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40 years after the Israeli Air Force launched its strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak, known as Operation Opera, new documents reveal how the Reagan Administration reacted to the news.
On 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force launched a strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak, marking it as the successful raid conducted against a 鈥榟ostile鈥 nuclear reactor. The raid has received much attention in and circles, especially in the context of the Iranian nuclear program, yet significantly, some important questions on Washington鈥檚 reaction to the raid and its impact on Reagan鈥檚 nonproliferation policy were left unanswered. We address these questions by exploring declassified documents from numerous archives in a forthcoming article in the Journal of Cold War Studies.[1]
Iraq鈥檚 nuclear program made critical progress in 1979 and 1980, with the assistance of nuclear technology imported from France and Italy. , US diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an 鈥淎merican strong belief鈥 that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear capability.
When Reagan won the November 1980 presidential elections, Iraq鈥檚 nuclear program was not on his agenda. His Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) transition team from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration on nuclear proliferation.
On 7 June 1981, the day of the raid, a policy paper composed by the 鈥楽enior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation鈥 (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. crowned the administration鈥檚 nonproliferation efforts as a 鈥渒ey foreign policy objective鈥 and called to revise the existing Carter era legislation, the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA).
When the raid took place, it caught the administration by surprise, leading to an initially harsh reaction towards Israel. Secretary of State that the raid caused a serious complication for the US, stating, 鈥淧resident Reagan thinks the same.鈥 and that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was promoting a tough, anti-Israel response. The raid was carried out by American F-16 jets and Israel was legally required not to use them to attack its neighbors, unless as an act of 鈥渓egitimate self-defense. The administration , pending a legal review of the strike. Israeli ambassador to Washington, Ephraim Evron, by the unexpected suspension.
A week after the raid, the US attitude started to change. National Security Advisor that the administration was in fact 鈥渘ot required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated US law,鈥 stating the issue should be treated 鈥渁s a political rather than a legal question.鈥 that the suspension was perhaps an American goodwill gesture towards Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, designed to appease him and keep the peace process with him alive.
Administration officials were gradually becoming aware of a 鈥済ap鈥 in the administration鈥檚 鈥渋nstitutional memory,鈥 as termed by US ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis. , Lewis explained that the Carter administration had clear indications from Israel on its intention to launch a strike. Realizing that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, .
Within the administration, , stopping . On the other hand, a key, pro-Israeli voice belonged to ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow, who given the dangers of the region.
A few days into the crisis, Haig proposed a new strategy to deal with the raid. According to this strategy, Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would Weinberger adhered to his support of a punitive response, of the Israeli leadership in other in the months to come.
The diplomatic battle spilled over into the IAEA. Israel publicly criticized the agency for its shortcomings in Iraq, while . In September 1981, to anticipate a 鈥渟evere attack鈥 against Israel, and to 鈥渧igorously鈥 object to a vote on the 鈥渟uspension of technical aid鈥 to Israel. In September 1982, as the diplomatic conflict continued, the delegation was ordered to leave the IAEA鈥檚 building, thus withdrawing from the agency, in a response to a vote rejecting the credentials of the Israeli delegation.
In Congress, the administration criticized the agency, raising 鈥溾 on the 鈥渃redibility and reliability鈥 of its safeguards.[2] But the withdrawal was short-lived and Washington resumed full participation in the agency in February 1983, once Israel鈥檚 status was clarified. The administration explained this by underlining the agency鈥檚 , and the lack of alternatives for its safeguards system.[3]
Our study underscores the hierarchy of goals within the administration鈥檚 foreign policy in the wake of the Osirak air raid. Notably, nonproliferation concerns had a shaky, yet steady, place, as the administration adopted an improvised, cautious approach to non-proliferation, rather than a well-ordered strategy. After some wrangling, Washington ostensibly worked to preserve the existing nonproliferation regime, seen as the only credible option at hand, rather than undermine it completely.
[1] Giordana Pulcini and Or Rabinowitz, 鈥淎n ounce of prevention - a pound of cure? The Reagan Administration鈥檚 non-proliferation policy and the Osirak raid鈥, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol.23, n.2, Spring 2021.
[2] United States Executive Office of the president, 鈥淩eport to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978: For the Year Ending December 31, 1981.鈥 (1982), p. 23-24, DNSA.
[3] Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978: For the Year Ending December 31, 1982.鈥 (January 1983). p. 5. DNSA.
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