乐鱼 体育

On the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, I would like to revisit Stalin鈥檚 and Mao鈥檚 motivations in their management of this conflict.

As revealed by declassified Russian archives, it was Stalin who, by offering Kim Il Sung in late January 1950 the 鈥済reen light鈥� to attack the South, was ultimately responsible for the outbreak of the war. Why did Stalin do so? Opinions of scholars differ.

Was this solely because of Dean Acheson鈥檚 12 January 1950 speech excluding Korea from US western Pacific defense perimeter?  Or was this just because Stalin intended to bog down the United State in a war quagmire in East Asia, while spreading the Chinese Communist experience of seizing political power via armed struggles to other parts of East Asia? If indeed the above were all the reasons, why did Stalin, in late January 1950, suddenly abandon Moscow鈥檚 backing of the Chinese Communist plan of 鈥渓iberating Taiwan,鈥� which he already was prepared to support? And why did he inspire Kim to launch the war in Korea in such a hurry?

To answer these questions, we must remember that Stalin made decisions always to serve the Soviet Union's strategic interests. He would never make a decision solely to promote China鈥檚 interest or to help North Korea.

The key, in my opinion, lay in L眉shun (Port Arthur) and the China Eastern Railway (CER). Both were of critical importance for the Soviet Union鈥檚 access to the Pacific Ocean, a consideration that had long occupied a central position in Russian and Soviet security strategies in the Far East.

Thus it is important to note that Stalin endorsed Kim鈥檚 war plan in the middle of Mao鈥檚 visit to Moscow. At the top of Mao鈥檚 wish list for his Soviet visit was to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, which, Mao hoped, would also allow China to reclaim its full sovereignty over L眉shun and CER.

Upon Mao鈥檚 arrival in Moscow, Stalin initially showed no interest in signing a new treaty with China, in part because he feared that this would deprive Moscow of the privileges to use L眉shun and CER. In early January 1950, Stalin yielded to Mao鈥檚 persistent push and agreed to sign a new treaty. By late January, the negotiations for the details of the treaty had reached a crucial stage. Stalin鈥檚 lieutenants, on January 26, proposed signing the treaty while keeping Soviet privileges of accessing L眉shun and CER, which Mao rejected immediately. As a compromise, Zhou Enlai proposed that China would reclaim L眉shun and CER in three years after treaty鈥檚 signing.

On January 28, Moscow accepted the Chinese proposal 鈥渋n principle,鈥� but added a new clause: the Soviet Union might share the use of L眉shun and CER if either China or the Soviet Union was involved in a war in Asia. The Chinese agreed to this clause.

So, if a war occurred in East Asia, the Soviets would continuously be able to use both L眉shun and CER. When the Korean War broke out, the Soviets indeed kept the rights to use L眉shun. Stalin got what he wanted.

This, in my opinion, was the most important reason why Stalin endorsed Kim鈥檚 plan to attack the South on January 30, 1950. This, most likely, would cause a war to occur in the Far East.

Mao鈥檚 motivations to intervene in Korea were much more complex. He saw China鈥檚 responsibilities for the socialist camp (especially for North Korea). He was enraged that US Seventh Fleet had been sent into the Taiwan Strait. He was very concerned about the safety of China鈥檚 northeastern borders. Last but not least, he wanted to enhance the Sino-Soviet alliance, so as to consolidate the CCP鈥檚 new regime in China.

For Mao, Washington鈥檚 blocking of his plan to 鈥渓iberate Taiwan鈥� meant that a war between China and America had already begun. Before the Inchon landing in September 1950, he thought of sending Chinese troops to Korea, disguised as Korean Peoples鈥� Army units, to help Kim to win the war. This would eliminate the security threats to China鈥檚 northeast while, at the same time, strengthening China鈥檚 position in East Asia and allowing the CCP to concentrate on domestic reconstruction. It was also a low-risk way, from a Chinese perspective, to bring the Korean War to a speedy end. Yet this scheme was blocked by Stalin.

After Inchon, North Korean troops were under siege. If Chinese troops were to enter the war immediately, North Korean morale would be boosted and the UN/US forces would be prevented from crossing the 38th parallel. This, however, was again rejected by Stalin.

By early October, the North Korean resistance had collapsed and the UN/US forces had crossed the 38th parallel. China鈥檚 entry into war might result in a direct confrontation with the United States. Most leaders in Beijing thus had reservations about, or even opposition to, sending troops to Korea.

However, Mao underscored China鈥檚 duty as the leader of Asian revolutions and the need to extinguish the threat to China鈥檚 border security. Further, he counted upon Moscow鈥檚 promise that it would provide China with weapons and air support. Mao invoked all this to persuade other leaders in Beijing to make the decision to enter the Korean War.

Stalin鈥檚 reneging on his promise of Soviet air support, even if it meant giving up North Korea, put Mao in an awkward position. But Mao remained determined to send troops to Korea. He realized that Stalin did not really mean to abandon North Korea. If the Chinese Communists failed to come to the rescue of Kim鈥檚 regime, they would totally lose Stalin's trust, which was crucial for them to consolidate their new regime. Beijing had already made an enemy of Washington; if it were to lose Moscow as an ally, it would have been placed in a most undesirable position. Mao also calculated that if Chinese troops, after entering Korea, could maintain a defensive posture and await Soviet military and air support, then China would be able to reduce the risk of fighting a war with the Americans to the minimum.

All of the above essentially was a psychological contest between Mao and Stalin. History鈥檚 later developments have shown that Mao made a correct decision based upon accurate judgment. China鈥檚 decision to enter the Korean War played a decisive role in convincing Stalin that Mao and his comrades were 鈥済enuine internationalist Communists.鈥� Shortly after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to help defend the Chinese supply lines. Thereafter, Soviet military and economic assistance poured into China, guaranteeing that Chinese logistical needs in Korea would be met while significantly enhancing China鈥檚 overall capacity for domestic economic reconstruction. When Chinese troops successfully drove the enemy forces back to the 38th parallel, North Korea became a security buffer for China. All of this substantially strengthened the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as well as the CCP鈥檚 new regime in China.

However, Mao never forgot Stalin鈥檚 suspicion of the Chinese at so critical and historic a moment. Though the Chinese experience in managing the Korean crisis bridged Sino-Soviet differences for the moment, it sowed the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split a decade later.

(Translated by Wang Yiling and John Payne.)