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Despite their many differences, the U.S. and Russia do (or at least in Washington鈥檚 view, should) have common interests regarding certain countries of concern. These include China, Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan. Post-Cold War American presidents have, at various times, hoped that such shared concern might lead to improved Russian-American cooperation on these challenges, and eventually lead to an overall improved Russian-American relationship.[1] Russia鈥檚 Vladimir Putin, though, has seldom shown much interest in cooperating with the U.S. against any other country. Perhaps Putin did not share America鈥檚 assessment of these countries as constituting quite the threat to Russia as Washington believed, then or now. Yet even when Putin does recognize the very real risks that these nations pose, his preferred policy is not to cooperate with the U.S., but rather to pursue a policy of deflection (or buck-passing) that leaves Russia largely aloof from tensions between the U.S. and those states which may pose concerns for Russia as well.

With China鈥檚 large population, growing economic and military strength, and increasingly assertive leadership, it is not surprising that the U.S. and many of its allies have become wary of China. Many analysts in the West consider that Russia (with its much smaller population, weaker economy, geographical proximity to China, and history of conflict with it) should be even more worried about the rise of China than the U.S. is. As Isaac Stone Fish wrote in The Washington Post this past May, 鈥淢oscow has more to fear from Beijing than Washington.鈥�[2] Some (including former President Trump, among others) have even hoped that Russia and America would 鈥渏oin forces鈥� against China.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin, though, describes China as Russia鈥檚 strategic partner. In June 2021, Putin proclaimed that, 鈥淲e do not believe that China is a threat to us. China is a friendly nation. It has not declared us an enemy as the United States has done.鈥�[4]

Similarly, the U.S. and several of its Middle Eastern allies are extremely concerned about Iran and how it might behave should it obtain nuclear weapons. From an American viewpoint, Moscow should also be worried about the possibility of a nuclear Iran. Moscow and Tehran, though, have maintained a close partnership despite not just whatever concern Moscow may have about this, but several ongoing Russian-Iranian differences (including over Syria and over Moscow鈥檚 close ties to Iran鈥檚 Israeli and Arab Gulf adversaries).[5]  If U.S.-led efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons should ultimately succeed, Moscow would benefit anyway鈥攁ll while avoiding worsening Russian-Iranian relations that could well occur if Moscow were to join Washington in pressuring Tehran. And if U.S.-led efforts do not succeed and Iran does obtain nuclear weapons, Moscow will definitely prefer that Tehran be at odds with the U.S. and not with Russia.

In addition, the behavior of nuclear-armed North Korea should be of concern to all its neighbors, including Russia. Putin, though, has largely stayed out of the diplomatic fray with regard to Pyongyang. He has long been unwilling to join in U.S.-led efforts to pressure North Korea into renouncing nuclear weapons, as any such Russian effort may only succeed in eliciting North Korean hostility toward Russia as well as toward the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.[6]

In contrast to this pattern, Putin was initially supportive of the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan that overthrew the Taliban regime which had provided safe haven not just to Al Qaeda, but also to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Moscow later helped the U.S. establish and sustain the 鈥淣orthern Distribution Network鈥濃�攁 supply route for U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan through Russia and Central Asia (which provided Moscow with substantial transit income) that allowed Washington to reduce its dependence on supply routes via Pakistan (which was covertly supporting the Taliban at the same time).[7] Moscow, though, also began talking to and seeking improved ties with the Taliban beginning in 2009.[8] The Taliban鈥檚 2021 return to power could spell the renewal of the threats emanating from Afghanistan to Russian-backed governments in Central Asia鈥攕omething that the U.S. does not want to see either. But unlike the U.S. and other Western governments, which have expressed great concern about the Taliban and threatened it with international isolation, Russia has signaled its willingness to cooperate with the new government.[9]

In all these cases, Moscow has declined to join with Washington in what many Western analysts see as common threats to both Russia and the U.S. emanating from China, Iran, North Korea, and (more recently) the Taliban. But while the Kremlin may understand the various risks to Russia coming from these nations, Putin prefers to let the U.S. and some of its allies bear the burden of containing them. In effect, Russia prefers 鈥渇ree rides鈥� to collaboration with the United States.

Putin, then, really may be worried (as Washington thinks he should be) about China鈥檚 growing strength; Iran鈥檚 belligerent behavior toward Israel and Gulf Arab states that Moscow has improved ties with; the erratic and threatening behavior of North Korea; and the possibility that the Taliban will once again provide safe haven to groups seeking the downfall of Central Asia鈥檚 pro-Russian regimes. It is doubtful, though, that Moscow would openly work with the U.S. against any of these risks today鈥攏ot when it can benefit from U.S. efforts to contain these actors. In other words: even though a state or movement poses a threat both to Russia and the U.S., Putin sees Russia as better off if the U.S. and its allies bear the burden of responding to these common threats while allowing Russia to avoid doing so. Russia not only stays out of the fray while the U.S. acts to contain the common threat, it also benefits from Washington鈥檚 diminished capacity to focus on its differences with Moscow.

