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Is North Korea鈥檚 Nuclear Breakout Already Here?

Coverage by John Milewski and Matt Starling with photographs by Christopher Cruz

Nuclear nonproliferation expert Robert Litwak鈥檚 latest book, 鈥淧reventing North Korea鈥檚 Nuclear Breakout,鈥� introduces the concept of 鈥渃oercive engagement鈥� among a list of less than perfect options for dealing with the outlier regime鈥檚 growing capacity. As the author observed, during a conversation with New York Times National Security Correspondent David Sanger, the primary choices are to 鈥渂omb, negotiate, or acquiesce鈥� and there are no good options.鈥�

The conversation took place at a March 7, 2017 event co-hosted by the 乐鱼 体育鈥檚 North Korea International Documentation Project, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, and the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.

Key Quotes

Robert Litwak

鈥淣orth Korea, which first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, is now on the verge of a nuclear breakout. Quantitatively by ramping up its warhead numbers, and qualitatively through mastery of warhead miniaturization and long range ballistic missiles.鈥�

鈥淲hen I got into this field, I couldn鈥檛 have conceived of North Korea acquiring a nuclear arsenal approaching half the size of Great Britain鈥檚.鈥�

鈥淭he nuclear issue is embedded in the broader question of North Korean societal evolution. The dilemma is these timelines are not in sync. The nuclear timeline is immediate and urgent, while the prospects for regime change are uncertain. We can鈥檛 wait for an indeterminate regime change timeline to play out while North Korea acquires a breakout capability.鈥�

鈥淭he Iran nuclear deal was precisely that, a deal and not a bargain. The Iran nuclear deal was transactional and not transformational.鈥�

"Now, China faces a hard choice. China can either cling to their talking point, 鈥淚t鈥檚 America鈥檚 problem. Sort it out with North Korea,鈥� or they can recognize their shared interest with the United States in preventing a North Korea nuclear breakout by applying meaningful pressure on Pyongyang to accept the freeze."

"North Korea is arguably 'Pakistan 2000, or Pakistan lite,' and what the freeze proposal intends to accomplish is to prevent North Korea from getting to 'Pakistan heavy.' "

"Squeezing North Korea harder has not been possible because China won鈥檛 cooperate with a strategy they view as running the risk of regime collapse."

David Sanger

鈥淭he Obama administration thought about negotiating a North Korean nuclear freeze as well and they rejected it for two reasons. First, it would acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. Second, North Korea has a history of breaking out of these agreements. If anything, you are kicking the can down the road as Obama noted his four previous successors had done.鈥�

鈥淎ll the presidential candidates said the solution to the North Korea problem was through China. If China was going to solve this problem, they would have solved it sometime in the last ten years.鈥�

"North Korea strikes me as different. They have a complete willingness to put up with extreme deprivation for their people."

Q & A with David Sanger

Following the book launch, 乐鱼 体育 NOW host and managing editor John Milewski spoke with moderator David Sanger about Litwak鈥檚 book and the notion of a North Korean 鈥渂reakout.鈥�

MILEWSKI 鈥� What constitutes a 鈥渘uclear breakout鈥� and how close is North Korea to achieving one?

SANGER 鈥� I think we鈥檙e past breakout because we鈥檙e at the point where we think they鈥檝e got 12 weapons and can get to 20 or so. At that moment, I think the old classifications of breakout don鈥檛 really make any difference. 

MILEWSKI 鈥� Do you think Rob Litwak鈥檚 idea of 鈥渃oercive engagement鈥� is a viable option?

SANGER 鈥� It is, but it requires getting all of the players onto the same element of coercion. And what we鈥檝e seen so far is that the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans and the U.S. are not in sync.

MILEWSKI 鈥� How quickly can this situation come to a head?

SANGER 鈥� That鈥檚 a really hard question to know. We would have guessed at various other moments that it would come to a head and frequently the North Koreans pull back from the brink because they begin to worry about regime survival. So that鈥檚 where the pressure might actually be.