乐鱼 体育

Communist-ruled Poland was one of the first states to recognize the Democratic People鈥檚 Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. Less than two years later, Poland (together with other countries from the Eastern Bloc) joined the Korean War effort by assisting the DPRK and spreading anti-American propaganda domestically. After the war, Poland supported the reconstruction of North Korea and received 1,200 orphans as well as a considerable number of students.

These efforts were typical for all European communist countries under Moscow鈥檚 domination, but Poland鈥檚 involvement with Korea did have several distinguishing characteristics. One was Poland鈥檚 participation in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Both bodies were established by the Korean Armistice Agreement, and Poland (as well as Czechoslovakia) was selected to become a communist member of the commissions.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

The NNRC existed for less than one year, and the majority of POWs from North Korea and China decided not to return to the DPRK or communist China. A similar stance on repatriation was presented by a small group of POWs from the United Nations side, who declared that they wished to stay in communist custody.

Despite the official name of the commission, Polish delegates were far from 鈥渘eutral.鈥� They followed the instructions relating to repatriation that they received from Chinese officials. Moreover, they used the NNRC as a covert institution for the activities of intelligence officers.

One of the officers that worked for Polish intelligence was W艂adys艂aw Tykoci艅ski. In 1965, after long service as a Polish diplomat, he fled to the West and asked the Americans for asylum. In April 1966, he stood before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives and shared with the Americans significant information on the operations and the scope of interest of Polish intelligence, also recalling some of the activities in Korea. 

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

While the NNRC was short lived, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission still exists today鈥攁lthough it has evolved over the decades. Between August 1953 and mid-1956, the NNSC was an extremely important body. Its members were obliged to monitor 10 ports of entry in both Koreas in order to avoid rearmament of the peninsula. Furthermore, mobile inspection teams of the NNSC were allowed to supervise other locations in the North and the South, if violations of the armistice had been reported.

Similar to their behavior in the NNRC, the Poles did not maintain neutrality. They used the commission to collect intelligence in South Korea and helped North Korea to avoid unexpected inspections. Such an attitude facilitated the introduction of new weapons on North Korean soil.

Under pressure from South Korea, in mid-1956, inspection teams were withdrawn from its territory and soon the DPRK demanded the same treatment. The significance of the NNSC soon thereafter decreased, and members of the NNSC could work only in the narrow Demilitarized Zone. Nevertheless, Polish representatives stayed in the northern part of the DMZ until early 1995, when they were forced by the DPRK authorities to leave North Korean territory.

Trends in Polish-North Korea Relations

In general, Polish-North Koran relations during the Cold War were strongly influenced by Soviet-DPRK ties.

Poland was a satellite state subordinate to Moscow and obediently followed the Soviet Union鈥檚 instructions in foreign policy. Consequently, when North Korean-Soviet relations reached their lowest point in the first half of the 1960s, it was also the worst time for contacts between Poland and the DPRK. The Soviet Union and its satellites were perceived as 鈥渞evisionist鈥� and unreliable partners, mainly because of Khrushchev鈥檚 criticism of Stalin鈥檚 crimes and the cult of personality.

In the second half of the 1960s, mutual relations warmed. It could be said that for almost the next two decades, Polish-North Korean relations were cordial but not very close. The Poles, following Soviet steps, criticized the DPRK for its self-reliance politics and for not discussing its internal and foreign policies with Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet Split

Another factor that affected mutual relations was the Sino-Soviet split. North Korea tried to balance between the two conflicted communist states, but there were periods when it seemed to have better relations with Beijing than with Moscow (and vice versa). Consequently, because Poland sided with the Soviet Union, its relations with North Korea declined whenever Pyongyang moved closer to China. For instance, in September 1978, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia postponed a visit of the North Korean Minister of Defense, initially planned for October 1978, due to Soviet pressure. The Soviets explained to their satellites that the DPRK acted hostilely toward the USSR by publishing the Chinese stance on Sino-Soviet border clash of May 1978.

On the other hand, in less tense times, Poland tried to build links with North Korea in order to strengthen its connection with the Soviet zone and weaken ties with China.

For example in January 1972, the Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski explained to Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz that the Polish Ministry of National Defense should meet DPRK expectations and organize a visit of its Minister to North Korea. He stressed that the awaited trip could be a good tool to strengthen North Korean ties with the Eastern Bloc and neutralize Chinese influence in the DPRK. (It is worth mentioning that the invitation for the Defense Minister was sent to Poland in 1967.)

Polish-North Korean Exchanges (and Non-Exchanges)

When it was useful, North Korea seems to have tried not to treat the whole Eastern Bloc as a united structure. The DPRK made efforts to have close ties with certain countries when it could profit from this type of contacts.

Poland, however, stayed loyal to the USSR and was not interested in sharing a special relationship with Pyongyang. This kind of attitude among the Poles is suggested by its non-response to the invitation sent in 1972 by Kim Il Sung to First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party, Edward Gierek. It was again extended in 1978 but Gierek did not travel to the DPRK. The North Koreans had to wait until 1986 for the first visit of the leader of communist Poland. General Wojciech Jaruzelski visited the DPRK, a return visit following the second trip of Kim Il Sung to Poland in 1984 (his first visit was in 1956).

These exchanges by the leaders of both states lifted Polish-North Korean relations to their highest levels. During Jaruzelski鈥檚 1986 visit, a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was signed.

Simultaneous with the deepening of political ties, North Korea wanted to develop economic cooperation. Among others projects, the DPRK asked Poland to establish an Mi-2 helicopter factory鈥攁lthough this never happened due to North Korea鈥檚 financial problems.