Putin himself seemed to acknowledge this 鈥渄eflection doctrine鈥� at the June 2019 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In response to a question about Russia鈥檚 place in the growing U.S.-China tariff war, Putin answered, 鈥淭here is a good Chinese proverb that says 鈥榳hen tigers fight in the valley, the smart monkey sits aside and waits to see who wins.鈥欌��[10] With President Xi alongside him on the platform for this occasion, Putin went on to soften his statement by noting that, 鈥渋f trends like today鈥檚 persist, it will be bad for everyone.鈥�[11] Still, the fact that Putin himself raised the idea that Russia preferred to remain aloof from U.S.-Chinese competition was telling.

Putin clearly pursues a policy of deflection with regard to Iran in Syria. Their ongoing joint efforts to shore up the Assad regime proved a success.  Now, though, Moscow and Tehran are increasingly in competition with each other for influence in Damascus as well as for reconstruction contracts and other economic benefits.[12] In addition, Putin does not wish to see Iran grow so powerful in Syria that it spoils Moscow鈥檚 highly cooperative and profitable relations with America鈥檚 anti-Iranian allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. But instead of confronting Iran directly over its behavior, Moscow has deflected by turning a blind eye to Israeli strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria[13] while pursuing a largely neutral policy toward Yemen, where Iran is backing one party in the conflict there and Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting others.[14] By the same logic, it makes sense for Russia not to get involved in U.S.-led efforts aimed at getting Iran to agree to tighter restrictions on its nuclear and other military programs[15]. While Russia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, it prefers not to risk its own relations with Iran by joining the U.S. in pressuring Iran on this issue.  Moscow, of course, did formally support the Iranian nuclear accord (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) because this was something Tehran itself sought, but as former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif revealed, Moscow collaborated with Iran鈥檚 hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in attempting to sabotage the agreement.[16]

The Trump administration pursued a vision of a U.S.-North Korean rapprochement鈥攐ne that would result in Pyongyang renouncing nuclear weapons to the benefit of all other countries (including Russia). Yet at the time Moscow (along with Beijing) seemed more worried about the possibility of that process leading to a Korean unification in which the South absorbs the North (much like West Germany absorbed East Germany during the 1990 German reunification), and a united Korea allied with the U.S.[17] Moscow may very well have breathed a sigh of relief when Trump鈥檚 efforts came to nothing.

Similarly, Moscow may have feared that the U.S.-Taliban agreement for the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan might mean the return of the pre-9/11 situation, in which Russia largely bore the main burden of supporting anti-Taliban forces to counter the Taliban-backed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from threatening pro-Russian regimes in neighboring Central Asia.[18] Moscow鈥檚 attempt to establish good relations with the new Taliban government now may be an attempt to persuade the Taliban not to support such forces again, and instead keep the Taliban focused on its differences with Washington.

Of course, efforts at deflecting the attention of two adversaries away from oneself and toward each other can backfire. As Sean McMeekin observed in his new book, Stalin鈥檚 War: A New History of World War II, Stalin believed that the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 would deflect Hitler鈥檚 attention away from the Soviet Union and toward the West. His hopes that there would be a stalemate between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other, though, did not turn out as he anticipated.[19] Instead, after Germany overran France and the Low Countries and British forces withdrew from the Continent in 1940, Hitler turned his attention toward the Soviet Union, invading it in 1941.

Putin, it should be noted, has stoutly defended Moscow鈥檚 signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.[20] But pursuing a policy of deflection in the hopes that one鈥檚 adversaries will keep each other in check runs the risk, as Stalin discovered in 1941, of failing should one side defeat or weaken the other, thereby increasing the potential threat to oneself. If, for example, China should one day grow sufficiently powerful to dissuade the U.S. from countering Chinese aggression in the South China Sea or against Taiwan, Russia should not expect much practical or diplomatic assistance from America or any of its allies if a triumphant Beijing should then turn its attention to regaining Chinese territory lost to the Tsars. Beijing hinted at precisely this claim last year on the 160^th anniversary of the founding of Vladivostok. On this occasion, as the Atlantic Council鈥檚 John Herbst observed, 鈥渟tate-owned China Global Television Network [noted] that Vladivostok sits on land ceded by the 鈥榰nequal Treaty of Beijing鈥� and that Haishenwai was the Chinese city replaced by Vladivostok.鈥�[21] Moscow鈥檚 possession of nuclear weapons might be seen as a guarantee against any such claims, but when it comes right down to it: Would the Kremlin risk Moscow for the sake of Vladivostok?

