press, radio, and public organizations in the closing months of 1958.[5] As a result, from the onset, the PSP was thought to be the legitimate organizer of Cuba鈥檚 working class and peasants in the struggle against the 鈥渓ocal oligarchy鈥� and 鈥淎merican imperialism,鈥� as the .[6]

In its attempt to explain the differences between the communist PSP and Fidel鈥檚 M-26-7, the of the relations between these two political groups, namely their tactical differences.[7] Unlike Fidel Castro, the Cuban communists were convinced that the revolution must be waged peacefully. The PSP therefore refused to participate in Castro鈥檚 attack on the Moncada Barracks on 26 July 1953. At this early stage, the Budapest envoy鈥檚 analysis concluded that the new leadership in Havana attempted to distance itself from the communists due to their lack of cooperation with the M-26-7.

Seeking to bridge the differences between the two camps, a offered a different interpretation of the relations between the M-26-7 and the PSP.[8] The Hungarian operative contacted various PSP leaders, who offered their alternative version of the revolutionary role of the Party. According to their versions of the events, the Cuban communists remained in the background for tactical reasons, not because of their weaknesses. In their interpretation, Castro鈥檚 initiative would not have succeeded if they had not organized and led a broad popular resistance movement.

While expressing sympathy for the M-26-7 in the first months of 1959, Soviet propaganda did not offer any personal praise for Fidel Castro. Similarly, as demonstrates, the developments in Cuba in March 1959 were still referred to as 鈥渂ourgeois-democratic鈥� revolution, cutting it short from being the sweeping transformational process that would warrant the Socialist states鈥� full support.[9] 

Nevertheless, after talking with the member of the PSP's Central Committee, , Prague鈥檚 Communist Party leaders saw a glimmer of hope for the further radicalization of the revolution: the fact that the 鈥渂ourgeois鈥� leaders of the revolutionary army, the Castro brothers, and Ernesto 鈥淐he鈥� Guevara, relied on the people鈥檚 army, on which the communists had significant influence.

As 1959 drew to a close, East European officials who began to pay visits to Havana received more detailed information, and their analyses changed accordingly. Czechoslovak party cadres visiting Cuba in 1960 delivered a very optimistic outlook.[10] 

To verify the situation on the ground, in August 1960. Speaking at the gathering, the Cuban communist leader, Blas Roca Calderio, effectively offered his stamp of approval to Castro before the Czechoslovakian guests, recognizing him as a 鈥渘ew phenomenon in Latin America鈥檚 history.鈥� In their comments, the Czechoslovaks demonstrated satisfaction with the deepening influence of the Cuban communists within the country鈥檚 socio-political transformations, which held the serious potential to increase the significance of the Cuban revolution in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states.

Connected Sources

[1] 鈥淧odsetnik o Kubi i jugoslovensko-kubanskim odnosima鈥� [A reminder of Cuba and Yugoslav-Cuban relations], 20 February 1974, Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, [AJ], KPR I-5-b/61-3, p. 1; 4.

[2] Memcon, Zvonko Grahek - Fidel Castro, 26 April 1960, AJ, KPR, I-5-b/61-1, p. 3.

[3] See 鈥淛egyz艖k枚nyv a Politikai Bizotts谩g 1972. junius 13-谩n tartott 眉l茅s茅r艖l鈥� [Minutes of the meeting of the Political Affairs Committee of 13 June 1972], 13 June 1972, Magyar Nemzeti Lev茅lt谩r (National Archives of Hungary), Budapest [MNL], M-KS, 288f. 5/583, p. 2 [132 R].

[4] See "D暖vodov谩 zpr谩va o n谩v拧t臎v臎 p艡edsedy kub谩nsk茅 revolu膷n铆 vl谩dy 邪 I. tajemn铆ka KS Kuby s. Fidela Castra a jeho doprovodu v 膶SSR" [Explanatory memorandum on the visit of the Prime Minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Government and the First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, Comrade Fidel Castro, and his entourage to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], N谩rodn铆 Archiv 膶esk茅 Republiky (National Archives of the Czech Republic), Prague, [NA膶R], KS膶-脷V 1945-1989, Praha - Gust谩v Hus谩k, k. 376, p. 4.

[5] [Undated document], c. 1958, NA膶R, KS膶- 脷V-100/3, svazek 107, arch. jednotka 344, p. 1 [60].

[6] D. Linkov, 鈥淥tnosheniyata mehzdu Kuba i SASht - s怒stoyanie i perspektivi鈥� (Relations between Cuba and the United States - state and prospects), 20 October 1978, Diplomaticheski Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na V怒nshnite Raboti na Republika B怒lgariya (Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria), Sofia, [DAMvNR], 1979, op. 35, d.  107, a. e. 1900, p. 4 [92].

[7] Tibor Z谩dor, 鈥�A kubai esem茅nyek es az Egyes眉lt 脕llamok鈥� [Events in Cuba and the United States], p. 21 January 1959, MNL, XIX-J-1-j Kuba, T脺K, 1945-64, 5/b, 2d, p.  3.

[8] Mikl贸s Abonyi, 鈥淛elent茅s. Budapest, 1961 j煤lius 28鈥� [Report. Budapest, 2 July 1961], 脕llambiztons谩gi Szolg谩latok T枚rt茅neti Lev茅lt谩ra (Historical Archives of the State Security Services), Budapest, [脕BTL], 3.2.5, O-8-246, 2 r茅sz, p. 2 [36].

[9] 鈥淶谩znam o rozhovoru se s. Severo Aguirre, 膷lenem PB UV Lidov茅 soc. strany Kuby鈥� [Record of a conversation with Comrade Severo Aguirre, a member of Politburo of the Central Committee of Cuba鈥檚 People鈥檚 Socialist Party], 10 March 1959, NA膶R, KS膶-脷V-100/3, sv. 107, a. j. 344, pp. 2-3 [70-71].

[10] 鈥淚nforma膷n铆 zpr谩va delegace 脷V KS膶 z VIII. sjezdu Lidov茅 socialistick茅 strany Kuby鈥� [Information report of the delegation of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to the 7th Congress of the People鈥檚 Socialist Party of Cuba], 16 September 1960, NA膶R, 脷V KS膶, Anton铆n Novotn媒 鈥� Zahrani膷铆, Karton 121, Komunistick谩 strana Kuby, p. 2.