Intelligence Cooperation

In the second half of the 1980s, the DPRK also pursued closer collaboration between the Polish and North Korean security institutions and intelligence services.

In mid-1989, the chief of Polish military intelligence, General Roman Misztal, visited Pyongyang and received a list of wishes from his counterpart. Principally, they wanted the DPRK鈥檚 intelligence officers to be free to operate against South Koreans in Poland, after the expected recognition of ROK by the Polish government.

Moreover, the North Koreans wanted the Polish members of the NNSC and other Polish representatives with access to South Korean territory to conduct intelligence operations in favor of the DPRK. In his report to the chief of the General Staff, Misztal suggested accepting the DPRK鈥檚 requests. We do not know what happened next because, by this time, the democratic reforms in Poland had already begun, and documents subsequently produced by intelligence services are still classified today.

North Korea probably felt betrayed by Poland鈥檚 democratization. However, both countries have maintained mutual diplomatic relations at the Ambassador鈥檚 level. For 17 years, the post of the DPRK Ambassador to Poland was even held by Kim Jong Il鈥檚 half-brother, Kim Pyong-il (from 1998 until 2015). mentions his increasing role inside the ruling regime in the late 1980s.

Searching for Korea-related Documents in Poland

I have selected 24 documents about North Korea from Poland鈥檚 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 of them) and the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (10 documents) for translation and publication on the .

The first institution preserves materials produced by the Polish diplomatic service after 1944. The second archive contains documents produced by the communist security apparatus and intelligence services between 1944 and 1990. In general, these two repositories are the most meaningful Polish archives when it comes to searching for documents related to North Korean affairs.

While selecting the documents, I assumed that the most interesting and informative documents for readers were probably not those that solely dealt with Polish-North Korean relations. I strove to select sources that presented a wider scope of events and facts. So only exclusively concerns bilateral ties between the two states. It the DPRK attitude toward the introduction of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. 

A Brief Look at the Documents

Because of the fact that the civil intelligence of communist Poland did not have a station in North Korea, from time to time the stations in Japan and China were ordered to write reports concerning Korean affairs.

In the case of the situation was very specific, because an analysis of Hua Guofeng鈥檚 visit to Pyongyang in May 1978 was written by a Polish intelligence officer in Tokyo at the request of the KGB resident. , produced by an intelligence station in Beijing, deals with the simultaneous visits of North Korean and Cambodian delegations to China in the summer of 1978鈥攁pparently to ease any concerns both countries had about the planned signing of Chinese-Japanese treaty.  

On the other hand, Poland鈥檚 military intelligence had representatives in North Korea: the military attach茅 and his subordinate officers, and some officers under the cover of the NNSC.

Several of the documents in this collection are reports written by military attaches during the so called Second Korean War. They do not refer only to North-South tensions () and its consequences for the Korean People鈥檚 Army (), but also mention the DPRK鈥檚 nuclear ambitions ( and ) and North Korea-China relations ( and ). The last document produced by a Polish military attach茅 in Pyongyang () is a record of a conversation between Marshal Matvei Zakharov and Kim Il Sung during Zakharov鈥檚 visit to the DPRK in June 1970. They mainly discussed DPRK-China relations.

China is prominently discussed in many published documents produced not only by the above mentioned military attaches, but also by Poland鈥檚 diplomats. concerns Kim Il Sung鈥檚 visit to Beijing in April 1975. depicts the temporary cooling of DPRK-China relations in late 1980s, mostly because of China鈥檚 openness for contacts with South Korea. And last but not least, describes the North Korean leaderships鈥� opinion about the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown.

Another issue explored in several translated documents is DPRK-USSR relations. and refer to the early 1960s, when mutual relations declined and the Soviets were perceived as 鈥渞evisionists.鈥� describes talks between Kim Il Sung and Soviet officials during Kim鈥檚 visit to USSR in May 1984, when bilateral contacts were definitely much better than two decades earlier.  

As mentioned above, dependence on the USSR also influenced Polish foreign policy. Sometimes this resulted in asking Soviet officials about its assessment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, such as in April 1976 () or February 1984 ().

Two documents provide some information on North Korean contacts with the Middle East in the final period of the Cold War. deals with Yasser Arafat鈥檚 trip to the DPRK in mid-1989 and his wish to strengthen ties with North Korea. comments on Kim Yong-nam鈥檚 visit to Iran and its possible consequences (such as the import of oil) and also cooperation in uranium exploration in North Korea.

Finally I would like to underline, that this is only a fraction of the valuable Polish documents touching upon North Korean affairs. There are many more of them, especially in the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the Cold War, Polish diplomats in Pyongyang as well as officers serving in the NNSC and intelligence officers carefully monitored the situation in North Korea. This resulted in numerous reports and records that are unknown, but relatively easily accessible, to the majority of researchers interested in North Korea.

List of Documents

Document No. 1

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 2

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 3

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 4

[Source: AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 5

[Source: AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 6

[Source: AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 7

[Source: AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 8

[Source: AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 9

[Source: AIPN, 2602/8420. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 10

[Source: AIPN, 2602/8420. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 11

[Source: AIPN, 2602/8901. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 12

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 56/78, w. 6. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 13

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 12/79, w. 1. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 14

[Source: AIPN, 02011/600/D. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 15

[Source: AIPN, 02011/600/D. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 16

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 43/86, w. 2. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 17

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 43/86, w. 2. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 18

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 30/87, w. 5. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 19

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 30/87, w. 5. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 20

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 25/92, w. 4. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 21

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 3/94, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 22

[Source: AMSZ, Department II 25/92, w. 4. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 23

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 3/94, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]

Document No. 24

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 3/94, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Ha艅derek and translated by Jerzy Giebu艂towski.]