乐鱼体育

How Japan's leaders underestimated the moral and emotional elements of Sino-Japanese relations

The  between Japanese and Chinese leaders unveil the very last phase in the process of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972.

Readers can clearly see the personalities of two nations鈥� leaders. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, particularly in his discussion with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, showed his broad view of international affairs as well as his detailed knowledge of Japanese internal politics, even though there were no official connections between Tokyo and Beijing by that time.

On the other hand, Tanaka repeatedly emphasized his difficulties in persuading anti-PRC, pro-Taiwan lobbyists in his Liberal Democratic Party that Japan should establish ties with Beijing. This might have been a typical diplomatic tactic so as to make the Chinese believe in Japan鈥檚 inability to compromise, but it also indicates that the China question was more a domestic issue than an international one in the minds of the Japanese leader.

Not surprisingly, Zhou Enlai鈥檚 statements in these records show that the primary external concern of the Chinese was the threat of the Soviet Union. While it is debatable whether it was necessary or not, Zhou unilaterally made a long speech to Tanaka and his Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi offering a .

Interestingly, Tanaka did not conceal from Zhou his hatred of Moscow, even though the United States鈥擩apan鈥檚 principal ally鈥攁voided taking sides with either Beijing or Moscow at that time. At the end of Zhou鈥檚 long speech, Tanaka agreed with Zhou鈥檚 position, stating that Japan did not trust the Soviet Union because 鈥�,鈥� referring to Soviet participation in the war with Japan in August 1945. The Chinese side seemed to be impressed with Tanaka鈥檚 attitude.  this metaphoric expression from Tanaka in his conversation with Henry Kissinger in 1973.[1]

In the  published on the last day of Tanaka鈥檚 visit, they agreed that 鈥渂oth countries will oppose other countries or groups of countries that seek to establish hegemony,鈥� which many people, including the Russians, interpreted as implicitly declaring their common anti-Soviet stance. Tanaka鈥檚 successors had to make every effort to deny such implications of this agreement.

Yet, as these records show, it is impossible to believe that Tanaka and Ohira accepted this clause in order to stand together with the Chinese against the Russians. To be sure, Tanaka was personally anti-Soviet, and his administration was not eager to approach Moscow after constructing ties with Beijing.

However, on the basis of these records, it would be more natural to consider that the Japanese side accepted this clause only because they failed to understand the implications of this phrase, whereas the Chinese did not intend to demand it strongly. As early as two months before Tanaka鈥檚 visit to China,  that if 鈥渢he wording of the section on hegemony is thought to be too strong鈥e will not have anything to include,鈥� indicating that the Chinese side was even ready to compromise if Japan wished to avoid being involved in China鈥檚 strategic position. Also, in the , it was Ji Pengfei who suggested to add the phrase 鈥淛apan-China relations is not exclusive, and that it is not aimed at a third country鈥� to the 鈥渁nti-hegemony鈥� clause. Oddly, to Ji鈥檚 suggestion, Ohira responded by saying 鈥淲e are not particular about this.鈥� Ohira seemed unaware of the implications, while the Chinese were even more sensitive than the Japanese to the effect of this statement on the Japanese strategic position.[2]           

The Taiwan problem, which had generally been an extremely sensitive issue for the Chinese, did not cause difficulties during the process of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese idea of establishing the new 鈥溾�� relations between Tokyo and Taipei was smoothly accepted by the Chinese side. After hearing Ohira鈥檚 plan for new Japanese-Taiwanese relations after the breakup of diplomatic ties, the Chinese side 鈥渁ll looked relieved鈥� and Zhou even recommended that Japan 鈥渢ake the leadership role and establish an office in Taiwan first.鈥�

According to these descriptions, it might even be possible to imagine that the Chinese had expected the Japanese to be more demanding on this issue. Zhou and his followers might have been ready to negotiate, or even compromise to some extent, with Tanaka and Ohira. Of course, we need to wait for the Chinese records to be disclosed so as to know what exactly the Chinese position on the Taiwan question was.

Although there were frictions over Tanaka鈥檚 鈥渆mbarrassment鈥� speech, the 鈥渉istory problem鈥� was not as major an issue as it would be in later decades. However, it is significant to note that  鈥渉ope[d] that problems relating to the liquidation of abnormal relations between Japan and China in the past, including war, should all be solved by this conversation and its result, the Joint Statement, thereby leaving no backward job in the future.鈥�

Already in 1972, the Japanese understood the potential seriousness of the 鈥減ast鈥� issue, and believed that it was possible to block the beginning of the history problem only by agreeing the Joint Statement. This implies that, as was common in later decades, Japanese leaders overestimated the power of legal agreement in diplomacy, whereas they underestimated the significance of moral and emotional elements in Sino-Japanese relations.