It is understandable, then, why Moscow may see it as being more prudent to risk what it regards as the unlikely possibility that China will become much stronger than America in the future than to encounter the certainty of Beijing鈥檚 wrath now if Moscow joined the U.S. in a joint effort to reign in Beijing. Likewise, any Russian effort to push Iran out of Syria in cooperation with America, Israel, and the Gulf Arabs could backfire and result in Iran and its Hezbollah allies making it too hot for Russian forces to remain in Syria. A vigorous Russian stance against a nuclear-capable North Korea might only result in Pyongyang threatening Russia along with the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. Finally, a strong Russian stance against the Taliban might backfire and result in renewed Taliban support for Central Asian jihadists.

Indeed, to a suspicious mind like Putin鈥檚, any U.S. attempt to enlist Moscow in a joint effort to contain a common adversary is more likely to be an American ploy to deflect that adversary鈥檚 animosity away from the U.S. and toward Russia. Thus, while allying against a common adversary may seem a logical course of action to analysts and policymakers in Washington, deflecting a common adversary鈥檚 attention toward the U.S., Russia鈥檚 鈥渕ain adversary,鈥� likely seems the more sensible path to Putin.

[1] On how the hopes of post-Cold War administrations for improved U.S.-Russian relations based on Washington鈥檚 view of their common interests were successively dashed, see Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S. Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), all; and Angela E. Stent, Putin鈥檚 World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest, rev. ed. (New York: Twelve, 2020), pp. 293-376.

[2] Isaac Stone Fish, 鈥淲hy Does Everyone Assume that Russia and China Are Friends?鈥� Washington Post, May 26, 2021, .

[3] 鈥淭rump Wants Putin To 'Join Forces' On China, Former Adviser Says,鈥� Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 28, 2020, ; and Maria Siow, 鈥淐ould Russia Side with the US and India against China?鈥� South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020, .

[4] 鈥淧utin Slams Attempts to Sour Russia-China Relations,鈥� Xinhua, June 15, 2021, .

[5] Ghoncheh Tazmini, 鈥淩ussian-Iranian Relations: Impact on Persian Gulf Interests,鈥� in Nikolay Kozhanov, ed., Russia鈥檚 Relations with the GCC and Iran (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 177-203.

[6] Chris Miller, 鈥淲hy Isn鈥檛 Russia Worried About Kim Jong Un鈥檚 Nukes?鈥� Foreign Policy, July 17, 2017, ; Fred Weir, 鈥淲hy Trump's Efforts on North Korea Aren't Apt to Win over Putin,鈥� Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 2017, .

[7] Stent, The Limits of Partnership, pp. 229-32.

[8] Nurlan Aliyev, 鈥淗ow Russia Views Afghanistan Today,鈥� War on the Rocks, October 19, 2020, .

[9] Felix Light and Pjotr Sauer, 鈥淎s Chaos Engulfs Kabul, Russia Says It鈥檚 Ready to Work With the Taliban,鈥� The Moscow Times, August 19, 2021, .

[10] 鈥淒irect Line with Vladimir Putin,鈥� President of Russia website, June 7, 2019, .

[11] Ibid.

[12] Sarah Dadouch, 鈥淎fter Backing Assad, Iran and Russia Compete for Influence and Spoils of War,鈥� Washington Post, May 20, 2021, .

[13] Mark N. Katz, 鈥淚ran-Syria Air Defense Pact Could Cause Russian-Iranian Friction,鈥� Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020, .

[14] Kirill Semenov, 鈥淩ussia Looks for Way Back into Yemen,鈥� Al-Monitor, June 11, 2021, .

[15] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has called for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to be restored, not revised. 鈥淟avrov Says West Using JCPOA to Impose More Commitments on Iran,鈥� TASS, July 2, 2021, .

[16] Mark N. Katz, 鈥淩ussia Secretly Feared the Iran Nuclear Deal. Here鈥檚 Why,鈥� Atlantic Council, April 28, 2021, .

[17] 鈥淕lobal Perspectives: North Korean-Russian Relations,鈥� 乐鱼 体育, May 19, 2021, /event/global-perspectives-north-korean-russian-relations .

[18] Mark N. Katz, 鈥淲hy Is Moscow Paying the Taliban to Kill Americans?鈥� Responsible Statecraft, June 30, 2020, .

[19] Sean McMeekin, Stalin鈥檚 War: A New History of World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2021), pp.86-87, 275-292.

[20] Vladimir Putin, 鈥淭he Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II,鈥� The National Interest, June 18, 2020, .

[21] John Herbst, 鈥淭he Coming Russian-Chinese Clash,鈥� The National Interest, August 21, 2020, .